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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Katy Hayward 
Abstract 
This article introduces this volume by constructing a model for analysing 
political discourse as an instrument of conflict and peace, drawing on 
evidence from the Northern Ireland case. It identifies three processes, or 
stages, in a peace process in which political discourse can play a unique and 
crucial role: (i) the construction of a (conceptual) framework within which 
negotiations can take place, (ii) the facilitation of agreement between 
moderate and extreme positions, and (iii) the forging of common ground. 
The motivating thesis of this research is that discourse analysis is a vital 
resource for deepening our knowledge of why, how and when violence can 
erupt and peace can be built. 
 
Introduction 
 
If politics is about bargaining, persuasion, communication and 
cooperation, it is one of the most important uses of discourse in the social 
world. These discursive features of political activity are particularly fraught 
in a context of societal division. This is not least because a conflict situation 
confers even greater political weight on ideology and identity (both 
discursively constructed). Similarly, political language plays a crucial role in 
the transition out of conflict, as implied by the maxim attributed to Churchill: 
“jaw-jaw is always better than war-war”. Language can support and promote 
war just as it can be used to support and promote peace (Schäffner and 
Wenden, 1999).  
This has long been recognised in the case of Northern Ireland. It was 
evident during the conflict, as seen in the decision by Irish government in 
1971 and the British government in 1988 to impose broadcasting bans on 
Sinn Féin (amongst other groupings associated in some way with 
paramilitary activity) until the IRA ceasefire in 1994. And from the early 
1990s onwards, in a period of political sensitivity surrounding cautious 
negotiations, top-level recognition of the power of political discourse was 
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exemplified in the care taken by the two governments to issue joint 
statements on Northern Ireland, such as the “Downing Street Declaration” 
made by Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds on 15 
December 1993 (HMSO, 1993).  
With regard to the specific matter of conflict transformation,
1
 the 
fundamental assumption in most peace processes is that political debate and 
dialogue needs to replace violence as the expression of dissent and 
difference. This view is articulated by the former Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, Peter Hain (2007), in his assessment of the model of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. He claims that key actors need, “to prevent 
violence filling the vacuum left by the absence of political engagement”. 
Such political engagement, he argues, centres on “inclusive dialogue at every 
level, wherever there is a negotiable objective”. Conflict transformation, he 
concludes, therefore requires “the taking of risks to sustain that dialogue and 
to underpin political progress”. Although Hain is referring here to secret 
negotiations as much as to public statements, the principle that the 
communication of political views is an alternative to conflict is integral, he 
suggests, to the approach taken to the Northern Ireland peace process by the 
British and Irish governments and top-level third parties. 
The purpose of this article (and this special issue as a whole) is to 
examine the transformative potential of political discourse in contexts of 
(violent) political division and post-conflict agreement. In doing so, it draws 
upon the research presented in this special issue. This field work on various 
dimensions of – and parties to – the conflict and peace process in Northern 
Ireland has been conducted by scholars from a range of disciplines with 
specific consideration of the role of political discourse. The significance of 
political discourse in such an arena relates to the fact that it may be used to 
legitimise, accompany, disguise or substitute for change in political activity 
and policy. These various possibilities point directly to what is 
simultaneously the greatest strength and the greatest difficulty of discourse 
as a topic of study: its enigmatic relationship with practice and context. In 
fact, the three elements of language, practice and context are inseparable (see 
Fairclough, 2001, below). I contend that analysis of discourse can, therefore, 
provide some insight into the processes involved in the transition from 
conflict to peace. In the case of Northern Ireland, this has meant the creation 
of a socio-political environment through negotiation and political agreement 
that has enabled the minimisation of direct sectarian violence. As with most 
of the contributors in this special issue, I am concerned here not so much 
with the linguistic (de)construction of particular texts but rather broader 
analysis of the instrumental use of discourse by key political players. 
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Political Discourse: Theory and Practice 
 
According to Fairclough (2001), the term “discourse” refers to each of 
three levels of the social world – language/text, practice/interaction and 
context – and, importantly, the connections between them (see Figure 1 
below, source: Fairclough, 2001, p. 21).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Discourse as text, interaction and context 
 
The two elements in Figure 1 that I wish to elaborate in relation to the 
subject of this article relate to the role of discourse as text and as interaction. 
First, the text of political discourse (be it presented in a speech, interview or 
newspaper report) embodies processes of production and interpretation of 
ideas as well as influencing the interaction that shapes these processes. 
Secondly, what is termed here “interaction” reflects as well as affects wider 
conditions for the production and interpretation of ideas. When I transfer this 
model to a “political” arena (as used by the type of party and community 
actors examined in the research presented in this special issue), it is possible 
Text 
Process of production 
Process of interpretation 
Interaction 
Context 
Social conditions of production 
Social conditions of interpretation 
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to identify two crucial dimensions in the role of political discourse that are of 
relevance to the issue of conflict and its transformation. These discursive 
dynamics of political and social change may be further elaborated in relation 
to what I here term “power” and “principle” These core elements can 
determine the effectiveness and endurance of political discourse in a context 
of conflict (transformation). 
 
Power: Politics as Discursive Action 
 
Politics affects the way people think about, communicate regarding, 
and act in relation to social conditions and facts. For this reason, Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) designated all social systems to be inherently political 
constructions. More particularly, as Howarth (1998, p. 275) claims, “political 
practices serve to constitute (and undermine) discourses and the identities 
they form”. The relationship between the changing political world and the 
language used to describe and appraise it, or between conception and action, 
is close and crucial (Skinner, 1989, p. 6). The changing relationships of 
power that characterise the transition from conflict to peace (or vice versa) 
are, to a degree, the manifestation of the discourses of political actors. I note 
in particular that the subject (speaker of the text, in this case usually a 
politician) seeks to manipulate the potential of the discursive text to affect 
the other two realms of practice and context as much as to reflect them.  
It is accepted that political constitutions, laws and norms reflect 
dominant discourses, namely the language/ideology of those in society who 
hold the reins of structural power (ref. Foucault, 1972; Bourdieu, 1991). The 
greater the actor‟s power, or capacity to change the socio-political and 
structural environment, the more the actor‟s discourse is likely to affect the 
wider context for public interaction. Put differently, the power of an actor is 
related to the strength of the effect of a text of his/her words on individual or 
group behaviour and experience. This is most obvious when considering 
official discourses (i.e. the language used by actors as representatives of the 
government or state), as has been done by Catherine O‟Donnell and Aaron 
Edwards in this volume in relation to the Irish and British governments 
respectively. By having the capacity to shape the rules governing the 
production and reception of discourse in the public sphere, such actors are 
able to manage the interpretation (and, in effect, the meaning) of political 
discourses by a wide range of actors (for analysis of this effect, see Haidar 
and Rodriguez, 1999). Even if power is not achieved democratically (through 
persuasion to vote a certain way), it is still achieved through discourse to a 
degree in that it is used to persuade individuals to act a certain way 
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(including violently) for a particular end. Analyses of the discourses of 
political parties, community representatives and former paramilitaries in 
Northern Ireland contained in this special issue reveal the importance of the 
concept of power in discourse of a range of groups directly involved in 
conflict and its transformation. 
 
 
 
Principle: Discourse as Political Action 
 
Discourse is “socially constitutive” (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 8). It 
generates and produces social conditions, maintains, legitimates, and 
reproduces them. On account of this, Ball et al. (1989, p. 2) have designated 
conceptual change to be “a species of political innovation”. Because 
conceptual change attends any reconstitution of the political world, political 
change and conceptual change must be understood as one complex and 
interrelated process (Farr, 1989, p. 30-32). Moreover, a key element of 
discourse theory is the notion that actors/agents and systems/structures in the 
social and political realm “undergo constant historical and social change” 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 6). Discourse is central to this process of 
change and, importantly, to the impression of stability through its role in 
bringing together concepts, interaction and context. There needs to be 
movement in all three realms for real change to take place. However, again, 
this depends on the power and influence of the speaker of the text and, 
crucially, its reporting in the public realm. The role of the media, particularly 
local printed media, in Northern Ireland is acknowledged throughout this 
volume.  
The closer a text appears to relate to/address individual citizens‟ 
experience of social conditions and their interpretation of them, the more 
influence it will have. This is because of the congruity (as noted above) 
between dynamics of interpretation and production. More broadly, there 
needs to be a certain consistency and logic in the relationship between text, 
practice and context as put forward by the speaker. This can be “explained” 
through the ideology maintained by political parties (among other 
communal/elite actors) on behalf of particular groups. Wenden and Schäffner 
(1999, p. xx) claim that,  “ideologies shape group and individual attitudes 
which, communicated in discourse and determining other social practices, 
can either facilitate or hinder the achievement of peace”. In their influential 
work on Language and Peace, Schäffner and Wenden (1999) work with a 
definition of “peace” as the absence of structural violence. This is necessary 
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because, they note, other forms of violence can continue through 
discriminatory practices, institutions and ideologies (Wenden and Schäffner, 
1999: xxii). Whilst O‟Donnell and I, as co-editors of this volume, also 
acknowledge that discourse (in its three forms of text, practice and context) 
can perpetuate structural violence to an even greater extent than direct 
violence, our evidence-based assessment of the role of discourse in the case 
study of Northern Ireland would lead us to a necessarily delimited definition 
of “peace”. This is not least because we are as interested in what might be 
termed the “positive” as well as the “negative” effects of political discourse 
in the transition from conflict. This is particularly evident regarding the role 
of discourse as a medium for upholding the ideology or principles of a 
particular group. Such principles help to affirm the historical integrity of 
their group, to rationalise the stance taken by group leaders in response to the 
present situation, and to imagine the ideal position of the group in the future. 
This is closely related to the effect of political discourse on socio-political 
change, which is a theme that underlies our analysis on the transition from 
conflict to peace. 
 
Political Discourse in Northern Ireland 
 
In a situation of conflict or ineffectual democracy the lack of political 
engagement (as mentioned by former Secretary of State Hain in the above 
quotation) means that the ability of political discourse to effect change – or 
even representation – in political interaction and the political landscape is 
stymied.
2
 In Northern Ireland, the lack of real political power held by local 
politicians together with lack of representation (and potential for holding 
power) in the UK parliament embedded inequality at the macro level for all 
in Northern Ireland for much of the duration of the Troubles. The absence of 
a forum via which political discourse could be directly effectual has 
implications for its contents (“source domain”), for what it purports to be 
describing (“target domain”) and the connection between the two (Charteris-
Black, 2005, p. 2).  
Analysis of political discourse in such a situation in Northern Ireland 
here is intended to offer an insight into way in which political actors and core 
community leaders (in this case those representing loyalism [Orange Order] 
and republicanism [former IRA prisoners]) managed and legitimated the 
transition from conflict to peaceful agreement. The “agreement” referred to 
here is actually two documents, eight years apart: that between the political 
parties in April 1998 in the Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement (which was 
opposed by the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP]) and the most significant 
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amendment to it since, in October 2006, the St Andrews Agreement (which 
centred on agreement between Sinn Féin and the DUP). Within Northern 
Ireland, the 1998 and 2006 Agreements have been carefully presented so as 
not imply radical change to the ideologies and goals of the parties 
concerned.
3
 The key to their success has been being able to place moves 
made as tactical or as pragmatic: always in line with the interests of one‟s 
own group. This has been achieved in no small part through political 
discourse, as examined in detail in the articles contained in this volume. 
 
 
Synopsis of this Special Issue  
 
The collection begins with Sissel Rosland‟s analysis of competing 
political discourses about “legitimacy” in the context of the early 1970s. Her 
research may be seen to reaffirm Burton‟s (1978) analysis of the situation in 
Belfast at the start of the Troubles.  Conflicting interpretations of how power 
is made manifest were, according to Burton, at the heart of the spiralling 
conflict itself. Rosland elaborates this theme in her article here, by analysing 
difference between political discourses within Northern Ireland at the time. 
Unionists, she argues, saw power as being conferred by majority rule and 
through state sanction. Nationalists, however, related questions of power to 
“universalist” principles of human rights and equal citizenship, principles 
which extended far beyond the remit of the Northern Ireland parliament or, 
indeed, the United Kingdom. Rosland here uses the subject of internment – 
and the themes of “law”, “democracy” and “violence” connected to it – to 
illustrate conflicting interpretations of power and legitimacy in Northern 
Ireland in the 1970s. Such ideological conflict was exacerbated by a growing 
emphasis by political actors on ethno-national or religious identity. Such 
discourses are particularly difficult to address and debate in the traditional 
forums for democratic dialogue, even if such forums are in place and 
effective, which they certainly were not in Northern Ireland at this time. 
Demands were therefore made through the political discourses of various 
“players” in the conflict, both party and paramilitary, to actors and 
institutions outside Northern Ireland, while within Northern Ireland the same 
groups used political discourse to define themselves against each other. 
 The two most important recipients of these demands were the Irish 
and British governments. Each was under pressure to act in response to the 
conflict not only in practical terms but also as a result of its ideological 
association with the discourses of power and principle at conflict within 
Northern Ireland. Catherine O‟Donnell‟s article here examines the discourse 
Role of Political Discourse In Conflict Transformation 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 8 - 
 
of Irish political parties south of the border during the Troubles and the peace 
process. She shows that as well as sharing a common concern to prevent the 
spread of republican upheaval into the Irish state, the mainstream political 
parties in the south came to articulate a common discourse which balanced 
the ideal of Irish reunification with the pragmatic acceptance of Northern 
Ireland‟s inclusion within the United Kingdom. Aaron Edwards also looks at 
the discourse of mainstream political parties outside Northern Ireland, in this 
case that of Tony Blair‟s New Labour party. Edwards shows the way in 
which the discourse of this party regarding Northern Ireland had to be quite 
dramatically moderated on its accession to government in 1997. As with 
O‟Donnell (both in this volume and elsewhere [2007]) and Hayward‟s 
(2008) analysis of the discourse of Fianna Fáil as the largest Irish political 
party, Edwards shows that political discourse of the British Labour Party 
played a crucial role in modifying certain ideological principles in order to 
facilitate the peace process in Northern Ireland and to garner public and party 
support for it.  
 Laura Filardo-Llamas, as the linguistics expert among the 
contributors to this volume, has performed the difficult task of comparing in 
detail specific discursive texts put forward by each of the main political 
parties in Northern Ireland in immediate response to the Good Friday 
(Belfast) Agreement of 1998, namely the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin as nationalist/republican parties and the Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) and the DUP as unionist/loyalist parties. The latter of 
these was the only party which refused to participate in the final negotiations 
of, and Executive arising from, the 1998 Agreement. By analysing texts 
spoken by the leaders of these four parties (John Hume, Gerry Adams, David 
Trimble and Ian Paisley respectively), Filardo manages to include a 
discussion of the importance of personalities in the peace process in Northern 
Ireland. This is no more evident than in the case of John Hume who, as Peter 
McLoughlin argues in this volume, was a lynchpin in the peace process. 
Hume‟s importance was not because some supporters of his party had to be 
convinced of the power of the “ballot box” (as was the task for Gerry 
Adams) or because his was the largest party in Northern Ireland (as was the 
case for David Trimble) or because his party was capable of amplifying and 
building on underlying scepticism of the peace process (as Paisley‟s DUP 
did between the Agreements of 1998 and 2006). Instead, the importance of 
Hume‟s role centred on his use of political discourse to conceptualise a way 
forward for negotiations between the two governments and political parties 
across the spectrum in Northern Ireland. As McLoughlin‟s article elaborates, 
concepts that proved to be crucial to the 1998 Agreement (without which the 
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2006 St Andrews Agreement, which this time included the DUP, would not 
have been possible) originated in the language of the SDLP leader – so-
called “Humespeak”.  
The change in the positioning of the DUP between the 1998 Agreement 
and the 2006 Agreements is one of the most interesting elements of the long 
walk to peace in Northern Ireland. The article by Amber Rankin and Gladys 
Ganiel in this volume shows just quite how extraordinary this change has 
been by exploring the theme of paramilitary violence in DUP discourses that 
lambasted the 1998 Agreement and opposing parties (especially the UUP) 
for their participation in it. Just as Filardo‟s article shows that ambiguity – 
and room for interpretation by the various parties – was crucial to the 
acceptance of the 1998 Agreement, so Rankin and Ganiel show that the 
DUP‟s predominant role in the 2006 St Andrews Agreement (and the new 
power-sharing Executive established as a result in May 2007) necessitated 
that such issues as paramilitary violence be downplayed in contemporary 
DUP political discourse.  
The final two articles in this volume address the role of political 
discourse outside of the realm of government or political parties in Northern 
Ireland throughout the peace process. Both articles use large-scale fieldwork 
using survey and interview data to analyse attitudes and discourses within 
two influential groupings in loyalism and republicanism (the Orange Order 
and former IRA prisoners respectively). These two particular groups have 
proven to be significant in the caution and decisions exercised by political 
parties in relation to the peace process. James McAuley and Jon Tonge‟s 
article analyses the membership of the Orange Order, which has been an 
important constituency of support for both mainstream unionist parties. 
Indeed, much of the DUP discourse analysed by Rankin and Ganiel may be 
interpreted in the light of that party‟s attempt to attract the support of Orange 
Order members away from the moderate UUP. McAuley and Tonge 
conclude that the maintenance of the traditional elements of Orange 
discourses, much of which centre on Protestantism, and clear positions 
regarding cultural symbols and practices, such as Orange Parades, is seen by 
members as crucial to the endurance of this community and, thereby, the 
constitutional link with Great Britain.  
Tonge and McAuley also participated, together with Peter Shirlow, in a 
major project examining discursive and identity change within the republican 
community since the peace process in Northern Ireland. The article by 
Shirlow, Tonge and McAuley in this volume considers the question – one 
close to the heart of many unionist politicians – of the extent to which 
republican ideology has essentially changed since the 1998 Agreement. Their 
Role of Political Discourse In Conflict Transformation 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 10 - 
 
analysis of the discourse of former IRA prisoners shows that, similarly to 
their loyalist counterparts, these actors do not conceive republican ideology 
to have been compromised or weakened by the peace process. Rather, they 
assert that the “other side” is the one that has moved to facilitate agreement. 
Moreover, they consider it vital that republican principles be maintained 
through in the new political environment of Northern Ireland, from the 
highest levels of Sinn Féin‟s sharing of power in the Executive to the ground 
level of cross-community interaction. 
 What this collection of articles on this case study encapsulates, 
therefore, is the fact that the greatest power of political discourse lies in its 
ability to be interpreted in very different ways at different levels. Analysts 
such as ourselves may be able to show critical junctures at which the uses of 
particular terms altered, or to show different themes in the language used by 
key players in the course of the conflict and peace process. Certainly, hints of 
change or compromise in the discourses of parties to a conflict are what third 
parties, elite facilitators of negotiations and, indeed, opposing parties wish to 
hear in a peace process. However, what gives these players power and 
relevance is their ability to convince their wider base of support that they are 
bringing the exercise of power closer to home, that they are remaining true to 
their principles and making progress towards a shared goal. I will now 
outline three categories for analysing these apparently contradictory 
dynamics of political discourse as an instrument of conflict and peace. 
 
 
The Role of Political Discourse: A Framework for Analysis 
 
In order to set a context for the elaboration of these case studies that 
encapsulates the enduring elements in the connection between political 
discourse and socio-political change – that is to say, power and principle – 
this article works from four core propositions: 
1. Political discourse offers insight into blend of ideology and practice 
and into the wider (socio-political) context 
2. Change in political discourse goes hand in hand with change in 
political practice and environment 
3. Conflict transformation in a divided society requires change in 
political discourse and its context (the two are inseparable) 
4. Discursive difference (and the environment for this) is as important 
for peace as shared discourse 
From these propositions, the hypothesis put forward in this article is 
that political discourse can perform a unique and crucial role as an 
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instrument of conflict transformation in relation to three processes: (i) the 
construction of a (conceptual) framework within which negotiations can take 
place, (ii) the facilitation of agreement between moderate and extreme 
positions, and (iii) the forging of common ground (for discourse and 
interaction). Each of these will be considered in turn, looking at the 
particular role of political discourse with regard to the process, examples 
from Northern Ireland, and lessons that can be taken for wider analysis of 
political discourse and conflict transformation.  
 
 
Framing Negotiations 
 
Political discourse can affect the construction of a (conceptual) 
framework within which negotiations can take place in three main ways. 
First, political discourse on power can be used to justify a new course of 
action by the party concerned that is considered necessary preparation for the 
negotiations to follow. In this sense, justification by political actors for the 
use of the power and responsibility that their supporters have given them is 
tested frequently and over a long period of time to ascertain the 
trustworthiness of the leaders at the negotiating table. For similar reasons, 
when political actors step into the realm of preparing for negotiations with 
the “other”, discourses of principle are needed to reassure their supporters of 
their integrity. This integrity would mean that they uphold principles 
founded on the essential nature and shared ideology of the group in question. 
Related to this, political discourse on what the actors see as opportunities for 
progress must make consistency with both past achievements and future 
ideals apparent.  
 
Experience in Northern Ireland 
 
In Northern Ireland, given the role of the grandest questions of national 
identity and state legitimacy in exacerbating the conflict, the conceptual 
framework for negotiations involved the discourses on power that centred on 
the reconfiguration of arrangements for constitutional and territorial 
representation in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland. As O‟Donnell 
describes in this volume, by the early 1990s, there was broad cross-party 
consensus among southern Irish parties regarding the necessity of co-
operation with the British government, recognition of the legitimacy of 
British governance over Northern Ireland, and support for inclusive multi-
party negotiations. She also shows that consensus existed among Irish 
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political parties regarding discourses of principle, namely that the goal of 
Irish reunification was unimpeachable as a political ideal but almost 
inconceivable as a political goal. This contrasted with the rather fluid 
interpretations in British politics regarding principles for addressing the 
“Northern Ireland question”. As Edwards depicts in relation to the New 
Labour party alone, there was little intra-party let alone inter-party consensus 
on the principles for negotiating the future of Northern Ireland. One thing 
that both British and Irish mainstream parties do have in common (as noted 
by McLoughlin) is that they were heavily influenced by the principles for 
negotiation espoused by John Hume as SDLP leader. Whilst the articles here 
by O‟Donnell and Edwards illustrate the role of official or governmental 
discourse in influencing the ideological – and strategic – positioning of 
parties prior to negotiations, McLoughlin‟s article serves as a reminder that 
this process of discursive influence is not merely a top-down one.  Moreover, 
the common approach to the Northern Ireland peace process that was evident 
among the British and Irish governments, EU Commission and US 
administration was due in no small part to the influence of the SDLP 
discursive principles. Such principles facilitated a shared approach at the 
highest levels to Northern Ireland, approaches that were concerned to uphold 
“unity by consent”, a “three stranded approach”, and “agreed Ireland”, 
amongst other things.  
The key to the success of these principles in the peace process in 
Northern Ireland is that they were ambiguous enough to allow those who 
subscribed to them to appear to be maintaining the integrity of their long-
held principles and to be drawing a line of continuity between past and 
future. In the case of nationalist/republican parties (south as well as north of 
the border), these terms were used in effect as synonyms for well-established 
ideals of a united Ireland, etc. In the case of unionist and British parties, 
these terms represented a flexibility of ideology within Irish nationalism and 
an acceptance of an integral “British” dimension to the future of Northern 
Ireland.  
The SDLP‟s engagement with external actors and the imprint of its 
ideology on the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 gave it an authority and 
influence in relation to framing the peace process. Nonetheless, as 
McLoughlin and Filardo‟s articles reiterate, this did not automatically 
translate into electoral success or political power. The focus on bicommunal 
or ethno-national identity in political activity and institutions established 
after the 1998 Agreement meant that the SDLP in effect drew itself out of the 
circle within which political bargaining would take place. The SDLP‟s 
discourses for post-Agreement Northern Ireland did not correspond with the 
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resulting political construct. This indicates that progress after the framework 
for negotiations has been set does not necessarily correspond with a group‟s 
contribution to that framework.  
 
Facilitating Agreement 
 
Once the groundwork for negotiations has been laid, political discourse 
can play a vital role in enabling agreement to be reached between moderate 
parties, moderates and hardliners, or between extreme ideological positions. 
Political discourse on power at such a time is of particular interest, because 
real power is at stake according to the discursive line followed by 
participants in the negotiations. The priority of political actors as negotiators, 
is to balance the requirements of power with the possibility of holding it. 
Discourses of principle are also under particular pressure when it comes to 
facilitating agreement; “agreement” by definition means agreed terms, but 
does it also mean agreed meanings? Certainly, the room that is necessary for 
bargaining in order for those “at the table” to make progress must be enabled 
by the discourses they espouse.  
 
 
 
Experience in Northern Ireland 
 
Engagement in negotiations towards an agreement has always required 
in Northern Ireland the discursive acceptance of the norms of participation. 
Political discourses on power within parties that have held a seat at the 
negotiating table have centred on the assumption of their essential equality 
with the other players.  This has been more difficult for some parties to 
accept than others. The articles by Rankin and Ganiel and Filardo-Llamas in 
this volume indicate that unionist parties have struggled to articulate 
discourses during the process of making peace agreements that allow them to 
accept the equal bargaining position of Sinn Féin in particular. Regarding the 
actual substance of these negotiations, as noted above, it is difficult to find 
accommodation – or democratic peace – between parties distinguished 
primarily by ethno-national principles. It is for such reasons that, as Tonge 
(2007) has argued, principles are “downgraded to tactics” for hardline 
parties. McIntyre (2001) contends that such principles in republican 
discourse (namely those on Irish identity and unity) had pretty much always 
been tactical, from the start of the Troubles, and were used to cover for 
reactionary violence, rather than to inspire it. Bean (2007) puts a more 
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modest interpretation forward, suggesting that, in the case of Sinn Féin, it 
was the particular context of the peace process that led the party to accept the 
norms of other parties in order to find agreement with them. Shirlow, Tonge 
and McAuley‟s article recounts the effects of this tactical change in 
republican party discourse among hardline supporters of republican 
principles; what is notable is that their support of Sinn Féin has been 
conditional on being able to identify an ideological continuity between party 
tactics and political principles. Discourses of all parties in relation to an 
agreement intended to formalise a peace process must be seen to enable 
(internal and contextual) change to occur. Yet, in the case of Northern 
Ireland, the most successful parties in electoral terms have been the slowest 
to change but have ultimately come the furthest in both discourse and 
practice. 
 
Forging Common Ground 
 
The stability of any common ground revealed through a peace 
agreement may be determined to a large degree by the discourses of those 
sharing power. The very fact that new actors are holding power has huge 
significance. If political discourse has “consequence”, is a co-operative or a 
competitive discourse more likely? Aside from the particularities of the 
context, the nature of political discourse chosen by parties at this stage 
depends in part on their assessment of whether progress towards their goals 
is best achieved through co-operation or competition with one‟s political 
opponents. This is not least because, judging by what has been outlined 
above, the common ground that has been forged is less likely to have been 
constructed from shared principles than through the acceptance of (the 
existence of) different principles. The construction of some shared political 
space as a result of an agreement can mean that political competition is more 
direct and, according to the particular terms of the political agreement, this 
competition could either be directed most severely at opponents within each 
community or at those representing the “other” community. Either way, 
parties from a “hardline” tradition may be the ones most comfortable with 
using the type of political language and (media-aware) tactics necessary in a 
forum of direct political competition.  
 
Experience in Northern Ireland 
 
The outstanding question in Northern Ireland is whether those now 
sharing power (the DUP and Sinn Féin) be forced to confront the legacy of 
Role of Political Discourse In Conflict Transformation 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 15 - 
 
their historical polarising discourses, or are they the ones best placed to 
redress it? As several articles in this volume show (Rankin and Ganiel, 
Shirlow et al., McAuley and Tonge), the moral discourses of parties 
(including that used in the past) makes forging of common ground not only 
difficult but controversial. Taken together, articles in this volume provide 
evidence from Northern Ireland that some (particularly hardline) actors have 
the ability to blend conciliatory public discourses with oppositional private 
discourses in order to make political progress. Sinn Féin, for example, had 
already become adept at the use of emotionally-driven cultural factors in 
political activity prior to the 1998 Agreement (Shirlow and McGovern, 
1998). Such skills have proven useful in the party‟s competitiveness for 
support from within nationalism and against unionism in new forums for 
political engagement in Northern Ireland. Moderate parties, such as the UUP, 
are not as practised or as comfortable with discourses of otherness and 
defence that the new forum of direct political competition (including within 
own communal group) appears to have required (Hogan, 2007). Two of the 
parties that have benefited the least in electoral terms since the successive 
suspension (between 2000 and 2007) of the institutions established by the 
1998 Agreement are the SDLP and the centre-ground Alliance Party; it is 
perhaps no coincidence that these have been the main parties to engage 
directly and meaningfully in discourses of a “shared identity” in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Evidence from Northern Ireland would suggest that it is important to 
consider political discourse as a crucial factor when seeking to understand 
the processes involved in the escalation of conflict or the transition to 
relative peace. We are not at a stage in Northern Ireland where we can 
confidently assess the “success” of the peace process; nor is our theoretical 
framework comprehensive enough to draw anything more than tentative 
lessons regarding the potential of political discourse in conflict 
transformation. Figure 2 (below) summarises the key themes regarding the 
“power” and “principle” dimensions of political discourse in stages of 
conflict and conflict transformation. 
 
Role of Discourse Power Principle 
Frame negotiations Justification Integrity 
Facilitate agreement Balance Tactics 
Forge common ground Competition (Accepted) difference 
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Figure 2. The role of discourses on power and principles in conflict 
transformation 
 
First, in relation to power: analysis of the connection between discourse 
and political activity/change indicates the necessity of providing a forum in 
which political discourse has the possibility of effecting real change. Within 
Northern Ireland, the polarising influence of different discourses was further 
exacerbated by the suspension of Stormont and its replacement with “direct 
rule” from Westminster in 1972. This in effect removed the shared (albeit 
highly flawed and integrally unequal) forum for political debate and activity 
within Northern Ireland. At the very least, by having political responsibility, 
key actors should choose their words more carefully before addressing a 
public audience. Ideally, the conditions of local democratic representation 
will provide a forum for the peaceful articulation of ideological principles 
and, crucially, the practical application of political responsibility. What we 
have seen in Northern Ireland is that active (and conceptual) input into the 
architecture of a peace agreement is ultimately not as important as being seen 
to be ready to lead in the post-agreement context. Both qualities depend on 
the use of political discourse and the marriage of “power” and “principle” 
therein.  
On the issue of principle, Northern Ireland witnessed rapid polarisation 
between parties when the touchpaper of identity was lit by key political 
actors in order to prove (to their own community) the seriousness of their 
demands. Such demands centred on policy issues that brought together the 
most sensitive points of principle with the need for pragmatic 
accommodation (such as policing or decommissioning). These issues were 
only agreed upon at the negotiating table through what might be termed a 
“fudging” of specifics and grew in significance in the post-agreement 
context. It is with such controversies – and ambiguities – in mind that 
Aughey (2002) has termed the 1998 Agreement a “paradoxical reality”. 
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind (as reflected in my use of the 
term “conflict transformation” rather than that of “resolution”) that it is 
possible, even desirable, to have conflictual discourses in a post-agreement 
political arena. Whether these have the capacity to stymie all progress 
depends in part on the discursive strategies adopted by core political actors in 
relation to their assessment of the attitude of their own communities as well 
as their opponents (plus, of course, the potential critics within their own 
party). The analyses of the contributors to this volume reveal why some 
political discourses have been more enduring and influential than others at 
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different stages along the path from conflict to relative peace in Northern 
Ireland.  
 
Endnotes 
 
1
 Whilst I acknowledge that the term “conflict transformation” is often 
conscientiously applied to processes outside the realm of (party) political 
activity, it is my intention to highlight the relevance of the insights provided 
by Lederach (1995), Francis (2002), Miall (2004) and other theorists of 
conflict transformation to this “political” sphere. I do this not least because I 
believe the importance of discourse as a medium and driver of contextual 
change derives from the fact that it supersedes societal divisions (such as 
“community” and “elite”) and is often used to connect them. 
2
 O‟Neill‟s (2003, after Habermas) argument for a forum for the free use of 
communicative reason in order to confer legitimacy on a post-conflict 
political arrangement relates to this awareness. 
3
 It should be noted that the electoral fortunes of political parties changed 
quite dramatically in the ten years after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998; 
this may be characterised in summary by the growing dominance of the 
“hardline” parties of the DUP and Sinn Féin and the weakening position of 
the “moderate” parties of the UUP and SDLP. In the election to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly in June 1998, the SDLP won just under 22 per cent of first 
preference votes (24 seats in the Assembly), the UUP won just over 21 per 
cent (28 seats), the DUP won 18 per cent (20 seats) and Sinn Féin won over 
17 per cent (18 seats). In the March 2007 Assembly elections, the DUP won 
30 per cent of first preference votes (36 Assembly seats), Sinn Féin won 26 
per cent (28 seats), the SDLP won just over (16 seats) and the UUP (18 
seats) won just under 15 per cent each.  Source: Northern Ireland Social and 
Political Archive (ARK) < http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections> (August 2008). 
4
 For a fascinating application of notions of membership categorisation in 
political discourse, see Leudar et al.  (2004).   
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NARRATIVES OF LEGITIMACY: POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN 
THE EARLY PHASE OF THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 
 
Sissel Rosland 
Abstract 
This article examines the discursive construction of legitimacy in the early 
phase of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The empirical material covers the 
debate on internment without trial from 1971 till 1975 – a debate which 
involved conflicting claims of legitimacy. Some strongly defended internment 
as a legitimate step in the fight against the IRA, whilst others regarded it as 
an illegitimate measure employed by a corrupt political regime. These 
conflicting claims of legitimacy entailed a conceptual battle concerned with 
the construction and authorisation of political order. The article explores 
this battle along three dimensions: law, violence, and democracy. 
 
Introduction 
 
On the 9
th
 of August 1971 the government of Northern Ireland 
introduced internment without trial.
1
 Internment was meant to curb the 
escalating conflict in Northern Ireland. However, when internment was 
ended four years later, this aim had not been reached: Cease-fires had come 
and gone; peace proposals had emerged and failed; and more than 1,300 
people had died.
2
 
 This paper will explore the construction of legitimacy in Northern 
Irish political discourse in the early phase of the Troubles. The empirical 
focal point is the debate on internment. The general conclusion of many 
commentators has been that internment alienated the Catholic population in 
Northern Ireland (see Arthur, 2001, p. 114; Murray, 1998 p. 18; McAllister, 
1977, p. 97-103; Ruane and Todd, 1997, p. 130; Staunton, 2001, p. 276.) The 
undermining of state legitimacy can be seen already in the process of re-
politicisation in the late 1960s. This process was, however, accelerated and 
shaped by internment which accentuated a wide range of contentious issues.  
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The debate on internment involved conflicting claims of legitimacy: 
some strongly defended internment as a legitimate step in the fight against 
the IRA, whilst others regarded it as an illegitimate measure employed by a 
corrupt political regime. These conflicting claims of legitimacy entailed what 
I, inspired by Frank Burton‟s (1978, p. 104) phrase, will call “a conceptual 
battle” concerned with the construction and authorisation of political order.  
 
Interpreting Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is used in a variety of disciplines due to its 
usefulness in the conceptualisation of the process whereby authority is 
produced not by force but by voluntary obedience (Barker, 1990, p. 11). It 
has been pointed out that studies of legitimacy have dealt with a growing 
number of institutions, linking their stability and the consensus they enjoy to 
the existence of legitimacy (Zelditch, 2001, p. 40).  But the concept of 
legitimacy is not only applicable to a situation of stability. By paying 
attention to disobedience, light may be cast on the conditions of and reasons 
for obedience, since it is often the case that the reasons for behaving in a 
particular way are more clearly stated when that form of behaviour is 
threatened or in decline, than when it is commonplace (Barker, 1990, p. 6). 
The concept of legitimacy has been closely connected to the name of 
Max Weber, and he represents what we might call a “subjectivist” approach 
to legitimacy (Weber, 1978). He stressed the empirical and historical 
character of legitimacy, rather than its normative validity. To Weber it was 
not legitimacy as such, but the search for legitimacy, which characterised 
states, and he was subsequently interested in studying how authority and 
compliance were justified. “Legitimacy” as used by Weber was thus both a 
belief held by subjects and a claim made by rulers (Barker, 1990, p. 59).
3
 
In studies that have dealt with issues of legitimacy in conflicts, 
different conceptions of legitimacy have been employed. One approach has 
dealt with non-state violence as a problem or as a challenge to the state. The 
concept of legitimacy is rarely explicitly discussed in such studies, but it is 
taken for granted that legitimacy derives from the law (see, for example, 
Phillips, 1990, p. 77 and Wilkinson, 1990, p. 48). Since legitimacy here is 
viewed as a mere reflection of law, other claims to legitimacy seem to be 
overruled and ignored.  
This approach has been challenged, however, and starting from a 
critical view of Jürgen Habermas‟ theories, the political theorist Shane 
O‟Neill O‟Neill has developed a framework for a critical discourse theory of 
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democracy (see O‟Neill, 2000 and 2002). O‟Neill stresses the importance of 
linking legitimacy to other sources than current law: for a law to be 
legitimate it is also necessary that the law be passed without violation of the 
free use of communicative reason (O‟Neill, 2000, p. 506).  
In contrast to these (implicit or explicit) normative perspectives, some 
studies have applied a more subjectivist concept of legitimacy through 
studying how legitimacy has been established within a particular context (see 
Burton, 1978; also Sluka, 1989 and Feldman, 1991). The issue of legitimacy 
is particularly significant in a study by the sociologist Frank Burton (1978) 
who in his book The Politics of Legitimacy, argues that the quest for 
legitimacy is waged in a conceptual battlefield where: “claims and counter-
claims represent ideological struggles within a discourse of legitimacy” (p. 
104). Burton follows the subjectivist approach in examining the contextual 
and conceptual bases of these claims, rather than their normative validity. 
This article analyses the construction of legitimacy as a discursive 
process. Having the historical character of the process of legitimisation at 
heart, this study resembles the subjectivist perspective of Weber and Burton 
rather than the normative perspectives. For the present purpose, discourse 
will be defined as practises that constitute the objects of which they speak 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 49). This concept of discourse highlights the constitutive 
aspect of language and implies that power is constituted by “regimes of 
truth” concerned with the creation of an ontological, political, and moral 
order (see Malkki, 1995, p. 194, and Foucault, 1980, p. 13).  
The public utterances are embedded within a historical context, and in 
the debate the participants negotiate meanings which are never fixed but 
continually undergoing contestation and redefinition (Chadwick, 2000, p. 
292). A central challenge when researching the discursive construction of 
legitimacy is to find a way to examine how participants in the public debate 
represent the relationship between the state and the people. In the case of the 
internment debate, three dimensions stand out as particularly significant in 
the construction of legitimacy: law, violence, and democracy. Firstly, law 
was significant since much of the debate related to the legitimacy of the 
emergency powers, which legalised internment without trial. Secondly, the 
debate was closely linked to the issue of violence: the escalation of 
paramilitary violence was given as the main reason for the introduction and 
continuation of internment, and in addition, the issue of state violence 
surfaced through allegations that internees had been subjected to torture. 
Thirdly, the debate exposed conflicting views on the characteristics of “true 
democracy” and the status of the Northern Ireland state as democratic or 
undemocratic.  
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 In the following, we will explore how different narratives of 
legitimacy were constructed around these dimensions. But first, I will give a 
brief outline of the political situation at the time of the internment debate. 
 
 
Political Context 
 
The political landscape in which the debate on internment took place 
was rapidly changing. In contrast to the previous fifty years – in which the 
Unionist Party had stayed continuously in power and nationalist opposition 
had become something of an empty exercise – the state in Northern Ireland 
was gradually re-politicised in the late sixties. Inspired by the civil rights 
movement in the United States, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) was established, attracting support particularly from 
young Catholics, but also initially from Protestants. Thus in the early 1970s 
the composition of Northern Ireland‟s political spectrum changed 
considerably. 
 On the unionist side, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was still by far 
the largest party. It was, however, experiencing a growing internal division 
as well as increasing opposition from other unionist parties, in particular by 
Rev. Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) founded in 
September 1971. DUP soon became an important force in Northern Ireland 
politics and a persistent threat to the traditional dominance of the UUP. The 
UUP was also challenged by a new right-wing pressure group, Ulster 
Vanguard, and several loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). On the other 
side of the political spectrum, the UUP also lost supporters to a new 
moderate and liberal party founded in April 1970. This party, called the 
Alliance Party, gained support from a section of liberal Unionists who had 
left the UUP and from some former members of the Labour party. The party 
hoped to draw support from both Protestants and Catholics.  
 On the nationalist side the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP), founded in August 1970, rapidly became the most important 
political force rapidly surpassing the old Nationalist party. It presented itself 
as a radical, left-of-centre party and was backed by former supporters of the 
Nationalist party as well as members of the civil rights movement. The other 
strand within nationalist politics, the republican movement, was in 1970 split 
on the issue of recognition of – and abstention from – the Belfast and Dublin 
Parliaments. The party Sinn Féin then became two parties: Official Sinn 
Féin, a left-wing party, (also going under the name “Republican Clubs”) 
Narratives of Legitimacy 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 25 - 
 
which called for an end to abstentionism, and Provisional Sinn Féin, the 
party generally known as “Sinn Féin”, which remained abstentionist into the 
next decade.  
  
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Law 
 
The power to use internment without trial was laid down in the Special 
Powers Act from 1922. Whereas the government legitimised internment as 
the lesser of two evils, the anti-internment movement rejected the alternative 
altogether. In general, unionists presented the internment powers in terms of 
function and order, whereas the nationalist opposition portrayed them in 
terms of principles, human rights and freedom. 
 
Unionist Discourse on “Law” 
 
When introducing internment, the UUP government characterised the 
situation as war. The image of an emergency was supported by firm 
evidence: statistics showed that violence had escalated from the beginning of 
January up to the introduction of internment in August 1971. In an initial 
statement the government pointed out that the figures revealed, “not only a 
sustained, but a mounting pattern of violence, which could not be borne in 
any community determined to stay alive.” The government had no choice, it 
argued, but to enact the provisions of the Special Powers Act (Government 
Statement, 21 August 1971). 
 The use of emergency powers was not regarded as an ideal solution, 
but rather as the only viable option in the struggle for the restoration of order 
(Brian Faulkner, The Guardian, 16 September 1971). Captain Lawrence Orr, 
the leader of the Ulster Unionists at Westminster, was confident that, 
although internment would not reconcile the opposing factions in Ulster, it 
was certainly a step on the way to bringing order back to the streets (The 
Guardian, 16 September 1971). The Prime Minister Brian Faulkner claimed 
to know the identity of the perpetrators, and internment was thus a useful 
instrument, because it only affected people who had “murdered in cold 
blood” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971).  
The fundamental trust in the internment procedures was an essential 
element in the unionist government‟s defence of the emergency legislation. 
The prime minister declared that emergency powers were used with 
reluctance (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971) and he stressed that the 
government had established a three-man advisory committee to review pleas 
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made by individual internees (The Guardian, 16 September 1971). But in the 
end, the decision whether a person was to be interned or not, was in the 
hands of the prime minister. This should provide further reassurance, 
Faulkner argued, putting his own integrity and authority on the line as a 
guarantee for fair treatment: “I am not prepared to sign internment orders on 
anybody unless I am persuaded that person has played a very direct role in 
violence in Northern Ireland” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971). 
In a letter to The Times the Unionist MP, James Molyneaux, explicitly 
declared that he regarded internment to be a denial of “fundamental 
liberties.” But, he argued, internment was not only about individual liberties, 
there were also other important liberties to preserve, he argued: “there is also 
the fundamental liberty of every British citizen to live at peace under the 
law.” Liberties had to be considered in context, he argued, and liberty to live 
at peace under the law ought to take priority (The Times, 16 August 1971).  
As shown above, the unionist government viewed the internment 
powers as secure, just and legitimate because they were settled in current 
law. Within such a framework the only valid political question regarding 
internment was whether it served the purpose of restoring order or not. Some 
voices within the unionist opposition, however, presented another answer to 
this question. Ian Paisley argued against internment and rejected the Prime 
Minister‟s claim that he had no choice but to introduce internment. He 
claimed that Faulkner had tried to mislead the country by announcing he was 
introducing internment as a last resort. According to Paisley this was a 
deliberate falsehood, as not all processes of the law had been used against the 
IRA (News Letter, 10 August 1971). Still, the unionist opposition mainly 
presented the internment powers in terms of function (for a further 
discussion, see Rosland, 2003). 
 
Nationalist Discourse on “Law” 
 
Whereas the unionist government presented the emergency powers in 
terms of restoring order, the nationalist opposition immediately challenged 
this priority. A cross-party statement including politicians, priests and 
representatives of professional and business life in Northern Ireland, summed 
up this view, pointing out that preserving human rights rather than order was 
the most fundamental purpose of law:  
A society without order is a distressed society, but a society without 
freedom is not a society at all. If a choice must be made between the 
legal preservation of order and the legal preservation of freedom, 
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freedom must take priority (Statement in Irish News, 4 September 
1971) 
The opposition built its case against the powers of internment around 
two issues. Firstly, that the power to intern was a perversion of law denying 
individual fundamental rights; secondly, that the unionist government used 
internment deliberately as a political weapon to silence the opposition. The 
opposition believed internment to be an indefensible evil itself, irrespective 
of circumstances (Statement in Irish News, 4 September 1971). Labelling 
internment “a perversion of law”, the signatories of the cross-party statement 
particularly stressed that the emergency powers eliminated the restraints on 
power. By lowering the standards for evidence of guilt, persons could be 
imprisoned on the basis of evidence that was unknown to them and which in 
ordinary law would be seen as inadmissible.
 
The internees themselves 
protested against not being given the opportunity to defend themselves 
against decisive yet secret evidence (Statement by internees in Crumlin Road 
Prison, Irish News, 23 August 1971). In an open letter to the British Home 
Secretary, the Derry branch of the SDLP argued that the emergency powers 
in Northern Ireland did not adhere to the standards of English justice: 
To you, internment in Northern Ireland may be only an abstract word in 
a faraway place. You well know that English law in England holds the 
liberty of the subject in high regard and that a man is innocent until 
proven guilty. Only in the gravest circumstances such as the major wars 
does your English Government set aside these laws and even then, they 
try to ensure the minimum affront to the dignity of the person and the 
maximum safeguard for rights and welfare. Contrast this with what you 
have allowed in Northern Ireland (Irish News, 18 December 1971). 
Explaining the direct effects of this point, a leading article in the Irish 
News, observed that by using the Special Powers Act, members of the Police 
Special Branch were able to re-arrest men who had earlier been found 
innocent by ordinary juries. According to the newspaper this practise 
undermined individual liberty which was no longer protected by law, but was 
at the arbitrary disposition of Prime Minister Brian Faulkner (Irish News, 25 
November 1971). 
 
Competing Approaches to Law 
 
To sum up, the crucial point of division on the issue of emergency 
powers concerned the balance between order and rights: whereas Faulkner 
and the government assigned priority to the restoration of order, their critics 
asserted that the most fundamental task of the law was to preserve the rights 
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of the individual and to restrain the power of the state. On this ground the 
opposition ruled out Faulkner‟s “lesser of two evils”-argument, arguing 
instead that internment never could be the lesser of two evils.
 
 
It has been argued that by establishing what Homi Bhabha has labelled 
“counter-narratives” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 300), marginalized groups can resist 
hegemonic representations (Perry in Graham, 2001, p. 86). History has 
shown that whereas the “positive rights” approach has tended to support 
established authority, the theories of “natural rights” have been connected to 
opposition against authorities. The theories of Rousseau and other natural 
rights theorists produced a notion of legitimacy that transcended the 
procedures and authority of the state, thus making possible the idea of a 
legitimate revolution. With legitimacy residing in “a state of nature”, rather 
than in the state, a sense of essential commonality is produced beyond 
governmental procedures (Wolin, 1996, p. 41).
 
 
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Violence 
 
To talk of legitimate violence in the debate on internment seem to be a 
contradiction in terms. The word “violence” was rarely used to describe what 
the speaker viewed as a “legitimate” use of force, whether this be by British 
soldiers or paramilitary “defenders” and “freedom fighters”; “violence” was 
the force perpetrated by one‟s opponent.  
In their proposed role as peacekeepers in the increasingly troubled 
society, the security forces had already entered the front stage of Northern 
Ireland politics before the introduction of internment. Yet, their critical 
function in the operation of internment regarding arrests and interrogation 
made the security forces even more contentious.
4
 
 
Competing Discourses on the Security Forces 
 
Almost immediately after the first arrests on the morning of 9 August 
1971, there appeared allegations of brutal treatment of the internees (see for 
example Irish News, 10 August, 1971; Irish News, 13 August 1971). In a 
joint statement the SDLP, the Nationalist party, the Republican Labour party 
and NICRA proclaimed: “We demand that the military resume the role for 
which they were sent here, the protection of people and areas against 
sectarian attacks on their homes pending a political solution (joint statement, 
Irish News, 10 August 1971). The stories of mistreatment grew in number 
during the first months of internment as several internees got to tell their 
stories to the newspapers.
5
 Under pressure from nationalists in Northern 
Narratives of Legitimacy 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 29 - 
 
Ireland, the government of the Republic of Ireland lodged a series of 
complaints at the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg in 
December 1971. The Irish government alleged that British policy in Northern 
Ireland had degenerated to a military assault on the minority in violation of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (Boyle, 1974). Several persons 
also submitted individual petitions to the commission (Boyle, 1974).
6
 
Nationalists, thus, in general described the treatment of internees as 
brutal and inhumane, and a violation of the rights of the individual. The ill-
treatment was not in the main regarded as evidence of the evilness of the 
interrogators, but rather as the product of an aggressive state (see Rosland, 
2003). Consequently, government inquiries into the matter could never be 
trusted. Legitimacy had to be authorised elsewhere, and it is consistent with 
this standpoint that nationalists looked to the Republic of Ireland and the 
international human rights commission for confirmation of the perceived 
illegitimacy of state violence in Northern Ireland.  
In unionist statements, on the other hand, the security forces were 
portrayed primarily as responsible protectors characterised by virtues as 
heroism and victimhood. Already shortly after the introduction of 
internment, the Prime Minister hailed it as a great success, which allowed the 
security forces to work efficiently in their “relentless” struggle against the 
IRA (Daily Mail, 16 September 1971). In October, Faulkner concluded: “I 
think in the last three months that the security forces have got very positively 
and demonstrably on top of the situation” (News Letter, 27 October 1971).  
When rumours of mistreatment started to circulate, the government, 
were keen to respond and assured the public that any claim of ill treatment 
would be impartially investigated (News Letter, 16 August 1971). Yet, 
questioning the mistreatment allegations, James Kilfedder of the UUP 
suspected that the internees, in order to safeguard themselves against charges 
of being informers, were fabricating allegations of Army brutality (Belfast 
Telegraph, 20 October 1971). At the same time he contended that the 
security forces should be allowed to use some kind of force, if this could 
shorten the conflict. One had to choose between the terrorists and the 
soldiers, Kilfedder argued, concluding that the soldiers‟ lives ought to be 
regarded as more important than “the injured feelings of the terrorists” 
(Belfast Telegraph, 20 October 1971).  
Although the general unionist view was that the security forces were to 
be trusted, there were some exceptions to this pattern. In some cases 
involving loyalist paramilitaries loyalist and unionist politicians criticised the 
Army for mistreatment. After an incident in the Maze prison in late 1973 that 
left several loyalist internees injured, both Ian Paisley and the UDA 
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condemned the troops for mistreating the internees (see Daily Mail 20 
December 1973; News Letter, 20 December 1973; Irish Times, 20 December 
1973). This occasional criticism, however, did not challenge the main 
representation of the security forces as protectors of common good.  
 
Competing Discourses on Paramilitaries 
The debate on internment exposes several conflicting interpretations of 
the justification and responsibility for paramilitary violence. According to 
the government, the IRA was organising “a campaign of murder” with the 
“responsibility for death and suffering of innocent people” (News Letter, 16 
August 1971) and Prime Minister Brian Faulkner branded the IRA campaign 
“an armed conspiracy whose immediate purpose is to destroy the peace, 
stability and security in this part of the UK” (Daily Mail, 16 September 
1971). The Prime Minister also stressed that the IRA was isolated from the 
Catholic population, which it claimed to be representing. The main 
distinction went not along religious lines, he argued, but between those who 
pursued their ends democratically and those who wished to impose their 
views by violence (News Letter 13.09.71 and Irish Times, 15 April 1974).  
The Alliance party also to a certain extent supported the image of the 
isolated terrorist (see, for example, Oliver Napier in Belfast Telegraph, 12 
August 1971). Yet, the Alliance Party believed that introducing internment 
would increase rather than curb the escalating violence (see for example Bob 
Cooper in Irish News, 21 August 1971 and Oliver Napier in Irish News, 26 
July 1974). Alliance reflections on terrorism thus, instead of drawing a 
definite line between the agent of violence and the victim, indicated that “the 
terrorist” could be both an agent of violence and a victim.  
This logic was taken even further in the statements of the SDLP, which 
firmly situated the republican paramilitary within Northern Ireland society. 
Although condemning their use of violence, the SDLP also viewed 
republican paramilitaries as “victims of the past”, thus placing the 
responsibility of paramilitary violence not only on the individual IRA 
members but on the Northern Ireland state (see for example John Hume in 
Irish Times, 3 December 1973). The paramilitaries were also frequently 
singled out as agents of counter-productive violence. Violence, then, was 
depicted as both immoral and futile:  
We believe in political means and political means alone. Anyone who 
looks at our community to-day must be convinced that other than 
political means only leads us deeper and deeper into the mire and 
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increases the suffering of all our people (John Hume, Irish News, 1 July 
1974)   
Hume also argued that the responsibility for ending internment rested 
partly with the IRA: if violence stopped, there would be no justification for 
the continuation of internment (Irish News, 1 December 1973). 
Few statements in the debate on internment, even from the republican 
movement, explicitly defended the IRA as a violent agent.
7
 The purpose of 
the IRA violence, however, was made very clear: it was to break the 
political, economic and cultural connection with Britain. Republican 
statements insisted that they had a mandate for their struggle from both the 
people and the internees and the desire was that “the Irish people should 
enjoy justice, peace and prosperity, in a free united Ireland” (Long Kesh 
Comhairle Ceanntair, Sinn Féin, Irish News, 28 March 1972). In contrast to 
“the isolated terrorists” in the unionist statements, the “republican struggle 
for freedom” was presented as the manifestation of a birthright, a battle 
symbolised by the loyalty to the graves of the past.  
The loyalty of the loyalist paramilitaries, although to a different object, 
took on some similar features. The sacrifice of the loyalist paramilitaries in 
defending Protestants and the Union was a significant part of the 
representation of the “betrayed defender”. According to loyalist groups, the 
loyalist paramilitaries were defence forces helping the security forces. The 
loyalist groups thus felt betrayed when the British Government introduced 
internment of loyalists in February 1973. 
The loyalist paramilitaries were not given a prominent role in the 
different accounts of internment until after the internment of loyalists. The 
moderate unionist representation of the loyalist paramilitaries is quite 
interesting, for it shows that even though most acts of loyalist violence were 
condemned, it seemed to be important not to be considered an opponent of 
the loyalist internees. At some point it looked like the unionist parties almost 
competed to be seen as the strongest supporter of the loyalist internees (see, 
for example, Roy Bradford in News Letter, 29 September 1973 and Edward 
Burns in Irish Times, 4 October 1973). Several unionist representatives also 
initiated motions demanding the release of loyalist internees only, and 
several district councils adopted such motions (see Irish Independent, 28 
November 1973 and 21 December 1973; Belfast Telegraph, 13 December 
1973 and 20 December 1973).  
Nationalists challenged this reasoning and initially branded the loyalist 
paramilitaries as extremists, who attacked innocent Catholics. However, this 
image began to change after the first internment of loyalists in early 1973. 
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Loyalists were now, particularly in republican statements, also portrayed as 
class brothers and victims of internment, suffering in the same way as 
republican internees (see, for example, the statement by the Republican 
Clubs, Irish News, 31 January 1974; also joint statements printed in the Irish 
Times and Irish News in August 1974). 
Competing Approaches to Violence 
 
In a study of the discursive (de-)legitimisation of violence it is 
important to consider how the agents of violence are portrayed in the 
political statements: by presenting the agents of violence within a particular 
context the acts of violence might be explained and rationalised. With some 
exceptions, discourses on violence in the debate on internment echoed the 
various parties‟ representation of the use of emergency powers. On the one 
hand, the unionist movement in general legitimised state violence through an 
official legal mandate and the function of restoring order. In the case of the 
loyalist paramilitaries there was an ambivalent approach, however, and the 
question of purpose and context seem at least partly to come in to play when 
separating loyalist and republican violence. On the other hand, nationalist 
discourses stressed alternative sources of legitimacy. In the case of the 
republican groups, they referred to discrimination as well as human and 
national rights when justifying republican violence. Within the SDLP, 
however, violence seemed in general to have been delegitimized through 
references to moral values and inalienable human rights.  
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Democracy 
 
In the debate on internment all political parties presented “democracy” 
as the legitimate form of government. It is generally held that it is the 
commitment to popular rule which sets democracies apart from other 
political systems (Dalton, 1988, p. 206). This maxim was generally 
recognised in the internment debate, but the debate exposed conflicting 
representations of democracy. Some connected democracy to the procedures 
of the existing institutions of government; others linked it to ethnic/national 
rights. They also had different views on how the people were to conduct their 
“legitimate right to power”. Were the preferences of the people to be secured 
through institutionalised channels of representation, or should the people 
themselves defend their interests directly?  
 
Unionist Discourse on “Democracy” 
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To the Ulster Unionist Party, democracy was a set of procedures for the 
election of representatives who carried out “the rule of the people”. The 
decision to introduce internment was taken to protect this democracy. James 
Molyneaux observed that:  
in every election during the past 50 years they have shown their 
determination to remain part of the United Kingdom under the Crown. 
The electoral system is the same as in other parts of the United 
Kingdom – universal franchise of one man one vote. Is democracy to 
remain in Ulster or is the gun to take its place? (The Times, 16 August 
1971). 
Comments by Prime Minister Faulkner followed similar lines. Those 
who had been interned were interned because of their disrespect for the 
democratic means: “the essential conflict is between democracy on the one 
hand, on the other those who wish to bypass democracy by terrorist means” 
(Irish Times, 27 November 1971).
 
 
In general the unionist government disapproved of non-parliamentary 
methods and it berated both individuals and the elected representatives of the 
nationalist opposition for withdrawing from public bodies and declaring 
support for a rent and rates strike (Government Statement, 21 September 
1971). Although confirming the right to free speech (News Letter, 13 
September 1971), the government promulgated a six-month ban on parades 
and demonstrations when introducing internment: the security forces should 
not be diverted from their essential tasks at such a critical time (Belfast 
Telegraph, 9 August 1971).
8
  
The unionist representations of democracy changed somewhat, 
however, with the suspension of the Stormont parliament in March 1972 and 
the subsequent negotiations on power-sharing with nationalists. After the fall 
of Stormont and the agreement on power-sharing, the UUP found itself in a 
grave internal conflict: would a power-sharing assembly and Executive be 
democratic institutions?  
Brian Faulkner, the leader of the power-sharing fraction, viewed the 
power-sharing process as the route to a restoration of a Northern Ireland 
parliament, and thus also to peace, order and good government (News Letter, 
12 December 1973). Faulkner utterly rejected ideas of an independent Ulster: 
“Independence from Great Britain, of any style, under any name, and in any 
circumstances, is repugnant to our ideals, in complete opposition to our basic 
policy, and would be ruinous to our secure future and disastrous for our 
economic well-being” (Irish Times, 6 March 1973).  
The opponents of power-sharing in the UUP had a different 
interpretation and argued that the Council of Ireland proposed in the 
Narratives of Legitimacy 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 34 - 
 
Sunningdale Communiqué was the first step to a united Ireland. They 
therefore went into the United Ulster Unionist Council coalition with the 
DUP and Vanguard. Austin Ardill of the anti-power-sharing wing of the 
UUP claimed that the aim was, “to bring about the restoration of full 
parliamentary democracy in Northern Ireland” (News Letter, 26 February 
1974). This was despite the fact that the anti-power-sharing wing of the UUP 
also supported some non-constitutional actions such as the Ulster Workers 
Council strike (which eventually brought down the power-sharing 
institutions). John Taylor, also of the anti-power-sharing wing, stressed that 
the power-sharing institutions did not have the consent of the majority of 
Northern Ireland (News Letter, 2 March 1974). In contrast to Faulkner, 
Taylor did not rule out an independent Northern Ireland.  In a joint statement 
with the Vanguard leader, William Craig, he stated that:  
we don‟t agree with those who would accept membership of the U.K. at 
any price. If the British Government is not prepared to offer Ulster 
sufficient powers, then we are of the opinion that a negotiated 
independence for Ulster could be the best course of action for loyalists 
(Irish Times, 17 January 1973).  
 The Democratic Unionist Party primarily commented on the 
suspension of Stormont in terms of British citizenship rights (News Letter, 27 
March 1972). The calls for independence were strongly disputed by the DUP 
which instead advocated a stronger integration of Northern Ireland in the 
Union. This did not mean that the DUP was not also concerned with the 
“loyal Ulster people”. Even though the DUP primarily defended 
constitutional means of politics (see News Letter, 16 February 1972; 27 
March 1972) and Ian Paisley did not support the loyalist strike in the wake of 
the internment of loyalists (Irish Times, 8 February 1973), the party regularly 
defended the actions of loyalist paramilitary groups (see Rankin and Ganiel, 
this volume).  
 
Nationalist Discourse on “Democracy” 
 
Whereas both the DUP and the majority of the unionist parties related 
democracy to the rule of the majority, this view was strongly contested by 
nationalists. The SDLP generally stressed the importance of political 
representation, but did not regard the majority rule of the UUP in Northern 
Ireland to be real democracy. During the debate on internment the key 
element in the SDLP vision of real democracy was above all inclusion. New 
political institutions had to be built in order to include all sections of the 
community.  
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Although established as late as 1970, the SDLP had by the introduction 
of internment in August 1971, already acquired the experience of working 
both inside and outside the existing political institutions. The party‟s seven 
Stormont MPs decided to pull out of Stormont in the summer of 1971 in 
protest against the unionist government. When internment was introduced in 
August, the party supported a rent and rates strike and extended its boycott of 
public institutions (Irish News, 10 August 1971). Despite such support for 
civil disobedience, however, the position of the SDLP did differ from that of 
the civil rights and internees‟ groups (see below), since it continuously 
stressed the importance of political representation and responsible leadership. 
In John Hume‟s words, this was a time for brains, not for brawn (Irish News, 
11 September 1971).  
But even though the SDLP-deputies wanted to lead the people, they 
also recognised the importance of being in touch with popular sentiments. 
Representatives should not be too far ahead of the people, Gerry Fitt 
explained, when he refused to participate in talks with the unionist 
government after internment (The Times, 30 September 1971).   
Still, after the suspension of Stormont and its involvement in talks on 
power sharing, the SDLP resumed its cooperation with the British 
government and reversed its previous commitment not to participate in any 
institutions as long as internment remained in force. Now, representation and 
influence, it was claimed, made it possible for the SDLP to lobby for the 
release of internees. The SDLP leader, Ivan Cooper, warned against the 
dangers of taking politics back into the streets: “Demonstrations at this time 
will not bring internment to an end and will not secure the type of change 
needed in this community” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1973).  
It was important for the SDLP to have an Irish dimension included in 
the Sunningdale Agreement. The majority within the party believed that the 
nationalist community in Northern Ireland could not give its full allegiance 
to a state that existed purely in a British context (Murray, 1998, p. 22). Even 
though the Executive broke down the party still held on to the constitutional 
approach to politics and the vision of partnership “not merely in Northern 
Ireland and within Ireland, but in a very real sense between the two islands 
themselves” (John Duffy, Irish News, 20 July 1974).  
 
Civil Rights Movement and Republican Discourse on “Democracy” 
 
When internment was introduced, NICRA immediately called for 
public demonstrations throughout Northern Ireland and for workers to 
prepare for a general strike (News Letter, 10 August 1971). The association 
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claimed that the people themselves ought to be safeguarding their rights 
against incursions from the government: “We believe the greatest weapons 
of the people in the campaign are civil resistance and disobedience” (Ian 
Barr [chairman of the NICRA branch at the prison ship, Maidstone], Irish 
News, 15 September 1971). The internees in the Long Kesh internment camp 
similarly supported popular control and direct action stressing that: 
“Republicanism is concerned with the right of the people to control the 
political, economic and cultural life of our country” (Irish Times, 28 July 
1972). 
In other words, people should not wait for the politicians to act in their 
defence; the people should act themselves. The strong belief in the wisdom 
of the people and the fundamental distrust in politicians were common to 
both NICRA and the various internees groups established in the internment 
camps. The internees in Long Kesh claimed for example that, “the ordinary 
man having borne the brunt of the suffering over the past few years against 
the might of the British Army, must assert his will on the wily politicians 
who even now are snarling at each other in their attempt to claim political 
capital from a false victory” (Irish News, 25 April 1972).  
The internees at Long Kesh rejected the SDLP‟s claims that its strategy 
would eventually secure the end of internment, claiming that while the 
people suffered, the SDLP connived with the enemies of Ireland and reneged 
on all its promises: “You speak for no other than yourselves” (Irish News, 6 
December 1975). Although sharing a common view on popular participation, 
there were nonetheless differences between the republican groups. Whereas 
the Republican Clubs supported some kind of political action inside the 
existing structures,
 9
 the Provisional republicans, both inside and outside the 
internment camps, ruled out such action.
 10
 In the Provisional view, 
democracy could never be achieved through “partitionist institutions” (Irish 
News, 6 December 1975). The Irish people could only achieve justice in a 
free United Ireland, and it was important that the people rejected the “palace-
seekers” who wanted to divert people from the true national aim (Irish News, 
28 March 1972).  
 
Competing Approaches to Democracy 
 
As we have seen above, the representations of democracy differed 
considerably among the political parties. The UUP in the first year of the 
debate, and later the Faulkner unionists defended representation in elected 
institutions as the main system of popular rule. The SDLP and the anti-
power-sharing fraction of the UUP, also stressed the importance of 
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representatives, but departed from “the responsible model” in that they did 
not rule out civil disobedience. The civil rights association and the 
republican (at times also loyalist) groups played down the role of the 
representative in politics altogether, and connected popular rule to direct 
popular action.  
Another significant difference concerns the issue of majority rule 
versus “inclusive” government. Here the initial pattern was that the unionist 
parties viewed democracy as majority rule, whereas the SDLP, the Alliance 
party, the NICRA, and the republican groups considered the practice of 
majority rule exclusionary and undemocratic. When the Stormont parliament 
was suspended, however, this pattern changed. The UUP split on the issue of 
a power-sharing Executive, and the SDLP came under criticism from NICRA 
and, in particular, internees and Provisional republicans for taking part in the 
Executive. Now the unionist parties did not agree as to which measures 
would secure democracy: the DUP claimed that democracy could only be 
safeguarded if the Union was retained. Faulkner and his supporters chose 
power-sharing whereas his critics in the UUP and Vanguard indicated 
support for an independent Northern Ireland. In this matter, the logic of the 
latter resembled that of the Provisional republicans. Both perspectives linked 
democracy to some sort of ethnic/national right to autonomy, rather than to 
participation in the existing institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the political debate on internment has revealed that the 
dominant unionist representation of legitimacy was linked to the state in an 
almost tautological relationship: the internment powers were legitimate 
because they were settled in law; force used by the police and the army was 
legitimate because they had a mandate from the state; and democracy was 
viewed as the implementation of majority rule as set down in the governing 
procedures of the state. Consequently the principal points of reference for 
legitimacy were the procedures of the state and the “will of the majority”.  
Within such a framework, opposition to the state became illegitimate 
by definition, and the only valid political question regarding internment was 
whether it served the purpose of restoring order or not. Internment was aimed 
at restoring order by removing the “terrorists” from the streets. The 
“terrorists”, portrayed as isolated characters without context and history, and 
with the creation of fear as their only rationale, played a decisive role in the 
unionist construction of legitimacy, proving that the conflict was a matter of 
order, rather than of state legitimacy.  
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But nationalists saw things differently: many felt that the unionist 
hegemony had been clearly exposed in the 1960s and internment accelerated 
the ongoing process of political mobilisation of the nationalist community. 
The political mobilisation was taken to a new level by a wide-ranging 
withdrawal from public positions, an illegal rent and rates strike, and through 
an intensified campaign of protest.  
The nationalist counter-narrative of legitimacy was above all exposed 
in the way nationalists challenged the unionist priority of the order of society 
over the rights of the individual. In the nationalist narrative, human rights 
were made the defining source of legitimacy and consequently, rights were 
made a product of being human, rather than being a citizen in a state: if the 
state violated these rights, it could not be regarded legitimate. Nationalists 
also increasingly turned to international sources for validation of their 
approach, thus “removing” legitimacy from the political and territorial 
confinements of the state, and relocating it at an international level.  
There is no doubt that the division between a dominant narrative of 
legitimacy on the one hand, and a counter-narrative on the other, was deep in 
the debate on internment. Still, the debate on internment also exposed 
another line of division, supplementing this dualism: between a political 
centre on the one hand, and a politically marginalized periphery on the other.  
The fall of Stormont in 1972 changed the balance of power in Northern 
Ireland: the UUP lost governing powers, and the unionist opposition lost the 
power it had acquired by being the closest challengers to the UUP. The 
SDLP, on the other hand, increased its influence: From being a party 
permanently blocked as a minority in Northern Ireland, the party now 
became the “voice” of the minority in talks with the British government and 
in the power-sharing Executive. This alteration of power relations 
challenged, or perhaps more accurately supplemented, the general pattern of 
a unionist hegemonic narrative of legitimacy contested by a nationalist 
counter-narrative.  
The SDLP developed a more functional approach to law and 
democracy during its participation in the power-sharing executive. The 
keyword behind this transition seems to be “trust”; the SDLP‟s experience of 
increased political influence went hand in hand with the development of faith 
in the processes of government. In contrast, parts of the UUP, the DUP, and 
the loyalist paramilitaries went in another direction after the suspension of 
the Stormont parliament (and also the internment of loyalists). With the 
Stormont government replaced with a British government defending power 
sharing and internment of loyalists, the sense of faith and assurance of 
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political influence were disappearing. Legitimacy was now disconnected 
from the existing institutions of government and situated in principles of 
British civil liberties or in the idea of Ulster self-determination. 
The construction of legitimacy must therefore be viewed in relation to 
trust and influence: political pragmatism and functionalism, which 
legitimised the call for the restoration of order, required a sense of trust in the 
system and a confidence of political influence. In contrast, the lack of trust 
and influence seems to have fostered an approach based on rights and 
principles external to the established institutions of government; an approach 
which could justify resistance and change. 
 
 
Endnotes 
* I am grateful to all of those who have offered comments on this study at 
different stages, in particular the late Professor Øyvind Bjørnson, Professor 
William Hubbard, Svein Atle Skålevåg, Merethe Winsents and Maja Zahl. I 
am also most grateful to Catherine O‟Donnell and Katy Hayward for their 
very constructive and motivating comments and to the participants at the 
Peace Lines conference in Dublin in June 2007, for inspiring and fruitful 
discussions.  
 
i
 In that period, a total of 1981 persons were held without trial: 107 
“loyalists” and 1874 “republicans”.  
2 In the two years prior to internment, 66 people were killed; in the first 
seventeen months of internment, the number had risen almost tenfold to 
610 (Dixon, 2001, p. 118). Following the suspension of the Northern 
Ireland government in February 1972, internment was continued by the 
British government. 
3
 Weber‟s concept of legitimacy has been criticised, particularly for its non-
normative character. Jürgen Habermas (1996) has stressed the importance of 
employing a normative concept of legitimacy through an understanding of 
the relationship between solidarity and communication.  
4 The Compton Committee was set up to investigate allegations that the men 
being interrogated after their arrests on 9 August 1971 had been subjected to 
brutal treatment (Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p. 211). The report, 
acknowledged that there had been ill treatment of internees, but it rejected 
claims of systematic torture. Another committee (the Parker committee) 
investigating the methods used in interrogating, later held that the methods 
were justified in exceptional circumstances (Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p. 
391). 
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5 For example, one of the internees, Patrick Shivers was awarded £15,000 in 
February 1974 by the Ulster High Court in damages for wrongful arrest and 
torture (News Letter, 14 February 1974). 
6 The Commission determined that some techniques employed in 1971 did 
constitute torture and that other procedures were inhumane and degrading 
(Donohue, 2001, p. 121). Yet, the Commission was overruled in the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1978, which rejected the word torture, 
but accepted that the internees had suffered „inhuman and degrading 
treatment‟ (Coogan, 1995, p. 129).  
7 There could be various explanations for this. This type of statement might 
have been censored by the newspapers, which declined to publicise what 
may be viewed as violent propaganda. It might also relate to the fact that 
republican statements tended to deal more with the effects of state violence.  
8 The Alliance Party also generally argued that civil disobedience was not 
a legitimate democratic method; instead the party called for talks and a 
campaign that could foster understanding (see for example Robert G. 
Cooper in Irish News, 21 August 1971 and Basil Glass in Irish News, 13 
June 1974). 
9
 The Republican Clubs (Official Sinn Féin) viewed elections as one of many 
ways to voice public opinion, rather than the main channel of popular 
influence. When they decided to contest elections, the Long Kesh branch of 
this group supported the move, arguing that by participation in the elections, 
they were putting forward progressive and revolutionary politics to the 
electorate (Irish News, 21 June, 1973). 
10
 Some branches of NICRA also argued against the participation in the 
existing structures. One branch of NICRA ,for instance, sardonically 
remarked that the SDLP and the Republican Clubs “nearly broke their necks 
to get involved in another British institution which clearly has not a hope in 
hell of achieving any scrap of democracy” (Bannside and District Civil 
Rights Association, Irish News, 8 July 1975).  
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POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND 
ITS FUNCTION IN THE TROUBLES AND PEACE PROCESS IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Catherine O’Donnell 
Abstract 
Despite some historical divergence, political parties in the Republic of 
Ireland shared some key objectives in response to the Troubles. Most 
consistently, each of the main parties (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael) sought to 
undermine support for the IRA in Northern Ireland and de-legitimise 
arguments by Sinn Féin and the IRA. Over the course of the peace process, 
such common priorities developed into a wider shared discourse on the 
principles for agreement in Northern Ireland. The parties in the Republic 
soon established a vocal consensus incorporating support for the Good 
Friday Agreement, Sinn Féin involvement in politics in Northern Ireland, 
reconciliation, and a pluralist republicanism. The emergence of this common 
discourse has been essential to the legitimacy and durability of the peace 
process. 
 
Introduction 
 
Thinking about what caused the conflict in Northern Ireland, why it 
went on for so long and how and why it came to the end it did we often dwell 
on the mobilisation of nationalism and unionist divisions in the 1960s, 
politicisation of the republican movement in later years, the changing 
policies of the British and Irish government and the development of thought 
within unionism and loyalism. Thus we quite often prioritise political 
developments, political processes and relations, ideology and strategy. This 
volume is a welcome opportunity to examine how political discourse (as the 
communication in speech or written form of policy positions and ideological 
points by political parties and actors) fits into this complex web. Doing so 
helps us to provide a more complete explanation as to the Northern Ireland 
conflict and peace process. Political discourses offer a lot in terms of 
understanding the motives and decisions of key players, their interpretation 
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of developments and also inform us of their audiences. Political discourses 
do not develop accidentally and are generally employed with intent and 
purpose. In the Irish case, as will be demonstrated here, the political 
discourses used by the main parties in the Republic of Ireland on the subject 
of Northern Ireland since the outbreak of the troubles help to explain to us 
why the peace process took the shape it did and why it was that the Irish 
government and, in particular, Fianna Fáil, played a key role in this.  
Nationalism and the unresolved “national question” on Northern Ireland 
were always accepted as central to Irish politics and accounted to a large 
extent for party political divisions (See Mair, 1987). This was the case since 
the Civil War, which followed the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, led to the split 
in Sinn Féin and the subsequent formation of Cumann na nGaedheal (later 
Fine Gael) and Fianna Fáil. Given its opposition to the Treaty and emergence 
from Sinn Féin in 1926, Fianna Fáil presented itself as the true heir of the 
republican tradition in Ireland and as the party likely to realise the dream of a 
united Ireland. At the outbreak of the Troubles in the late 1960s and early 
1970s this division on the “national question” was brought into focus again. 
The Arms Crisis of 1970, where members of the Fianna Fáil government 
were accused of assisting in the importation of arms to the IRA in Northern 
Ireland (See O‟Brien, 2000), together with the use of traditional anti-
partitionist language by Fianna Fáil meant that Fianna Fáil was once again 
confirmed in the public mind as the more devout republican party. This was 
particularly so when contrasted to Fine Gael‟s decision to champion the 
principle of consent - that is that the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland could not be altered without the consent of a majority of people there 
(Noonan, 2006; Harte, 2005; Fine Gael, 1979, p. 4). The development of 
their respective party discourses on Northern Ireland is central to 
understanding how the parties differed on the subject.  
It is in this context that this article examines the official discourses used 
by the main political parties in the Republic of Ireland when they refer to 
Northern Ireland. It seeks to illustrate the different functions which political 
discourse in the Republic has played during the conflict as well as during the 
peace process.  In the first section the article will look at the political 
discourses employed by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael over the course of the 
Troubles. Section Two will show that political discourse in the Republic on 
Ireland has also played a key role in the peace process. An agreed political 
discourse reflecting the consensus that has emerged on Northern Ireland 
plays an important role in the operation of the peace process and the 
implementation of Good Friday Agreement. 
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Official Discourse during the Troubles 
 
During the conflict both parties shared a common aim to de-legitimise 
the IRA and Sinn Féin but they approached this in different ways. Fine Gael 
advanced an alternative discourse as a challenge to Sinn Féin and found itself 
a friend to the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern 
Ireland. Rejecting Sinn Féin, Fine Gael endorsed the SDLP as the legitimate 
representative of nationalism in Northern Ireland. Seeking to fortify the 
SDLP position and interpretation of politics and the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, Fine Gael‟s policy and discourse was often similar to that articulated 
by the SDLP. Fine Gael also often concurred with SDLP proposals for the 
resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland and this is seen most clearly 
through Fine Gael‟s involvement in the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4 and 
the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
Fianna Fáil in contrast sought to discredit Sinn Féin and the IRA‟s 
violent campaign by adopting an alternative but equally strong republican 
and anti-partitionist position. Fianna Fáil sought to disown Sinn Féin and the 
IRA as descendents of the 1916 Rising republican tradition and instead 
claimed that mantle for the Fianna Fáil party. At the 1985 Fianna Fáil Ard 
Fheis party leader, Charles J. Haughey, said: 
 
Fianna Fáil, as the Republican party, is proud to be the political 
embodiment of the separatist, national tradition that is central to the 
freedom and independence of the Irish nation. Republicanism for us 
means adherence to the principles of the 1916 Proclamation, which 
asserted the right of the Irish people to national freedom and 
sovereignty, and which guaranteed religious and civil liberty, equal 
rights and equal opportunity to all citizens. (Haughey, 1985). 
 
It was not just in its use of republican anti-partitionist language that 
Fianna Fáil sought to undermine the IRA and Sinn Féin.  In the era of the 
Jack Lynch leadership (1966-73), as we will see, Fianna Fáil matched this 
discourse with a reunification policy at Anglo-Irish level aimed at removing 
the reasons for IRA violence.  
 
Fianna Fáil Discourse on Northern Ireland 
 
Jack Lynch was leader of Fianna Fáil and Taoiseach at the outbreak of 
the Troubles. While calling for reform and expressing concerns for the 
nationalist population in Northern Ireland, Lynch was publicly critical of 
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IRA violence and stressed that the Irish government “have no intention of 
using force to realise this desire [re-unification]” (Lynch, 1971, p. 10). He 
also maintained that “there is no solution to be found to our disagreements 
by shooting each other. There is no real invader here” (Lynch, 1971, p. 22). 
Throughout the Lynch years and into Fianna Fáil‟s time under subsequent 
leader, Charles J. Haughey, the party rejected violence as a legitimate way to 
redress problems in Northern Ireland or as a way to pursue Irish unity. Like 
Lynch, Haughey rejected an IRA mandate: 
 
All but a tiny minority understand that violence can never bring a 
solution and that it serves only to perpetuate division and hatred. Let us 
make it absolutely clear that no Irish Government will tolerate any 
attempt by any group to put themselves above the law or to arrogate to 
themselves any of the functions of the Government. There is only one 
army in this State, one police force and one judiciary, appointed under 
the Constitution, to uphold the laws. The Government, acting for the 
people, will ensure that these laws are effective and are enforced. 
Democracy will be defended and the rule of law upheld. That is an 
essential element of national policy. (Haughey, 1980)
.
. 
 
Yet despite consistently stating that the IRA campaign did not have a 
mandate (Lynch, 30 November 1971), Fianna Fáil argued, from the outset of 
the Troubles, that Irish unity was the only viable long term solution for 
Northern Ireland. Like Éamon de Valera before him, Lynch claimed that 
Ireland‟s right to national self-determination underlined the party‟s belief in 
unity as the ultimate solution (Lynch, 1 November 1968). At the 1969 party 
Ard Fheis, Lynch made clear that his government‟s concentration on human 
rights, discrimination and reform in Northern Ireland did not “in any way 
indicate the abandonment by us (Fianna Fáil) of our just claim that the 
historic unity of this island be restored” (Lynch, 1969). Lynch believed that 
the emerging troubles in Northern Ireland were a direct consequence of 
partition and that their resolution lay in the undoing of partition. He also 
placed the blame for partition squarely with the British government. In 
October 1968, Lynch claimed that “partition is the first and foremost root 
cause. And partition arose out of British policy” (Lynch, 8 October 1968). In 
an address to the Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Group some weeks later he 
repeated the view that “the clashes in the streets of Derry are an expression 
of the evils which partition has brought in its train” (Lynch, 30 October 
1968). 
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It is not merely in Lynch‟s rhetoric that the claim to unity was 
expressed. Lynch also attempted to pursue this claim at a political level and 
for the first time in the history of the party, Fianna Fáil actively pursued a 
policy of reunification at Anglo-Irish level. While it is not the intention here 
to substantially quote from the archives, a look at the records from meetings 
at Anglo-Irish level reveals the rationale for Lynch‟s reunification-based 
discourse and policy.  
At a meeting with the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, in 
September 1971 Lynch reiterated that “partition was imposed and its 
existence always constituted a threat of violence because of the efforts to 
maintain Unionists in power” (Lynch, September 1971). Significantly, 
Lynch went on to say that “The IRA is a by-product of that situation (where 
the majority continued in power in Northern Ireland)” and if the British 
Prime Minister “could find it possible to state that the unification of Ireland 
would have to be the ultimate solution and gave an assurance of interest in 
working towards this end, this would be enormously helpful at the present 
time” (Lynch, September 1971). The Irish government and Lynch were of 
the view that if the British government were to move towards a policy of 
Irish unification then the reasons for the IRA would cease to exist. According 
to Lynch, support for the IRA could be diminished if a political initiative was 
put in place to move towards unity and to improve conditions for nationalists 
in Northern Ireland. Lynch clearly believed in the legitimacy of the call for a 
united Ireland and interpreted the conflict in Northern Ireland in these terms. 
More importantly Fianna Fáil believed that addressing the reasons for IRA 
violence was the key to bringing the conflict to an end in the short to 
immediate term.  Thus Fianna Fáil attempted to gain progress towards Irish 
unity at a political level believing that if the Irish government could prove 
that constitutional avenues could offer progress towards unity this would 
both remove the reasons for IRA violence and undermine support for the 
IRA.  
So while Fianna Fáil criticised IRA violence, its approach from the 
outset of the Troubles was to articulate a strong republican discourse and 
anti-partitionist policy at governmental level in the pursuit of a united Ireland 
as an alternative to the IRA violent campaign. The problem was that Lynch 
had no success in his attempts to put in place an initiative for Northern 
Ireland that might result in a united Ireland. This was mainly due to the fact 
that the British government did not accept that the Irish government had any 
right to be involved in discussions relating to Northern Ireland (See Bew et 
al., 1997, pp. 43-4) but also due to the reality of unionist opposition to such 
an outcome. As such Lynch endorsed the IRA pursuit of Irish reunification in 
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his choice of language but could not deliver any progress on this through 
constitutional mechanisms. In fact Lynch‟s inability to match anti-partitionist 
language with delivery at Anglo-Irish level further underlined for IRA 
supporters the argument that constitutional politics could not deliver. The 
failure of this approach also reinforced the republican discourse (in both the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland) which stressed British 
responsibility in relation to Northern Ireland.  
Despite failure at this point, Fianna Fáil remained consistent in its 
attempts to make political progress towards a settlement involving unity as a 
mechanism to remove the reasons for IRA violence. In the 1980s Haughey 
believed this settlement would develop at an Anglo-Irish level. He argued 
that Northern Ireland was a failed political entity and stressed the need for 
the Irish and British governments to „work together to find a formula and lift 
the situation onto a new plane that will bring permanent peace and stability 
to the people of these islands”. In Haughey‟s view this new Anglo-Irish 
approach would begin with “a declaration by the British Government of their 
interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland, by agreement and in peace [and 
this] would open the way towards an entirely new situation in which peace, 
real lasting peace, would become an attainable reality” (Haughey, 1980). 
While this is not exactly how it panned out, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
1985 and the potential benefits of a peace process persuaded the republican 
movement of the progress that could be made politically if violence was 
absent. 
While still seeking the mechanism to illustrate to republicans that 
constitutionalism could deliver progress towards unity, Fianna Fáil continued 
its use of anti-partitionist language and a strong republican position as an 
alternative to Sinn Féin and the IRA campaign. For Haughey this involved a 
rejection of the principle of consent and an insistence that talks with 
unionists would only involve discussion as to the form of a united Ireland 
and not about whether reunification might happen – “when we speak of the 
need to secure the agreement of the unionist population that agreement 
applies to the new arrangements for, but not to the concept of, a united 
Ireland” (Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 361, Cols. 2579-2600, 19 November 
1985). Haughey‟s rationale for this was similar to that of Lynch‟s as seen 
above in his meetings at Anglo-Irish level and this is illustrated in the 
response by Haughey to The Unionist Case (a submission to the Taoiseach 
and leader of the Opposition by unionist Robert McCartney). In this 
response, Haughey argued that the Irish government‟s position on Northern 
Ireland must aim to limit the strength of Sinn Féin and the IRA. Haughey 
believed that if the Irish government abandoned the claim to Irish unity then 
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republican violence would increase as nationalists in Northern Ireland would 
feel abandoned and the IRA‟s argument that no option other than violence 
was open to them would appear to be strengthened. Haughey wrote:  
 
It is a great illusion to suppose that if the Irish government were to 
recognise the validity of partition and to abandon the concept of a 
united Ireland that this would necessarily bring a diminution of 
violence. On the contrary, the only likely consequence would be a 
threat to the stability of the twenty-six counties as well as the six 
counties. An Irish government, which would abandon the fundamental 
democratic aspiration of the Irish people on both sides of the border, 
would invite repudiation possible in a form, which would only 
aggravate the existing conflict in Northern Ireland (Mansergh, 1986, p. 
574). 
 
Thus the use of traditional republican rhetoric by Fianna Fáil in the 
1970s and the 1980s and indeed more recently was and is aimed at 
undermining the ideological arguments put forward to justify the IRA 
campaign. Success towards a united Ireland at a political constitutional level 
was pursued in order to highlight the futility of violence and limit the level of 
support for IRA violence and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland and in the 
Republic, in particular. It was and is also intended to limit the electoral threat 
from Sinn Féin. It must be said also that the articulation of a united Ireland 
reflected and continues to reflect the long-term position of Fianna Fáil. 
Fianna Fáil does not necessarily dispute the IRA or Sinn Féin‟s interpretation 
of the conflict in Northern Ireland and agrees that unity is the ultimate 
solution. Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil shared a use of anti-partitionist centred 
discourse but what differentiated the two parties was Fianna Fáil‟s belief in 
constitutional mechanisms as the correct and most successful approach. It 
was the shared interpretations that ultimately convinced Sinn Féin that it 
could adopt a political approach which involved building a working 
relationship and an agreed position with the Irish government. It is for this 
reason also that in working with the Irish government, Sinn Féin prefers to 
work with an Irish government led by Fianna Fáil (See Adams, 2003, p. 197 
for views on this).  
 
Fine Gael and the Labour Party Discourse on Northern Ireland 
 
The common objectives by Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour in 
seeking to undermine Sinn Féin and the IRA have already been outlined. 
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What then was it that distinguished the Fine Gael approach in terms of 
discourse to that of Fianna Fáil and how did these discourses function 
together? Did they act to complement or oppose each other? These are some 
of the questions addressed in this section. 
Given its history as a strong defender of the constitutional tradition in 
Ireland, its declaration of the Republic in 1949 coupled with a celebration of 
the State‟s connections with the British State and Commonwealth (See 
O‟Donnell, 2008) it is not surprising that it was Fine Gael and not Fianna 
Fáil that reacted to the outbreak of the Troubles with attempts at 
reassessment and debate on the “national question” and Northern Ireland. 
This was very much influenced and led by the party‟s leader from 1977-87, 
Garret FitzGerald, who had a significant interest in Northern Ireland. Fine 
Gael members saw the party as having a role in reshaping attitudes and 
interpretations and in leading debate and discourse in the Republic as to 
Northern Ireland, republicanism and the achievement of a united Ireland. 
This was outlined by the party‟s spokesperson on Northern Ireland and 
prominent border TD, Paddy Harte, in a speech to the Fine Gael Ard Fheis, 
20 May 1978. He said:  
 
The challenge facing [the] Fine Gael leadership is to continue to guide 
southern opinion in the correct direction towards Irish nationhood and to 
involve the Party at all levels throughout the Republic in promoting 
better understanding of the complexities of Northern Irish life (Harte, 20 
May 1978). 
Like Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin, Fine Gael and Labour reaffirmed the ideal of 
a united Ireland (See Hayward, 2004, pp. 23-24), but they did not seek to 
present a strong republican position but rather alternative argument and 
alternative policy positions. Instead while Fianna Fáil talked about the 
ultimate solution of unity, national self-determination and Britain‟s 
responsibility in relation to Northern Ireland, Fine Gael, in agreement with 
the Labour Party, only talked about unity coming about through consent. On 
this point, Fine Gael has been consistent. In 1969, Fine Gael was proactive in 
its unilateral endorsement of the principle of consent and this has remained 
party policy (See Fine Gael, 1969 in Harte, 2005; See also Fine Gael, 1979, 
p. 4; Noonan, 2006; Deenihan, 2006). We‟ve seen above Fianna Fáil‟s 
alternative interpretation as to what the principle of consent entailed and 
indeed this represented much of the disagreement between the two parties 
through the 1970s and 1980s. 
Another point rejected by Fianna Fáil but on which Fine Gael and 
Labour did not shift was the need, in their view, for the Republic to become 
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more pluralist. They argued that Ireland‟s legislation would have to be made 
more attractive to unionists. FitzGerald, Harte and others in Fine Gael 
acknowledged that constitutional reform in the Republic was necessary 
before Unionists would contemplate unity. As early as February 1972, Paddy 
Harte talked about the need for “the foundations of a new and just society” to 
be assured before unity could take place. He argued that: 
 
Reunification is not yet on the agenda and we in the Republic have 
many changes to achieve before it will even be acceptable for debate by 
the most moderate of Unionist. Nothing short of a completely new 
Constitution leading in the direction of a Pluralist Society will be 
sufficient as an initial step on our part (Harte, 21 November 1972).  
 
Harte consistently argued that “Ireland united must mean the total 
acceptance of the policies, the cultures, the traditions and the religious beliefs 
of all Irish people and the freedom to express and practice these things in a 
natural way. Unless this is accepted Irish unity is a myth and an illusion and 
Irish nationhood can never be gained” (Harte, 4 October 1978). 
Harte‟s views reflected those of his leader, Garret FitzGerald, who also 
stressed the need for a more pluralist republic as a prerequisite to unity 
(FitzGerald, 1972, pp. 142-57) and, as Taoiseach, set about the completion of 
a “constitutional crusade” (Mair, 1987, p. 97). He outlined his party‟s 
policies for government as including “the creation of a pluralist society as a 
basis upon which to build a new relationship between North and South” 
(Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 337, Col. 577, 1 July 1982). Thus Fine Gael‟s 
discourse centred around what former Fine Gael leader, Michael Noonan, 
has described the twin pillars of Fine Gael thought on Northern Ireland, that 
is, an acceptance of the principle of consent and a recognition that “there‟s 
an obligation to try to accommodate difference by having a more pluralist 
society down here” (Noonan, 2006). 
As already mentioned Fine Gael‟s policy and discourse on Northern 
Ireland (in particular the emphasis on the principle of consent and unity) was 
very much influenced by the SDLP. While in government in the 1980s, Fine 
Gael sought to bolster the position of constitutional nationalism in the North 
and this was the rationale for FitzGerald‟s pursuit of an Anglo-Irish process 
which led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 (See FitzGerald, 1993, pp. 
191-2). Fine Gael had up to this point stressed consent and pluralism and 
seeking agreement with Protestants in Northern Ireland. However, now that 
the SDLP was perceived to be facing an electoral threat from Sinn Féin in 
Northern Ireland, Fine Gael prioritised a deal with the British government in 
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order to strengthen the position of the SDLP. Through the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, the Irish government sought to bolster the SDLP by securing 
nationalist representation in Northern Ireland and an Irish dimension – both 
of which were key demands made by the SDLP. 
 
Discourses as Functions of Politics in Northern Ireland 
Fine Gael‟s motivation in signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 is 
well known in terms of undermining the electoral threat which Sinn Féin 
posed to the SDLP in Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the Hunger Strikes 
there in 1981. In addition to this, the Anglo-Irish Agreement also affected a 
reassessment within the republican movement and forced a debate among its 
members as to the gains that could be made at political level (On 
republicanism and the peace process see English, 2003). This was an 
important, if unplanned, outcome of Fine Gael efforts. Fianna Fáil‟s use of 
republican anti-partitionist discourse is important here too. Given Fianna 
Fáil‟s republican position up to that point it was the obvious party in the 
Republic from which Sinn Féin sought assistance in the late 1980s when it 
looked for a way out of its isolating armed struggle (See O‟Donnell, 2003; 
Mallie and McKittrick, 2001)). 
These are important points in understanding the emergence of the peace 
process in the late 1980s but what functions did the two alternative set of 
discourses utilised by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael play in this? The answer to 
this lays in understanding the parties‟ objectives and assessing their success 
in these. As outlined, both parties were concerned to undermine Sinn Féin 
and the IRA‟s argument in favour of violence in Northern Ireland as well as 
to limit support for the republican movement. Fine Gael was particularly 
concerned with the effect of growing support for Sinn Féin in the 1980s on 
the SDLP in Northern Ireland. Fianna Fáil was also fearful of the effect on 
their support base in the Republic. How successful were they in their efforts? 
Fine Gael‟s main achievement was in its traditional concentration on 
the principle of consent and pluralism as a way of reaching out to unionists 
and in gaining recognition for these ideas. In contrast, Fianna Fáil‟s historical 
articulation of the Irish right to national self-determination and vocalisation 
of its belief in unity as the only acceptable outcome successfully maintained 
the republican constituency in the Republic mainly in the Fianna Fáil fold 
and acted as a deterrent to those in the Republic who might otherwise have 
supported Sinn Féin and the IRA if a republican vacuum had been allowed to 
exist. It also meant that Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin had many ideological 
points in common and enabled it to bring Sinn Féin into mainstream 
constitutional politics in the 1990s. 
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Thus both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael played important roles, through 
their choice of discourse, in creating the conditions for the peace process. 
Fine Gael incorporated the principle of consent into official political 
discourse in the Republic. Fianna Fáil, through its anti-partitionist discourse 
and concentration on self-determination, provided the avenue for which to 
bring Sinn Féin into discussion from the late 1980s onwards. Both sets of 
discourses had important goals and eventually played complementary roles 
in the development of the peace process and in framing the Good Friday 
Agreement. Ultimately they shared the same agenda to undermine support 
for the IRA. Both parties would now claim the peace process as an 
endorsement of their individual positions and discourses on Northern Ireland 
since the beginning of the Troubles.  
 
Political Discourse and the Peace Process 
 
A central part of the peace process experience in the Republic has been 
the development of a cross-party political and ideological consensus on long-
term and short-term policies and goals for Northern Ireland. This new 
political consensus plays a key role in maintaining the peace process and in 
implementing the Good Friday Agreement. The political parties have been 
articulating a discourse on Northern Ireland that illustrates the emergence of 
agreement on a number of levels. The consensus reached by Fianna Fáil and 
Fine Gael on Northern Ireland is based on their support for the Good Friday 
Agreement which both parties endorsed in 1998 (See Bertie Ahern, Dáil 
Éireann Debates Vol. 489, Col. 1029, 21 April 1998 and John Bruton, Dáil 
Éireann Debates Vol. 489, Col. 1038, 21 April 1998). By endorsing the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998 Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael agreed on the 
reformulation of the relevant Articles the 1937 Constitution of Ireland and an 
ideological formula involving the concepts of self-determination and the 
principle of consent. Both parties have declared their immediate goal for 
Northern Ireland to be the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement 
with unity as a long-term objective. The Fianna Fáil manifesto in 2002 
asserted the party‟s priority to “secure lasting peace in Ireland through the 
full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement” without “prejudice to 
the ultimate goal of achieving a united Ireland” (The Irish Times, 26 April 
2002). Under successive leaders, Fine Gael has supported the peace process 
and has also articulated the long-term objective of unity (Deenihan, 2006; 
Hayes, 2006; See also Coveney, 2004).  
As part of their shared support for the Good Friday Agreement and the 
peace process the language of the peace process as espoused by the main 
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parties in the Republic has been framed within the terms of reconciliation 
and a peaceful settlement. There has also emerged a common understanding 
between Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil (and Sinn Féin) on the meaning of 
republicanism as democratic, pluralist and as accepting of the principle of 
consent. This development in reflected in many of the party leaders‟ 
speeches. The Fine Gael leader, Enda Kenny, describes the republic as one 
that “upholds and practises true republican traditions - freedom, pluralism, 
justice, equality, brotherhood” (Kenny, 2007). Former Fianna Fáil leader, 
Bertie Ahern, has agreed: “We value religious liberty and practice religious 
tolerance. Our success in Ireland is based on democratic republicanism and is 
inspired by the principles of equality and fraternity” (Ahern, 2004). 
Also central to the agreed discourse in favour of the peace process and 
the Good Friday Agreement is the central role for Sinn Féin within the peace 
process and politics in Northern Ireland. Both parties have talked about the 
peace process as existing only through the inclusion of Sinn Féin. For 
example, former leader of Fine Gael, Michael Noonan, has stated that 
“certainly there is no peace process without Sinn Féin” (Noonan, 2006) and 
former Deputy Leader of Fianna Fáil, Mary O‟Rourke, has also argued that 
“there was going to be no process without them (Sinn Féin)” (O‟Rourke, 
2005). This belief in Sinn Féin inclusion is a major component of what the 
discourse of the peace process involves. 
Both parties are also in agreement though that the peace process does 
not mean that Sinn Féin should be considered suitable for government in the 
Republic. Fianna Fáil have taken this position on the grounds that „Northern 
Ireland is a different environment‟ and therefore “different considerations 
apply” (Treacy, 2005). Fine Gael‟s Brian Hayes has also argued that putting 
Sinn Féin in government in the Republic would be wrong on the basis that 
“the Republic is not the North. We don‟t have divided allegiance in this part 
of the island. The Northern Ireland Assembly is a regional parliament, 
established with the purpose of bringing together the divided and sectarian 
society that is Northern Ireland” (Sunday Independent, 17 October 2004). 
 
What does this mean for Northern Ireland? 
 
The first section of this article outlines the function which the chosen 
discourses by the parties in the Republic played in the course of the troubles 
in Northern Ireland and the emergence of the peace process in the late 1980s. 
Similarly, the language used by the parties in the Republic plays a significant 
part in ensuring the longevity of the peace process as the accepted political 
initiative for Northern Ireland and has contained any support for an 
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alternative approach. This shared discourse among the parties in the Republic 
and in Britain has had a highly significant impact in ensuring the 
maintenance and legitimacy of the peace process in the public mind. 
If we remember the situation in the aftermath of the 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Agreement we can understand the importance of political consensus for 
political peace initiatives. While Fianna Fáil continued to implement the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement when it came to power in 1987, Haughey 
consistently endorsed the idea of a process that would “transcend the existing 
framework for Northern Ireland” (Haughey, The Irish Times, 23 April 1988). 
This opened up the opportunity to renegotiate the Agreement and to find a 
process that would replace it. No such prospect exists now. The existence of 
cross-party support for the peace process in Britain means that this new 
cross-party agreement in the Republic on Northern Ireland is even more 
significant. Both governments have been firm in their support for the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, the peace process and more 
importantly the inclusion of Sinn Féin. This has been particularly important 
in forcing the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and, more recently, the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to engage with the peace process as a 
political reality. Both governments became converted to the peace process 
despite unionist opposition and unionists have been forced to respond to this 
(On the unionist experience of the peace process see Farrington, 2005). In 
short, the emergence of a cross-party discourse, which reflects the consensus 
that exists in the Republic, as well as in Britain, on short-term and long-term 
policies for Northern Ireland, has removed the political space for an 
alternative initiative for Northern Ireland. 
In addition, the cross-party endorsement of the constitutional change 
that was involved in the Good Friday Agreement was crucial to gaining 
overwhelming public support for change and ensured the relatively 
uncontroversial referendum campaign in the Republic in 1998.  If the parties 
in the Republic had disagreed on the Good Friday Agreement (as was the 
case with the Anglo-Irish Agreement) the entire project would have been 
weakened. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The role and purpose of political discourse is an important component 
of attempts to understand the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland. 
As has been illustrated by the other contributions to this volume, the 
articulation of key ideas, political and ideological positions by the parties in 
Northern Ireland are central to this. Equally important has been the official 
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political discourse on Northern Ireland in the Republic of Ireland. This has 
played important but differing roles in the Troubles and the peace process.  
Throughout the Troubles Fianna Fáil discourse centred around the right 
to national self-determination, unity as the ultimate solution and British 
responsibility in relation to Northern Ireland. Fianna Fáil pursued a 
reunification policy and discourse with the aim of removing the reasons for 
IRA violence through constitutional progress towards unity. It also sought to 
limit the level of support for Sinn Féin and the IRA in the Republic by 
providing a strong republican alternative and avoiding a republican vacuum 
from which Sinn Féin could benefit. While Fianna Fáil could not 
demonstrate in the 1970s and 1980s that constitutional mechanisms could 
provide progress towards unity it successfully limited the appeal of militant 
republicanism in the main to Northern Ireland. By the late 1980s when Sinn 
Féin sought to bring republicans into mainstream politics, the ideology and 
language that it shared with Fianna Fáil opened up an avenue through which 
to establish the pan-nationalist alliance which became so central to the peace 
process (See O‟Donnell, 2007). 
Fine Gael, and Labour, also sought to undermine the credibility of the 
arguments articulated by the republican movement in justifying IRA 
violence. Fine Gael articulated a challenging and new discourse on Northern 
Ireland based around the principle of consent and a pluralist society in the 
Republic prior to unity.  It was very much influenced by the SDLP and its 
policy in the 1980s had the objective of bolstering the SDLP in the North 
against an electoral threat from Sinn Féin in the years after the IRA Hunger 
Strikes. Much of Fine Gael‟s language on the principle of consent and 
republicanism as a pluralist and democratic concept provided the framework 
for the Good Friday Agreement and the language of the peace process (See 
O‟Donnell, 2008). The short-term policy and discourse differences between 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had important complementary impacts on politics 
in Northern Ireland. As a result of its commitment to removing the reasons 
for IRA violence, Fianna Fáil provided much of the basis and rationale for 
the peace process by making a process involving Sinn Féin likely. By 
emphasising the principle of consent, Fine Gael provided much of the 
framework for the constitutional reform undertaken by the Republic of 
Ireland through the Good Friday Agreement.  
The language by the parties in the Republic continues to have an 
important function for Northern Ireland as the peace process develops. While 
the aim throughout the conflict was to undermine Sinn Féin and the IRA, the 
aim now is to endorse the peace process as the only political initiative for 
Northern Ireland. Key to achieving this has been the cross-party consensus 
Political Discourse  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 57 - 
 
that has emerged in the Republic of Ireland (and in Britain) during the peace 
process on ideological, short and long-term policy points in relation to 
Northern Ireland. This consensus and shared discourse is key to explaining 
the durability of the peace process despite the problems it has faced.  
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INTERPRETING NEW LABOUR’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 
 
Aaron Edwards 
Abstract 
New Labour‟s superintendence of the Northern Ireland peace process has 
re-opened debate about the party‟s stance on the “Irish question”. While 
some commentators hold the view that it remains ideologically wedded to the 
nationalist goal of Irish unity, it could be argued that Labour‟s Northern 
Ireland policy has been characterised by an ambivalent non-interventionist 
approach. The “peace strategy” pursued by Tony Blair‟s three 
administrations between 1997 and 2007 is examined in light of the political 
discourse articulated by key actors within New Labour itself. Moreover, the 
interpretive approach in British political science is utilised to illuminate key 
variables, such as ideology and values, driving the party‟s view on 
sovereignty in the United Kingdom more broadly. In applying this analytical 
framework the article explains how New Labour‟s policy towards Northern 
Ireland underwent significant adaptation under Blair‟s leadership and why it 
finally achieved its overarching objective of consigning the violent conflict to 
atrophy. 
 
Introduction 
 
One problem with Tony [Blair]‟s fundamental view of Northern Ireland 
is that the process is the policy, that as long as the process is being 
sustained and you are giving plenty of evidence that you believe in the 
process, even if you can do nothing else, that is sufficient policy. (Peter 
Mandelson, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, cited in the 
Guardian, 14 March 2007) 
I would tell Tony that, no matter what, we had to try to keep things 
moving forward, like a bicycle. If we let the bicycle fall over, we would 
create a vacuum and that vacuum would be filled by violence … By the 
end, we had realised peace was not an event but a process. (Jonathan 
Powell, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2008, p. 5) 
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This paper considers the underlying ideological dynamics of New 
Labour‟s “peace strategy” in Northern Ireland by concentrating on three key 
components in its political discourse: devolution, bipartisanship and 
consent.
1
 It is argued here that these concepts underwent significant shifts in 
meaning after 1994, which permitted Tony Blair to move his party from a 
position of “persuaders for Irish unity” in the early 1990s to a position of 
“neutral arbitration” when returned to power in 1997. Moreover, in order to 
understand its “peace strategy” more fully these “endogenous” changes must 
be considered in light of the “exogenous” constitutional reconfiguration of 
the United Kingdom polity. Indeed, it is argued here that New Labour‟s 
policy towards Northern Ireland should be understood, can only be 
understood, in relation to the party‟s successful synergy of both of these key 
drivers in its political discourse. 
 
The “New” in New Labour’s Northern Ireland Policy 
 
Drawing on the interpretive work of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006) 
this article critically analyses New Labour‟s political discourse on the 
Northern Ireland peace process. In methodological terms, the interpretive 
approach is concerned with traditions, contexts and dilemmas in politics. 
“Tradition”, in the sense that Bevir and Rhodes deploy the concept, acts as a 
backdrop but does not fix everything; it is “an initial influence” on actors that 
colours their later actions but is always contingent (Finlayson et al., 2004, p. 
150). In many ways traditions are enabling ideological backdrops, against 
which actors are permitted to make informed choices within a specific socio-
political context. Moreover, when an actor becomes conscious of the rigid 
restrictions that may be placed upon their future actions by adhering to such 
traditions it is possible for them to lighten their ideological baggage by 
embracing a new idea. The point at which this self-realisation occurs is 
known as a dilemma. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 36) explain: “A 
dilemma arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in 
opposition to existing beliefs and associated traditions”. 
 
Explaining Ideological Change within the Labour Party 
 
New Labour‟s political discourse on Northern Ireland could be said to 
have encountered such a dilemma. In line with Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 
37) it is possible to demonstrate how, in order to “accommodate a new idea, 
people must develop their existing beliefs to make room for it, and its 
content will open some ways of doing so and close down others”. This paper 
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examines how and why an ideological dilemma arose within the Labour 
Party vis-à-vis its political discourse on Northern Ireland. In re-defining their 
policy the architects of “New” Labour were keen to distance it from that of 
“Old” Labour. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, pp. 197-198) elaborate: 
New Labour rejects the command bureaucracy model of old Labour 
with its emphasis on hierarchy, authority and rules … New Labour 
does not seek to provide centralised “statist” solutions to every social 
and economic problem. Instead New Labour promotes the idea of 
networks of institutions and individuals acting in partnerships held 
together by relations of trust … Patterns of governance arise as the 
contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed 
by beliefs of the agents as they in turn arise against a backcloth of 
traditions and dilemmas. 
In the Northern Ireland context, as elsewhere, “the triumph of Blair‟s 
vision of New Labour over other strands of social democracy represents the 
outcome of a contingent political struggle” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p. 140). 
The “contingent political struggle” – in the sense that it is employed in this 
article – is shown to be as hard-fought-out between New Labour‟s own left 
and right as it is with its electoral opponents in the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties. 
In her political memoirs Blair‟s first Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland Mo Mowlam (2002, p. 162) reveals how the formulation of Northern 
Ireland policy - in the wake of her party‟s victory in the 1997 British general 
election - was born out of the necessity to balance internal tensions between 
several Labour interest groups: 
As members of a party with a long tradition of fighting for justice and a 
fairer society, a lot of people in the Labour Party had been close 
supporters of the civil-rights movement in Northern Ireland in the 
1960s and 1970s, which translated for many into support for Irish 
nationalism. But [after 1997] we were no longer a campaigning 
opposition. We now had a clear position, standing, in my shorthand, for 
“neutrality, with fairness, justice and equality”. That meant we could 
do things as a government to further those crucial values, while at the 
same times maintaining our neutrality in the talks. 
However, the reality was somewhat more complex than Mowlam cared 
to admit, in that Labour‟s policy towards Northern Ireland ebbed and flowed 
according to a number of factors. Other variables not already mentioned 
included the personal interests of individual leaders, their dexterity in 
managing backbench critics in Parliament and the aims of certain Labour 
interest groups. Furthermore, it was a policy tempered to a large degree by 
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other domestic and foreign concerns of the day. Thus during his post-war 
government Clement Attlee (Labour leader, 1935-55) took a pro-unionist 
stance on Northern Ireland and invested heavily in passing legislation that 
secured the province‟s political survival. Such favourable rapprochement 
emerged directly from Northern Ireland‟s role in aiding the British war-
effort. Conversely, during its long spell in Opposition under Hugh Gaitskell 
(Labour leader, 1955-63) Labour maintained a close association with the 
cross-community Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), thus maintaining a 
partitionist outlook. Only under Harold Wilson (Labour leader, 1963-76) did 
the party pursue a more green-tinged policy, something subsequently resisted 
by his successor James Callaghan (1976-79). 
This ambiguous stance has led some critics, like Brendan O‟Leary 
(2004, p. 196), to conclude that “Statements they [Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan] made before or after their premierships showed they had 
formulated preferences substantively different from the status quo, but in 
office did nothing that significantly advanced these goals”. The move in 
Labour Party circles towards open support for Irish unity was hastened under 
the leadership of Michael Foot (1979-83) and Neil Kinnock (1983-92). 
Significantly, by the time John Smith (1992-94) had taken over from 
Kinnock the Irish question had been subordinated to the wider electoral 
ambitions of the party, where it was to remain until Tony Blair assumed the 
leadership in the wake of Smith‟s untimely death. 
It was under Blair that New Labour‟s policy on Northern Ireland 
underwent considerable adaptation between 1994 and 2007 in which a 
devolved settlement based on the “principle of consent”, not “unity by 
consent”, became the central plank in the governing party‟s peace strategy. 
Although in many respects it represented something of a clean break from 
the rigid “green” (i.e. sympathetic to the Irish nationalist aspiration for Irish 
unity) orthodoxy of the 1980s, it was nonetheless a by-product of the trade-
off undertaken by Labour‟s leaders in a bid to make the party more electable 
while diffusing internal tensions on Ireland. Thus, the policy of “unity by 
consent” was dropped in favour of non-interventionism in Irish affairs. While 
this new departure was qualitatively different from the policy pursued under 
Wilson‟s Labour governments of 1964-70 and 1974-76, it does share 
common ground with that pursued under Gaitskell in the 1950s and early 
1960s (see Edwards, 2007, 2009). An acceptance of majority consent, 
regionalism, and a locally devolved administration had long since formed the 
backbone of the party‟s immediate post-war policy towards Northern Ireland 
(Dixon, 1993). 
 
Interpreting New Labour‟s  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 64 - 
 
Devolution 
 
In his resignation speech on 10 May 2007, Tony Blair made just one 
minor reference to Northern Ireland in which he said, “I think Northern 
Ireland would not have been changed unless Britain had changed”. Change 
in Britain, and in government policy towards the province, under Blair 
centred round major constitutional and territorial adjustment, which saw an 
effective return to devolved government in the three peripheral regions of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Labour‟s commitment to devolution 
remained strong during Blair‟s decade as Prime Minister and in some ways 
demonstrates how New Labour sought to redress the issue of sovereignty in 
the absence of a more radical “Old” Labourist agenda. Arguably, Blair, 
rather than seeing devolution as an effective conflict management tool, 
viewed its utility through the much broader prism of constitutional reform. 
Before coming to power he remarked: 
I find it odd to say the least that the government proposes devolution 
for Northern Ireland as part of a package designed to keep the Union 
together but says that devolution anywhere else is irresponsible and 
reckless (Blair, 1996, p. 82). 
The empowerment of the ordinary citizen became a recurring theme in 
New Labour discourse throughout its first three terms of office. It is evident 
in a speech made by the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter 
Hain (2006)
2
 at the time of the St. Andrews Agreement, when he pointed out 
that: “Devolution gives local politicians the power to take local decisions 
about local issues. I hope they will grasp this opportunity and fulfill the 
obligations for which they have long been elected”. In New Labour discourse 
this decentralisation of governance sprang from both a deep-seated belief in 
empowering ordinary people and in a firm commitment to achieving a 
peaceful settlement to this most enduring of conflicts. 
A commitment to reconfigure the constitutional landscape of the UK 
was the key point of differentiation between New Labour‟s policy towards 
Northern Ireland and that of its political counterparts or predecessors.
3
 As 
indicated above constitutional reform remained a crucial element of New 
Labour‟s vision for a “New Britain”, wherein power was devolved to the 
constituent (or peripheral) parts of the UK in a way that reflected the party‟s 
own radical democratic socialist tradition. Tony Blair‟s vision for a “New 
Britain” is evident in his Maiden speech to the people of Northern Ireland, 
delivered at the Royal Ulster Agricultural Society in Belfast in 1997: 
I want to see a Union which reflects and accommodates diversity. I am 
against a rigid, centralised approach. That is the surest way to weaken 
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the Union. The proposals this government are making for Scotland and 
Wales, and for the English regions, are designed to bring Government 
closer to the people. That will renew and strengthen the Union. 
However, it must be borne in mind that devolution was conceived for 
an altogether different purpose in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in the UK. 
As Bradbury and Mitchell (2005, p. 295) point out: 
In Scotland and Wales the purpose of devolution had been to 
accommodate national feeling within a decentralised UK. In contrast, 
in Northern Ireland devolution had been a mechanism to reconcile 
implacably opposed nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist 
perspectives on the nature of government and to assist a wider “peace 
process” for scaling down sectarian violence between and within the 
two communities. 
A devolved, power-sharing arrangement between Protestant Unionists 
and Catholic Nationalists became the preferred outcome for the settlement of 
the local conflict. On a much broader level devolution, as a form of 
federalism, is a useful conflict management device for application in 
conflicts where ethno-nationalist feeling has spilled over into violence. 
While there is disagreement in the academic literature about the effects of 
federalism on ethno-nationalism (Hechter, 2004, p. 296), with some 
commentators arguing that it exacerbates it and others that it accommodates 
it, few would argue that it plays no role at all. In Zartman‟s (2004, p. 154) 
view: 
Despite the fears of many governments, autonomy is not a down 
payment on secession: Cancellation of autonomy is. When minorities 
are granted self-government in autonomy, it gives them something to 
do that takes their minds off of secession and conflict and puts the 
emphasis on skills at governing rather than on contesting government. 
By emphasising devolution in New Labour‟s political discourse Blair 
was afforded the opportunity to push the case for greater autonomy for the 
UK regions, while at the same time taking the sting out of what M.L.R. 
Smith (1999, p. 80) has called the „single most destabilizing force in British 
politics for a generation‟. Despite the Conservative Party‟s hostility towards 
devolution New Labour was able to successfully maintain “at least the façade 
of bipartisanship” (Powell, 2008, p. 88) on Northern Ireland affairs. 
 
Bi-partisanship 
Bi-partisanship has been defined by Dixon (2001, p. 345) as, “a general 
agreement between the two main British political parties on the principles of 
the constitutional approach towards the conflict in Northern Ireland”. The 
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acceptance of the so-called “principle of consent”4 in constitutional matters 
has been central to the creation of a common approach to the conflict by 
British political parties. However, bi-partisanship has not always been the 
motivating factor behind Labour Party policy on Northern Ireland, as 
indicated above. In 1981, owing to pressure from its left-wing who were 
aggrieved by Margaret Thatcher‟s handling of the republican Hunger Strikes, 
Labour officially declared itself in favour of a united Ireland, albeit by the 
reaching of democratic consent within Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2006, p. 
119; see also Edwards, 2009, Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the explicit meaning 
behind this change in policy was later elaborated on by the former Labour 
Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Kevin McNamara, who 
remarked “Because I believe that unity by consent is the only viable strategy 
for ending partition, I am convinced that the party should be actively 
pursuing such a policy” (Tribune, 1 December 1989). 
The tacit acceptance of bi-partisanship by McNamara and other 
nationalist sympathisers in the 1980s - added to the increasing divergence 
between Labour and Conservative policies on Northern Ireland - led some 
observers to believe that a change-over in future government would herald a 
return of a British administration sympathetic to the concerns of Irish 
nationalists. Indeed, the NILP (Labour‟s „sister‟ party in the province) had 
formally broke off its fraternal relationship with Labour on this very issue, 
when, following a meeting with Michael Foot, the local party accused him of 
pursuing “the idiotic and undemocratic policy of „rolling republicanism‟ 
which was adopted at the last party conference” (Belfast Newsletter, 4 
February 1982). 
However, the integrity of the Labour Party‟s nationalist bias and its 
willingness to act on such instincts has been seriously questioned by some 
scholars. As John Whyte (1993, p. 107) pointed out, although “There has 
always been a minority in the Labour Party with united-Ireland sympathies” 
(including former Prime Minister, Harold Wilson), “the limits of the feasible 
have reasserted themselves, and in practice Labour governments, faced with 
the adamant opposition of unionists to any kind of united Ireland, have 
proved as committed to the union as Conservative ones”. Despite the ups and 
downs in the peace process, bi-partisanship remained the most consistent 
guiding principle of successive British governments throughout the Direct 
Rule period, far outlasting the fringe tendencies of some interest groups 
within the Conservative and Labour parties. In the House of Commons, as 
Cunningham has observed, “the bilateral management of Northern Ireland … 
[soon became] the orthodoxy” (2001, p. 159). 
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Indeed, another dimension of New Labour‟s management of the peace 
process has been its ability to sustain its bilateral relationship with the Irish 
government, a process cultivated by John Major in the early 1990s. In its 
1997 election manifesto, New Labour indicated its willingness to work with 
the Irish government to secure peace in the province, and from his first 
meeting with Bertie Ahern it later transpired that Tony Blair and the new 
leader of Fianna Fáil had “hit it off immediately” (Powell, 2008, p. 88). The 
personal chemistry between the two men, added to Blair‟s appreciation of the 
nuances of Irish history, meant that when Ahern later became Taoiseach a 
more concerted effort to solving the conflict could be adopted. As a result of 
this transformation in Anglo-Irish relations Blair became the first British 
Prime Minister in modern history to address the Oireachtas (Irish 
Parliament). His speech had a dual aim: to appeal to the two communities to 
reconcile their differences, and to reassure unionists that – unlike his 
predecessors - he was not harbouring an anti-partitionist agenda. Thus, he 
argued: 
a framework in which consent is guaranteed is also one in which 
basic rights of equality and justice are guaranteed … those who wish 
a united Ireland are free to make that claim, provided it is 
democratically expressed, just as those who believe in the Union can 
make their claim … My point is very simple. Those urges to belong, 
divergent as they are, can live together more easily if we, Britain and 
the Irish Republic, can live closer together too (Blair, 1998). 
It is in this context that Mowlam made the candid admission that 
Blair had dropped the term “persuader” because it was politically loaded and 
insensitive to the unionist community. Now, the emphasis was on bringing 
both communities together to negotiate a fair and equitable settlement. The 
logic behind this recalibration in Labour discourse was simple, yet proved 
flawed in the longer-term: shore up the moderates at the expense of the 
extremists. 
Another point to highlight under the theme of bi-partisanship is that the 
policies of the Conservative and New Labour governments towards Northern 
Ireland were not that radically different. While tactics certainly varied - 
depending on the tempo of progress made on the political front - the strategy 
underpinning the British government‟s approach was not chameleon-like, 
changing according to the party in power. In fact, rather than stressing 
“consistent inconsistencies” acute to British policy, as Brendan O‟Leary 
(1997) has suggested, it may be more profitable to agree with Michael 
Cunningham‟s (2001, p. 153) characterisation of it in terms of its “strategic 
continuity”. By far the starkest illustration of this can be seen in relation to 
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the continuities of the Major and Blair governments (Patterson, 2001), when 
“London returned to its traditional role as an honest broker and facilitator for 
agreement” (Neumann, 2003, p. 186). 
With the benefit of hindsight one could argue that Blair sacrificed old 
Tory shibboleths about talking to terrorists for the benefit of safeguarding 
momentum in the peace process, certainly this is true with regard to his 
negotiations with republicans (see Edwards, 2008a; Powell, 2008, p. 313). 
The revelations by Peter Mandelson (who replaced Mowlam as Secretary of 
State between 1999 and 2001) confirm as much. Some years after leaving 
Northern Ireland, Mandelson claimed that: 
In order to keep the process in motion [Blair] would be sort of dangling 
carrots and possibilities in front of the republicans which I thought 
could never be delivered, that it was unreasonable and irresponsible to 
intimate that you could when you knew that you couldn‟t (Guardian, 
13 March 2007). 
Mandelson‟s criticisms serve to reinforce the view that New Labour had 
discontinued its dogmatic nationalist approach to Northern Irish affairs. By 
shoring up the unionists – while appearing to grant concessions to 
republicans - Blair was actually creating the conditions for the two groups to 
come together. That he chose to do so by applying a mixture of “carrot and 
stick” tactics points to Blair‟s sense of conviction politics noticeable 
elsewhere, particularly in relation to foreign policy (see Chandler, 2003). 
Nevertheless, Blair‟s relationship with unionist MPs, for example, 
was not bound by the same rules that prevailed during his predecessor‟s time 
in office. Ulster Unionist MPs had proved crucial in maintaining the 
Conservative balance of power in the House of Commons for the duration of 
John Major‟s government. With his 165 seat majority Blair was under no 
such obligation, though he chose to keep unionists onboard, albeit while 
endeavouring to reach out to republicans. Yet Blair chose to mollify unionist 
concerns about his new government‟s agenda and sought to stress his party‟s 
support for the “principle of consent” vis-à-vis the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Consent 
Although New Labour did undergo a certain amount of “greening” 
during much of its long spell in opposition in the 1980s, close reading of the 
party‟s discourse on Northern Ireland would challenge the assertion that its 
policy was ostensibly anti-partitionist in its strategic outlook. Even during 
the most radical phase of its Northern Ireland policy, the party‟s leadership 
(including spokesman Kevin McNamara) did not endorse the left-republican 
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view held by some Labour politicians (such as Ken Livingstone) that, once in 
power, the party should coerce unionists into a united Ireland. In a report 
McNamara co-authored with Mo Mowlam and Jim Marshall (McNamara et 
al., 1988, p. 10), they declared, “openly to all the people of Northern Ireland 
that we seek to persuade them of the merits of Irish unity and to win their 
support for it”. As already indicated the principle of “unity by consent” 
constituted the cornerstone of “Old” Labour‟s policy until 1994, when 
“New” Labour gravitated towards support for a political arrangement based 
on the “principle of consent” (see Neumann, 2003, p. 148; Powell, 2008, pp. 
11-12). 
The shift is evident in Blair‟s maiden speech on Northern Ireland, in 
which he was at pains to set out his newly elected government‟s agenda on 
consent: 
My message is simple. I am committed to Northern Ireland. I am 
committed to the principle of consent. And I am committed to peace. 
A settlement is to be negotiated between the parties based on consent. 
My agenda is not a United Ireland – and I wonder just how many see 
it as a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future. Northern Ireland 
will remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority here 
wish. 
Two important themes are discernable in the above extract. Firstly, 
that Blair was keen to reassure the unionist community that his recent 
electoral triumph posed no direct threat to the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland. Secondly, that New Labour‟s intentions for the future 
peace and prosperity of Northern Ireland were genuine, and that any 
impending British government initiative would be grounded firmly in the 
principle of consent. Blair‟s speech was important because it signalled a 
radical departure from the “green” dogmatism, which was widely perceived 
to buttress Labour policy on Ireland (Dixon, 2006, p. 133; Powell, 2008, pp. 
12-13). A discursive shift in New Labour‟s policy implied that constitutional 
change (whatever form it may take) must be negotiated by all of the parties 
to the conflict and then be ratified by both unionist and nationalist 
communities. 
This was an important first step in New Labour‟s bid to instigate a 
strategic sea-change in its policy. As Blair‟s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, 
recalled: 
This policy [of Irish unification by consent] had been an uncomfortable 
compromise cobbled together in the early 1980s to split the difference 
between two irreconcilable wings of the party: a small but highly 
motivated band of pro-unionists and the “Troops Out” movement. The 
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result was a green-tinged ambition to achieve a united Ireland by 
persuading the unionists to participate in it, even though it was 
perfectly obvious the unionists were not going to be persuaded. Tony 
replaced this mishmash with a policy of neutrality, where the job of the 
British government would be to help reconcile the two communities in 
Northern Ireland and find a solution that both could accept (2008, pp. 
79-80). 
Thus, New Labour had moved away from the old ideal of “unity by 
consent” towards a new umpire-like stance on the peace process. 
In many ways Blair had already prepared the ground for this shift in 
Labour discourse prior to coming to office. Following the announcement of 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire in August 1994, Blair‟s advisers 
gave explicit instructions to Kevin McNamara that the party leader, not the 
party spokesman on Northern Ireland, would handle the media on the issue. 
Shortly afterwards McNamara was sacked, thus becoming an early casualty 
in Blair‟s wholesale clearout of its more “tricolour-waving” old guard. He 
was replaced by the more congenial and down-to-earth Mo Mowlam – a 
candid politician with a sharp mind and a deep interest in Northern Ireland 
affairs. Michael Cunningham (2001, p. 92) argues that “one has to be careful 
not to exaggerate the significance of these changes”; however, it soon 
became clear that New Labour had initiated a shift in its approach to the 
conflict and Mowlam “fitted in happily with the change in policy” (Powell, 
2008, p. 80). This is despite the fact that Mowlam, along with Peter Hain and 
Clare Short (later to become Cabinet ministers in Blair‟s government), had 
been involved in pushing the “unity by consent” policy. By 1997, Hain and 
Short had embraced the new policy departure, although their personal views 
on the matter remain unclear (see Dixon, 2006). 
In an interview just prior to the 1997 election, Mowlam spelt out 
“New” Labour‟s radical departure from “Old” Labour‟s pro-Irish nationalist 
agenda: 
There is now a general acceptance that the future of Northern Ireland 
must be determined by the consent of the people as set out in the 
Downing Street Declaration [1993]. Labour recognises that the option 
of a united Ireland does not command the consent of the unionist 
tradition nor does the existing status of Northern Ireland command the 
consent of the nationalist tradition. We are therefore committed to 
reconciliation between the two traditions and to a new political 
settlement which can command the support of both (Irish News, 4 April 
1997). 
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Mowlam had demonstrated her ability to think more holistically about 
what a potential settlement in Northern Ireland might look like. It also 
permitted Labour to distance itself from the Conservative policy of 
sympathetic support for the Unionist community, by maintaining a focus on 
both communities. Many of Blair‟s speeches during his decade in office re-
iterated the need for parties in the conflict to end terrorism as a means by 
which to achieve political ends. As he pointed out in 2001: 
Look, underneath all the language and the detail of the agreement is 
this very simple concept that there has to be the notion of consent, that 
democracy rules, not violence, and alongside that there has to be justice 
and equality for all communities … And in the end, what has really 
been accepted by everybody is that there is no solution to this issue of a 
military kind. Violence offers no way forward. We are never going to 
change Northern Ireland by violence. 
The changing meaning of consent became increasingly tethered to the 
need to put clear blue water between the hard-headed realist view that war is 
simply a continuation of politics by other means and the idealist notion that 
democracy and co-operation offered a panacea for redressing the exclusivist 
nature of ethno-nationalism. 
 
Conclusion 
The overarching argument of this article has been that New Labour‟s 
“peace strategy” in Northern Ireland must be seen in light of “endogenous” 
ideological change within the Labour Party, as well as the “exogenous” re-
configuration of territorial sovereignty arrangements in the UK more 
broadly. By concentrating on articulating the benefits attached to these 
rapidly changing constitutional arrangements, New Labour could situate their 
internal policy adaptation amidst the new realities of governance in Britain. 
As Powell (2008, p. 20) later reasoned, “No longer was devolution a mark of 
the exceptional status of Northern Ireland, but rather a process going on 
across the whole of the United Kingdom” and as such made it easier for New 
Labour to sell a deal of power-sharing for local politicians. Initially, 
government policy towards the parties in conflict was aimed at bolstering the 
moderates at the expense of the extremists, a favoured tactic of government 
sponsors of peace processes more generally (see Zartman, 2005). This 
strategy, put in place soon after New Labour gained power, was summarised 
by Mo Mowlam: 
whatever had happened in the past, now the British government had to 
be, in my mind a referee, especially when it was important to the 
process to keep shoring up the moderate leadership on both sides 
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against the hardliners on the fringes. We had to make progress and try 
to reward either side for moving as we went along, so that they could 
say to their followers they weren‟t moving first or they weren‟t moving 
for nothing. It was essential to keep David Trimble and Gerry Adams 
in place, because without them it would have been much harder to 
sustain the peace process. (Mowlam, 2002, p. 164)  
One of Blair‟s most significant early achievements was brought about 
by carefully tempering his discourse within a tightly controlled framework of 
reference for unionists. Thus, Blair encouraged David Trimble and the Ulster 
Unionist Party to move towards a deal (see Trimble‟s comments in an 
interview with the Guardian, 14 March 2007) for the benefit of the wider 
unionist community. 
However, as Trimble (2008) has recently admitted this was not always 
successful and had the adverse effect of completely transforming the political 
environment in Northern Ireland. Thus Powell (2008, p. 312) later confessed: 
At first we tried to build from the centre, working with the UUP and 
the SDLP. But in the end perhaps it was inevitable that peace could 
only be made by the DUP and Sinn Féin on the principle of “Nixon 
goes to China” – it is only the extremes who can build a durable peace 
because there is no one left to outflank them. 
In all of this Blair played a formidable role in the process by heavily 
investing his own time in developing “peace strategy”. As John Rentoul has 
written: 
Blair brought his own gifts and his own luck to the issue which has 
broken Prime Ministers and governments before. His relationship with 
Bill Clinton was one, but his negotiating skill, his ability to finesse 
issues of deep principle which Major, with his party‟s unionist 
assumptions, found difficult, and his unnatural personal persuasiveness 
were his unique contribution (2001, p. 418). 
Encouraged by Powell (2008, p. 316) Blair sought to facilitate talks 
between the parties in conflict by coercing them with enforced deadlines and 
by encouraging the United States to apply its soft power as a useful third 
party mediator. Blair‟s amiable relationship with Bill Clinton developed 
significantly during the former‟s first term in office. Perhaps most 
importantly of all was Blair‟s personal drive to solving the Northern Ireland 
conflict, which was perhaps the one key component in helping to shape New 
Labour‟s political discourse on the peace process. As one critic wryly 
suggested: 
The [1998 Belfast] agreement was testimony to his talent for creative 
ambiguity, his gift for persuasion, his negotiating skills and his 
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willingness to expend huge amounts of effort and ingenuity in a cause 
that he believed in (Rawnsley, 2007). 
It is often said of Blair that he failed in the foreign policy arena 
(particularly in Iraq), but that he succeeded on the domestic front in Northern 
Ireland. This is perhaps a little too simplistic and does not take into 
consideration the remarkable dialectical relationship between the two 
conflicts in New Labour policy-making. Indeed, the tremendous synergy 
accomplished between the endogenous and exogenous variables driving 
Labour‟s peace strategy in Northern Ireland was underpinned by the need to 
reaffirm human rights, equality and democracy in societies where violence 
had become endemic. Perhaps Blair‟s “failure” in Iraq was not so much in 
the message he communicated but in the way it was interpreted. 
 
Endnotes 
* I would like to thank the editors for their suggestions on how to improve 
the article for publication. Any remaining errors are the author‟s sole 
responsibility. The views expressed in this article are the author‟s and not 
those of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Ministry of Defence or 
any other UK government agency. 
 
i
 “New” Labour is the pre-fix given to explain the modernisation of the core 
ideological parameters of the British Labour Party since Tony Blair became 
leader in 1994. The term itself was used by those inside the party who drew 
conceptual distinctions between “Old” Labour and “New” Labour in a bid to 
make the Labour Party more electorally relevant. It implied a break with the 
past dogmatism of the trade union dominated left-wing by the party‟s 
modernising right-wing. 
2 
Rt. Hon. Peter Hain MP, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
between 2005 and 2007, made a similar claim in a guest speech to British 
Labour Party members at Queen‟s University Belfast on the eve of the talks 
leading up to the St. Andrews Agreement in October 2006. While his 
comments were largely welcomed, his musings over the benefits of an all-
island economy caused something of a stir (Author‟s Fieldnotes, 10 October 
2006). 
3
 It should be noted that this strategy of constitutional rearrangement has had 
some adverse effects, not least in fuelling the widely-held perception that 
devolution has weakened the union. Ten years after devolution in the UK, 63 
per cent of respondents in an ICM poll for the Sunday Telegraph said that the 
union (between the constituent parts of the UK) had weakened under New 
Labour, while only 18 per cent thought that it had been strengthened (ICM, 
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2008, p. 7). The issue of devolution divides the UK‟s two main parties, with 
the Labour Party in favour of further decentralisation and the Conservative 
Party against. During his premiership John Major often made the point that 
devolution threatened the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the UK. As 
he wrote in his memoirs, “We advanced the argument, which I strongly 
endorse, that the Union still had enormous moral and political relevance in 
shaping our society. Moreover, it was, and is, vital in enabling the United 
Kingdom to exert its full influence in the world affairs. If the UK were to 
split into its component parts it would not wield the same influence. Its voice 
would be fragmented and marginalised” (Major, 1999, p. 421). However, the 
Tories did not oppose devolution for Northern Ireland, which was often seen 
as the only viable option for a settlement of the conflict. 
4
 The “principle of consent” refers to the internationally recognised 
legislation passed in Britain and Ireland after 1998 which states that the 
constitutional future of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged until such 
times as the majority of the people consent to a united Ireland. 
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LEGITIMISING THROUGH LANGUAGE: POLITICIAL 
DISCOURSE WORLDS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE 
1998 AGREEMENT 
 
Laura Filardo-Llamas 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper employs the hypothesis that one of the functions of political 
discourse is to legitimise a perceived point of view by promoting certain 
representations of a socio-political reality. It could be argued that the 1998 
Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement creates a paradoxical reality in Northern 
Ireland because its language is so vague that it can be interpreted in 
different ways. This paper analyses linguistic categories used in the text of 
the Agreement to reveal the type of peaceful reality promoted and the 
constructive ambiguity used to facilitate agreement. It argues that the 
success of the peace process depended to a large extent on the particular 
nuances of discourse in and around this crucial document. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As John Whyte (1990, p. viii) notes Northern Ireland is one of the most 
researched places in the world. Most studies on Northern Ireland are aimed at 
explaining the conflict by relying on sociological, political or economical 
theories. This research differs in its attempt to understand this conflict 
situation by relying on the different perceptions that may be politically 
transmitted about one single reality. In order to do so, this article looks at 
political discourse through a discourse analysis framework, and specifically 
through one characterised by its deep linguistic foundation. 
One of the key features of political discourse is that it is a useful way 
of spreading political beliefs, which are mostly related to the identity shared 
by those involved in the communication process.  This identity is evoked by 
means of the ideological beliefs which imbue a text and which can, in turn, 
be defined as mental representations that social groups have both about their 
own social practices and about the practices of other groups in society (Van 
Dijk, 1996, pp. 12, 19). Therefore, the ideologies that underlie a text are 
frequently related to the construction of social and political groups, and in 
most cases, they are determined by the position of the group in society, and, 
in particular, are framed “in relation to one or other group that are seen to 
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threaten the basic interests of the own group” (Van Dijk, 1996, p. 19).  These 
shared mental representations, which include ideological knowledge as well 
as more general and cultural knowledge, are known as “common ground” 
(Van Dijk, 2001). Mental representations perform an important function in 
the process of communication of political discourse as they involve the 
construction of a mental frame that is shared by the speaker (e.g. the 
politician) and the addressee. Furthermore, it is such shared identity between 
communicators which motivates the legitimising task of political discourse 
(Chilton, 2004, p. 23). 
Consequently, the objective of this article is to demonstrate how 
political discourse in Northern Ireland has a legitimising function of specific 
actions or world views about reality, and how this function can be unveiled 
through careful linguistic analysis. It is important to note that these views are 
frequently opposed on an ideological, political and discursive ground. Hence, 
it can be argued that the mentioned linguistic structures serve to establish a 
relationship between legitimisation and the creation of a “paradoxical 
reality” (Aughey, 2002, p. 2) that may be discursively transmitted. Therefore, 
we will compare how the representatives of the two main Northern Ireland 
ideologies – nationalism and unionism – make use of those strategies to 
justify or oppose the 1998 Agreement.  
 
Analyzing Political Discourse 
 
Language and Legitimacy 
 
 The approach elaborated in this paper arise from established research 
that relates language to conflict – or language to peace (see Wright, 1998; 
Schäffner and Wenden, 1995; Dedaič and Nelson, 2003). A core assumption 
underlying discourse analysis is Billig‟s (2003, p. xviii) belief that human 
conflict begins and ends via talk, hence establishing an inextricable link 
between “war” and communication. 
 It can be argued that words frame, mobilize and motivate political 
thought and action. According to Van Dijk (1997, p. 28), one of the main 
reasons for the appearance of human conflict is the promotion of the 
“ideological square”. This is the strategic and underlying principle of 
political discourse, and it can be defined as a semantic polarization in which 
propositions have an evaluative nature which promotes the emphasis/de-
emphasis of our/their good/bad actions. As a consequence, a polarization 
between “us” and “them” is created, and this results in the discursive 
construction of an “ingroup” and an “outgroup”.  
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 This idea serves to support the previously mentioned link between 
language and conflict: a connection which can be expressed in two ways. On 
the one hand, “language works through discourse to communicate and 
reproduce ideologies that support the use of war as a legitimate option for 
resolving national conflicts as well as inegalitarian and discriminatory social 
institutions and practices” (Wenden, 1995, p. 211). On the other, discourse 
serves to reproduce and spread the socio-political oppositions that may 
characterise a given society, as the “socio-political square” and the 
polarization between the “ingroup” and “the outgroup” can be discursively 
constructed; a process in which certain linguistic structures may have a 
prominent role. 
 Both aspects are closely connected, and from them comes the idea 
that language plays an indirect role in promoting values, beliefs and social 
practices that justify (Schäffner and Wenden, 1995, p. xxi) political policies 
or particular world views as presented by politicians. Justification and 
legitimisation are synonymous – mainly because “within the perspective of 
political philosophy the notion of justification might be related to 
legitimacy” (Chilton, 2003, p. 95). Thus, as argued by Chilton (2004, p. 23), 
one of the key functions of political discourse is legitimisation, defined as 
“the promotion of representations,” a pervasive feature of which “is the 
evident need for political speakers to imbue their utterances with evidence, 
authority and truth.” 
  
Language and Representation 
 
In addition to legitimisation, one of the main features of political 
discourse is representation. Representation and legitimisation are achieved in 
political discourse through what Chilton calls “discourse worlds”: 
the “reality” that is entertained by the speaker, or meta-represented by 
speaker as being someone else‟s believed reality. There are various 
meaning ingredients that go into these discourse realities, but the 
essential one is the projection of „who does what, to whom and where‟. 
(Chilton, 2004, p. 154)  
Legitimisation and its fulfilment through the creation of discourse 
worlds helps us understand how, and why, different parties react in different 
ways to specific events or situations, such as the variety of responses by 
political parties in Northern Ireland to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 
of 1998. The concept of “discourse worlds” explains the subjective and 
ideological representation that the political parties make of that “reality” and 
how they do so by presenting that subjective view as a “universal truth”. 
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 Taking this into account, we establish the main hypothesis that it is 
through political discourse that a particular world-view about certain socio-
political aspects or actions is legitimised. This legitimisation is achieved 
through the strategic, ideologically-motivated – and sometimes also 
unconscious – manipulation (Chilton, 2002) of language with the aim of 
promoting certain values.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 In order to analyse the legitimising function of political discourse, 
our starting point is the critical discourse analysis paradigm (Fairclough, 
1989; Van Dijk, 1993) because it highlights the inextricable link that exists 
between language and society (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, pp. 271-280). 
The objective of critical discourse analysis is to “interpret and understand 
how and why reality is structured in a certain way” (Wodak, 1989, p.14), and 
do so by relying on linguistic analysis.  
Within this paradigm, both Fairclough (1989) and Van Dijk (1993, 
2001) propose a theory which is based on three components, mainly aimed at 
explaining the connection between language and society. The importance of 
this connection is also related to the legitimising function of political 
discourse. Given that legitimisation is achieved through specific discursive 
representations (Chilton, 2004, p. 23), it can be argued that those 
representations are determined by the ideological beliefs held by the persons 
involved in the communicative process, and that those ideological beliefs 
determine a social representation – or discourse world - that is, at least partly, 
connected to the identity of the communicator.  
 Those discourse worlds are frequently related to at least one of the 
main types of discursive legitimisation that can be identified, namely 
semantic, pragmatic and socio-political legitimisation (Martín Rojo and Van 
Dijk, 1997, p. 71). Semantic legitimisation involves the justification of a 
specific and subjective view of society which is frequently a reflection of the 
utterer‟s point of view about society. This subjective representation tends to 
promote the creation and consolidation of ethnic – or national – identities, 
and it could be argued that in Northern Ireland it might be related to the 
perpetuation and justification (see Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p. 93) of 
the two communities, and the defence of Northern Ireland‟s constitutional 
status as upheld by their respective political ideologies. Pragmatic 
legitimisation aims at justifying an action which is usually considered to be 
controversial such as the 1998 Agreement, whose existence and 
approval/disapproval is justified in different terms by each of the four main 
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Northern Ireland political parties. Finally socio-political legitimisation 
involves the justification of the social and political role that any instance of 
discourse plays in the situation in which it takes place, that is, it involves an 
authorisation of the uttering of that discourse.  
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
A link could be established between the different components of 
discourse, the type of legitimisation and the three-stages in the analysis. 
Thus, the description stage would involve doing a linguistic analysis of the 
text so that semantic legitimisation can be uncovered; interpretation would 
mean taking into account the immediate context to obtain semantic and 
pragmatic legitimisation; and explanation would require considering the 
broad socio-political practice to expose socio-political legitimisation. We 
will briefly explain below the type of analysis that has been done, although a 
more complete account can be found in Filardo (2008). 
The first stage involves the description of the linguistic structures that 
form part of the text. This analysis consists of looking at three linguistic 
categories which we have elsewhere called “microlegitimisers” (Filardo, 
2008), and which involve the identification of temporal, space and personal 
pronouns and indicators, the use of proper names and referential expressions, 
and the appearance of given metaphorical expressions. The use of these 
linguistic cues by Northern Irish politicians has been marked in the 
discussion below through the use of “inverted commas”.  
The importance of those linguistic structures is highlighted by the fact 
that they are the indicators of a given discursive representation, and a 
subsequent (de)legitimisation of a given reality.  That is the second stage of 
the analysis, which involves interpreting the “textual” cues we have 
previously identified. There are two main aspects included within the 
interpretation stage: the uncovering of the discourse world that pervades the 
speech, and the portrayal of the (de)legitimised controversial political action 
that motivates it.  
Any textual feature has an (ideological) value which is related to the 
portrayal of three aspects: the subjects (participants) who are presented in the 
discourse, the relations that are established between those subjects, and the 
contents that are transmitted (Fairclough, 1989). Identification of subjects 
involves uncovering the (imagined) that is portrayed as being at the centre – 
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or main space – in the discourse world, that is, the one whose beliefs are 
considered central to the speaker (Anderson, 1991). Besides, certain 
discursive ties and oppositions may be established with other communities, 
and that type of relationship is an indicator of the ideological similarities or 
differences between them. Those discourse participants – or communities – 
are characterised in relation to other certain cultural, historical, geographical 
and political entities and actions, which are frequently recalled by means of 
verb tenses and pronouns, and metaphorical and referential expressions,. All 
these elements together make up the speaker‟s discourse world, which is, in 
turn, the semantic legitimisation that is spread through the analysed instance 
of discourse. 
This discourse world is the ideological point of departure for the 
pragmatic (de)legitimisation of a given political action – the Agreement, in 
this case. Uncovering this (de)legitimisation is the second aspect in the 
interpretation stage, and it involves looking at the relationship that is 
established between the controversial political action and the elements of the 
discourse world that have been previously identified. Therefore, we will 
mainly focus on the contents (Fairclough, 1989) that are transmitted and how 
those relate to the discourse participants and the relationships that are 
established between them.  
Finally, any text is linked to and has a role in the social practice within 
which it is embedded. That takes us to the third and last stage in the analysis: 
explanation. Every instance of political discourse performs a political role in 
the political practice where it can be found (Fairclough, 1989). Therefore, the 
objective of this last stage is to see how that political function is discursively 
authorised, that is, we need to uncover how the text legitimises the socio-
political context of practices which it gives expression to.  
 This methodological proposal has a double objective. On the one 
hand, it serves to show the link that can be established between language and 
society. On the other hand, it connects the creation of (discursive) conflict 
with the legitimising function of political discourse. These two objectives 
may be connected to a broader aim to highlight the validity of discourse 
analysis in the socio-political sciences as a means of raising our awareness  
of the social and political processes including “conflict”. 
The selection of instances of discourse for the analysis has been based 
on three criteria. First of all, the “reality” which is discursively portrayed is 
the Agreement, which becomes the “thematic dimension” upon which text 
selection is based. This is justified by the different political reactions to this 
document, which were partly motivated by the ambiguity of the language 
employed (Alonso, 2001, p. 434-436; Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 359). This 
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thematic criterion is connected to a “temporal dimension”, that is, the date – 
10 April 1998 – when the Agreement was signed. Consequently, the first 
reaction of political parties to the Agreement allows us to see the initial 
response that is made to this document. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider a “speaker dimension”, which 
involves looking at the portrayal of the Agreement by representatives of 
opposed ideologies, namely unionism and nationalism, and of different 
representatives within those ideologies. Thus, we have focused on the 
reaction of the four main Northern Ireland political parties: the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin (SF) on the nationalist 
side, and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) on the unionist one. 
 The next two sections of the article compare how party leaders from 
both political traditions in Northern Ireland discursively (de)legitimised the 
1998 Agreement. Four texts (the first formal public statements by each 
leader of the four main political parties in response to the announcement of 
the multi-party agreement on 10 April 1998) have been selected as the basis 
for analysis.  
 
Nationalist Discourse on the 1998 Agreement 
 
Both the SDLP and SF gave their support to the Agreement, although 
there were several differences in the ideological arguments – and strategies – 
used by each to do so.  The main difference can be seen in the socio-political 
entity that occupies the central space in the speaker‟s discourse world. On the 
one hand, Gerry Adams‟ discourse world relies upon the centrality of the 
“community” to republicanism, with which he establishes an affective frame 
(Johnson, 1994, p. 210) through his use of an inclusive “we” (Wodak and 
others, 1999, p. 46) or by focusing on their shared beliefs. Besides, their 
cultural characterisation is based on a “united Ireland” (Adams, 1998), which 
becomes their imagined homeland (Billig, 1995, p. 174), and the central 
geographical space upon which Adams‟ discourse world is based. On the 
other hand, Hume constructs a discourse world which is based on the 
centrality of the 1998 Agreement and the structures proposed in it. Those 
structures are perceived as an attempt to build a political space that is 
common to all the participants in Northern Ireland political life. Given the 
centrality of that political space, it is perceived as the imagined homeland 
within which his world is located. Thus, we do not have references to a 
“united Ireland” (Adams, 1998) as the imagined homeland, but to “an agreed 
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Ireland” (Hume, 1998), a phrase which acknowledges the necessary consent 
of all its members in order to be able to work.  
It is this difference in the characterisation of the central entity in the 
discourse space the one that lies at the core of all the other portrayals. Thus, 
in Adams‟ speech we do have references to the constitutional status – which 
do not appear in Hume‟s one -, mainly aimed at delegitimising the Northern 
Ireland “statelet” (Adams, 1998) whose existence the republican ideology 
does not admit. Besides, the British government is only attributed a political 
role, which is, in turn, negatively evaluated because of its submission to the 
unionists‟ will; the latter being metaphorically presented as children whose 
wishes need to be fulfilled. Besides, the role of the British nation is 
negatively portrayed because of the alleged wrongs they have committed in 
Ireland – as it can be seen in their carrying out negatively-evaluated actions 
such as “interference, occupation” or “involvement” (Adams, 1998) – and 
because of their perceived historical responsibility for the origin in the 
Northern Ireland conflict. This highlights one of the oppositions that 
underlies Adams‟ speech: between republicanism and the British 
government.  
That external opposition is connected to an internal one which can also 
be uncovered in this speech. The opposition between republicans and the 
British government becomes tied to the opposition between republicans and 
unionists through   indexical references to “they” and “the British 
government and the unionists” (Adams, 1998). In relation to the portrayal 
about these groups, it should be noted that the existence of the republican 
community is legitimised through references to its historical roots (“those 
risen people throughout this island” [Adams, 1998]); a strategy which 
involves a perpetuation of that ideology throughout time by anchoring 
discourse in past events in order to justify the present (Chilton, 2004, p. 59).  
The historical legitimisation is also connected to a victimisation strategy 
(Alonso, 2001, p. 241), in which nationalists and republicans are said to 
suffer from the negative outcome of past events such as “British military and 
RUC harassment”, “the days of nationalist rule” or “the nationalist 
nightmare” (Adams, 1998). That victimisation can be contrasted to the 
positive role they attribute to themselves in preventing the other community 
– the unionists – from suffering from the negative actions they have 
experienced in the past, and it also contributes to legitimising the republican 
“struggle” (ibid). The republican struggle is justified not only because of 
their reaction to those negative past actions – “partition”, or “British 
militarism”(Adams, 1998) –  but also by relying on the previous historical 
existence, in their view,  of a united Ireland. 
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The positive representation of republicans is highlighted through their 
commitment to peace – which is often contrasted to the negative “blocking 
of progress” and “preparation for war” (ibid) which are metaphorically 
attributed to the unionist community – and through their representation as 
contributors to the peace process. 
The lack of a geographical imagined homeland in Hume‟s speech, and 
the importance of the common political structures proposed in the 
Agreement serve to justify Hume‟s construction of discourse participants, as 
they all form part of one single imagined community which is bound 
together by the “new” (Hume, 1998) shared identity that can be created 
through the Agreement, and indexed by means of an inclusive “we” which is 
frequently accompanied by the determiner “all” (Hume, 1998). Moreover, 
that new identity does not involve “diminishing” one‟s previous identity, as 
different “shades of opinion” (Hume, 1998) can be encompassed within it. 
Relations between the members of that new community should, in Hume‟s 
(1998) view, be based on “partnership” and “participation”, two concepts 
which index the future and which are contrasted to the previous – and still 
existing – relations that are based on mistrust and division; two concepts 
that, as we have already seen, still underlie Adams‟ discourse world.  
Likewise, Hume also constructs a discourse world in which the central 
political space is occupied by the SDLP, mainly because he and the SDLP 
see the Agreement as incorporating the party‟s beliefs. This also contributes 
to a positive representation of the self, which is endowed with an authority 
trait, and is presented as the source of epistemic truth (Chilton, 2004, p. 60). 
Thus, we can see how all the aspects that form part of Hume‟s discourse 
world are, unlike the ones in Adams‟,  aimed at transmitting an image which 
is based on the lack of opposition, either between the two traditional 
Northern Ireland communities, or between the political parties that represent 
them. 
Because of the centrality of the Agreement and its future 
implementation, that temporal reference is the one which underlies Hume‟s 
discourse world. In particular, the future is indexed both through the 
auxiliary verb “will” – which emphasises the certainty of whatever is being 
signalled (Chilton, 2004, p. 60) –, and through references to “a positive 
future” (Hume, 1998). This future time is given a central role in the new 
Northern Ireland political life, and it is contrasted with the past, which is 
constantly characterised in a negative, and which should be forgotten. For 
this reason, Hume argues that the only possible structures that will work in 
Northern Ireland must be based on changing the future and creating new 
relations and new structures that do not involve or “recycle” (Hume, 1998) 
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any of the elements of the past. Besides, it is the “responsibility” of Northern 
Ireland inhabitants to contribute to and control those future changes; ideas 
which serve to issue a deontic command for political parties to “work 
together” for “creating new agreed political structures” (Hume, 1998).  
  In the case of both politicians we find a pragmatic legitimisation of 
the Agreement, although that is discursively portrayed in different ways 
which are intrinsically connected to the socio-political elements that underlie 
each politician‟s discourse world. First of all, Adams highlights the 
unquestionable role at the Talks of those who are allied to this community, 
namely “republican negotiators” and “the Irish government” (Adams, 1998). 
Besides, he also emphasises the positive outcome the republican community 
may obtain from this document by presenting it as a transitional “stage” 
(ibid) in the path towards the final destination of a united Ireland, an idea 
which is portrayed by means of the metaphorical conceptualisation 
(PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS TRAVELLING ALONG A PATH TOWARD A 
DESTINATION), which is at times nested within the conflict metaphor 
(STRUGGLE IS A JOURNEY) (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 45, 53, 73). This “stage” 
is part of an overall “struggle” within which other historical “phases” in 
republicanism are included, such as the 1916 proclamation of the Republic, 
the civil rights movement or the hunger strikes. Historicism reappears as a 
legitimising method when Adams places the historical origin of the 
Agreement with the IRA ceasefire; something which contributes to depicting 
the IRA as having an active and voluntary role in the promotion of peace. 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the Agreement is based on the 
weakening of the Union because negative aspects of British legislation – 
referred to as the “British territorial claim” (Adams, 1998) – have been 
revoked, and all-Ireland co-operation has been increased by the creation of 
all-Ireland bodies. Republican fears about the Agreement are also 
counteracted by locating them on an unreal world, indexed through modality 
indicators (Chilton, 2004, p. 60). 
In Hume‟s speech the Agreement is also legitimised, although he relies 
on the importance of the future, and the unique “opportunity” (Hume, 1998) 
this accord offers for solving the conflict, overcoming and healing past and 
still inherent divisions in Northern Ireland, and for creating one single 
identity within which all the Northern Ireland traditions can be included. 
This is based on the Agreement‟s opposition to conflict and sectarian 
victories and on its representation as “common success” (ibid) for both of the 
communities. Thus, the need of endorsing this document is highlighted 
because it represents a new beginning. Consequently, any possible rejection 
of the Agreement based on existing fears is discarded by focusing on its 
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positive achievements. These ideas are endowed with a high degree of 
certainty, spread through the use of the present simple tense, and the 
categorical commitment of the speaker to truth and validity that this tense 
implies (Fairclough, 1989, p. 120).  
Finally, in the case of both politicians we can see a socio-political 
legitimisation of their speech, which his mostly based on either the speaker‟s 
role as leader of the party and on the centrality of SF for the implementation 
process– in the case of Adams – and on the centrality of the SDLP and its 
actions and principles – in the case of Hume. Nevertheless, we can see slight 
differences in how those strategies are employed. Whereas Hume relies on 
the authority-role attributed to the SDLP to justify the deontic command – 
issued mostly through modal verb (Chilton 2004, p. 60) – for a “yes” vote at 
the referendum, Adams stresses the prominent role of SF and republicans, as 
they are the ones that have to work with the unionist community. Thus, 
Adams‟ speech has a double socio-political legitimising function aimed, on 
the one hand, at persuading his own community to endorse the Agreement, 
and, on the other, at stressing the importance of SF to perpetuate the existing 
“peace” (Adams, 1998).  
 
Unionist Discourse and the 1998 Agreement 
 
Unlike in the case of nationalists, there is division within the unionist 
political spectrum in relation to the Agreement, which is supported by the 
UUP and opposed by the DUP. Thus both parties portray a discourse world 
with recurring elements but presented from different perspectives. Key 
aspects in speeches of the UUP leader, David Trimble, show that the 1998 
talks lie at the heart of his conception of the political reality. They are 
described as a “battlefield” (Trimble, 1998); a word based on the 
metaphorical conceptualisation (POLITICS IS WAR) (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 
51) which shows Trimble‟s perception of the existing division between the 
two Northern Ireland communities. Given the prominence of the talks, the 
central political space is occupied by the UUP, who had an active role at the 
negotiations. Besides, it is the only unionist party to be evaluated positively 
as it was the only one fighting for (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 69) the interests 
and goals of the unionist people, or in other words, the maintenance of “the 
Union” (Trimble, 1998). On the contrary, the behaviour of the other unionist 
parties is delegitimised by focusing on their negative role at the negotiations, 
on their “running away from the talks” (ibid) and abandoning the unionist 
community, and on their lack of policies for the future. Thus, we observe 
how Trimble conceives Northern Ireland political life in terms of a division 
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within the unionist community, which has been curiously the recurrent 
pattern in the last 30 years of conflict (McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 232), 
and which, as we will see below, also prevails in Paisley‟s speech. 
The intrinsic opposition within unionism is not the only one in 
Trimble‟s discourse world, which is also characterised by an antagonism 
with republicanism; an ideology – which together with the political party 
standing for it, SF – is always characterised by its commitment to “violence” 
(Trimble, 1998). For Trimble, that violence implicitly delegitimises both the 
political role of SF, which is referentially linked to the IRA through phrases 
such as “SF/IRA” (ibid), and their historical struggle for a united Ireland.  
We can see that the same double opposition underlies Paisley‟s speech, 
although in this case centres on Northern Ireland, a place which is presented 
as the imagined homeland of the unionist community, and whose existence is 
historically legitimised. It is the importance of this central space that lies at 
the hart of Paisley‟s conception about Northern Ireland society and their 
constant fear of living as a minority in a united Ireland. 
Thus, the portrayal of discourse participants is based on their 
commitment to the maintenance of the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland as part of the UK, and this involves the broad opposition between 
nationalism and unionism. For this reason there is a double portrayal of 
unionists, ones whose behaviour can be legitimised because it is “customary” 
(Paisley, 1998) and committed to the maintenance of the Union – mainly by 
opposing the Agreement, at this moment. In addition, the political actions of 
those „exceptional‟ unionists who support the Agreement are delegitimised 
because they do not seem to defend the Union. This evaluation is connected 
to the type of ideological relationship established with both groups by means 
of deictics. This is because Paisley distances himself from the latter group 
while he places the former at the deictic centre, and creates an ideological 
connection between them and the self, which is presented as the source of 
epistemic truth, authority, and knowledge about the future. 
Nationalist and republicans are presented as the enemy by means of 
(POLITICS IS CONFLICT and POLITICS IS WAR) metaphors (Charteris-Black, 
2004, p. 51). Its political representatives – SF – are characterised as being 
inextricably linked to violence, not only explicitly but also through 
referential expressions such as “IRA/SF” (Paisley, 1998). Therefore, SF‟s tie 
with the IRA “terrorist” organisation is stressed, and the latter is deprived of 
any political justification for its violent actions. Because of this, the 
relationship between the two communities seems to be dominated by the 
underlying opposition between them and by a feeling of mistrust, which 
results in a conflict pattern underlying Paisley‟s statement. Paisley and the 
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DUP‟s role is justified because they have to fight against (Charteris-Black, 
2004, p. 69) those who are opposed to the preservation of the Union, 
regardless of their ideological unionist or nationalist background. 
The “Union” (Trimble, 1998) is presented as the geographical centre in 
Trimble‟s discourse world, and its existence as a separate entity from the rest 
of the island is legitimised by means of reference to it through its legal name 
– “Northern Ireland” (ibid). Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in this 
case, the role of this area within the UK and the British Isles is highlighted. 
Thus, it can be argued that a Northern Ireland imagined homeland is 
delimited for the unionist community, not a Northern Ireland on its own, but 
one whose Britishness needs to be acknowledged. History plays an important 
role in justifying this trait, because it is linked to past events, such as the the 
Act of Union, aimed at maintaining the Union. Trimble also places himself 
within that historical tradition, which is likewise used to legitimise his 
party‟s support of the Agreement.  
This different portrayal by the two unionist leaders about the same 
reality serves to explain the difference in their response to the Agreement, 
which Trimble legitimises not only through reference to historical facts, his 
party‟s achievements on the maintenance of the Union, but also through the 
UUP‟s centrality to the Northern Ireland peace process and its meaning as a 
“new” (Trimble, 1998) beginning which shall be contrasted to previous 
negatively evaluated attempts to restore peace in Northern Ireland, such as 
the Anglo-Irish or Sunningdale Agreements. By means of the same 
“journey” metaphorical conceptualisation employed by Adams, this 
document is presented as a “settlement” (Trimble, 1998), that is, it is the end 
of a completed process, an idea which is highlighted through the 
employment of the passive voice and the past perfect tense (Kress and 
Hodge, 1979, p. 129). That completion implicitly neglects the slightest 
possibility of future negotiations about the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland. Therefore, the Agreement is legitimised by highlighting its role as a 
guarantor of the Union, and by stressing unionist achievements in the 
document, amongst these is the “restoration of democracy” (Trimble, 1998) 
via the creation of a new Northern Ireland Assembly and the devolution of 
powers from Westminster can be underlined. 
This image of the Agreement is contrasted by the one presented by 
Paisley, for whom this document presents a threat to one of the pillars of 
unionism – the existence of the Union because it “would place the Province 
on the road to” (Paisley, 1998) a united Ireland. It shall be noted that the 
same metaphorical expression employed by Adams – and Trimble – 
reappears with a change in the ideological value. The “threat” strategy is also 
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important as we can see that this speech is permeated by the “negative 
stance” (Aughey, 1996, p. 76) that characterises the DUP, and which is based 
on their saying no to a united Ireland.  
Socio-political elements connected to the Agreement – such as 
prisoners, decommissioning or policing – are also employed by both 
politicians in different ways. Trimble tries to downplay unionist fears about 
the Agreement, and worries about the disbandment of “the RUC” (ibid) are 
rejected by presenting it as an impossible event in an unreal and impossible 
world – indexed by means of negative modality indicators such as “cannot” 
or “will not” (Chilton, 2004, p. 60) –, and also by showing the necessary 
defensive role of the RUC against the threat from “Republican terrorists” 
(Trimble, 1998). Likewise, other controversial aspects such as the “early 
release of prisoners” (Trimble, 1998) or the possible involvement of 
paramilitary-related parties in government are presented as necessary steps 
for the return of peace to Northern Ireland, but ones whose implementation 
will be partly determined by the unionist behaviour. 
On the contrary, Paisley relies on these elements, together with conflict 
and war metaphors to delegitimise the Agreement, which has been 
“enthusiastically endorsed” and “warmly welcomed”, with a subsequent 
“dilution and diminution of the “Union” (Paisley, 1998). First of all this 
document is presented as having a perceived nationalist historical origin, 
which is placed on the Hume/Adams talks, and which can be seen in the 
name given to it by Paisley: “the Hume/Adams Agreement” (Paisley, 1998). 
Furthermore, those aspects of the Agreement which are negative for the 
unionist community are portrayed as part of the real world, and are presented 
as completed actions, two traits which are recalled through the uses of the 
verbs “will” and “can” (Chilton, 2004, p. 60). We can see this, for examples 
in Paisley‟s (1998) references to the legal historical origin of Northern 
Ireland as “our 1920 Act”, his insistence of referring to the republican 
political party as “IRA/Sinn Féin”, his description of “terrorist 
prisoners”,,and his condemnation of the “sacrifice” of the Royal Ulster 
Constrabulary. All those aspects contribute to promoting an image of the 
Agreement as an anti-peace accord which is immoral because of what 
Paisley (1998) views as republicans‟ merely strategic (and therefore 
uncertain) commitment to peace, dishonesty in the negotiations, and the 
Northern Ireland Office‟s “black propaganda” campaign aimed at its 
endorsement. 
Finally, we can see that both speeches legitimise different socio-
political aspects. Trimble tries to justify his role as leader of the UUP and 
within the negotiation of the Agreement, a role criticised by some within his 
Legitimising Through Language   
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 91 - 
 
party. This is achieved mainly by the constant employment of a “presidential 
I” (Blas Arroyo, 2000, p. 7) and by placing himself as part of a historical 
unionist tradition, in such a way that his political actions are linked to those 
of his predecessor, Lord Molyneaux.  
On the contrary, Paisley does not focus on his role as leader but he 
legitimises the uttering of the statement, which is presented as a necessary 
event in order to clarify the Agreement to the Northern Ireland people. Thus, 
the role of the DUP is justified because it is presented as the only source of 
morality and, consequently, as the party to be trusted. The positive function 
of the self in the “No” campaign is contrasted to the negative depiction of the 
Northern Ireland Office, which is presented as “bribing and browbeating” 
(Paisley, 1998) the Northern Ireland people. Thus, the DUP‟s political 
performance at this time is justified as a necessary challenge to the 
“deception and duplicity” (ibid) of the others. 
  
Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this article that political discourse has a legitimising 
function which is aimed at justifying specific discourse worlds in which 
social elements and political actions are included and linked to a given 
ideology. This has been proved in the Northern Ireland context, where the 
Agreement – and the reality surrounding it – is discursively portrayed in 
different ways by each of the political representatives, in such a way that it 
results in the creation of a paradoxical reality. Besides, we have seen how a 
linguistic analysis of political speeches becomes a useful tool for uncovering 
legitimising strategies, as they allow us to see how language is used with 
certain political and discursive objectives. The inextricable connection that 
exists between language and peace (or conflict) is evident (Wright, 1998; 
Schäffner and Wenden, 1995). In fact, in Northern Ireland that relationship 
becomes clear if we take into account that pre-Agreement overt physical 
conflict is transferred to political discourse after this document is signed, 
when the political arena – and discourse, which is its explicit manifestation – 
becomes the site for political struggle. 
The analysis of the linguistic strategies – or linguistic weapons, to 
continue with the conflict conceptualisation - employed to fulfil that 
legitimising function shows that the four Northern Ireland political parties 
tend to resort to the same strategies. All of them employ deictics, referential 
expressions and metaphors, and frequently they do so in the same way. In 
fact, a comparison of the obtained results shows that they may even draw on 
the same linguistic forms, as we have seen, for example, in the case of the 
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„journey‟ metaphorical expression used by Gerry Adams, David Trimble and 
Ian Paisley to portray the Agreement. It can also been seen in the use of the 
first person plural pronoun “we” by the four political leaders with different 
social referents, depending on the actual needs of the speaker. How those 
linguistic structures are interpreted depends on the common knowledge 
shared between communicators; a knowledge which is similar if the audience 
belongs to the same ideological community, but which differs when they 
belong to an opposed one. It is because of this ideological opposition, and 
the impact it has in the interpretation of language, that discourse analysis 
becomes even more interesting because it helps to explain socio-political 
events and processes by relying on the analysis of language at different 
historical times. 
Thus, the analysis of post-Agreement language shows that the conflict 
pattern has been transposed to the political arena, where we can find 
discursively-created oppositions that reproduce the ones that had previously 
caused physical conflict – such as republicans opposed to the British 
government and the unionist community, or unionists opposed to republicans 
– although sometimes they also replicate political oppositions – as we have 
seen in the case of the division within unionism. Hence, we may argue that 
discourse reflects socio-political oppositions, which are, in turn, related to 
the legitimising function of political discourse, in as much as each political 
representative needs to justify different social elements. Nevertheless, it can 
also be argued that discourse changes may result in socio-political changes 
(Filardo, 2008) because if discourse stops reproducing socio-political 
oppositions, that may result in a dilution of those oppositions in “real” life. 
Consequently, it can be claimed that the ambiguity of the language of the 
Agreement has allowed the creation of a discursively paradoxical reality 
which is manifested through different nuances of discourse, which lie, in 
turn, at the heart of the success of the peace process as we know it today.  
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“HUMESPEAK”: THE SDLP, POLITICAL DISCOURSE, 
AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 
 
P. J. McLoughlin* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the vital role played by the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) in the formulation of a new political discourse and 
conceptual approach to the Northern Ireland problem. In particular, it 
shows how John Hume, party leader through the 1980s and 1990s, helped 
to propagate this discourse, and in doing so influenced policy-making in 
London and Dublin, and thinking within the republican movement. 
Although the paper emphasises the importance of this influence, it 
concludes by considering the reasons why the Ulster unionist community 
have remained so unreceptive to the political discourse of Hume and the 
SDLP. 
Introduction 
 
This article examines the political discourse of Northern Ireland‟s 
SDLP. In doing so, it aims to show that many of the concepts and themes of 
the SDLP‟s discourse helped to shape the ideological parameters of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. In this, the article is limited in its scope. 
Clearly, a great number of actors have contributed to the discourse and 
ideology of the Northern Ireland peace process, and there is not room here to 
explain the way that the SDLP‟s ideas have interacted with those of other 
parties to the conflict. In particular, changes in northern Irish nationalist 
thinking – many of which have involved the SDLP – have both fed upon and 
fed into similar shifts in southern Irish nationalist ideology. As such, whilst 
the focus here is in on the SDLP, the party should be considered as part of 
the wider Irish nationalist “family”. Accordingly, this article is intended as a 
contribution to the wider literature on the evolution of Irish nationalist 
discourse. For the SDLP‟s discursive and ideological innovations must be 
seen as related to and interactive with changes in the language of other 
members of the broader nationalist family.
1
 
In order to draw out the SDLP‟s role in this complex process, the 
article focuses on a select number of concepts which were particularly 
common to the party‟s discourse from the 1970s through to the 1990s. It 
does not claim that these concepts were completely unique to the SDLP, and 
indeed aims to show that other actors were often thinking in similar ways. 
“Humespeak”: The SDLP  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 96 - 
 
However, the article explains how the party deployed these concepts in a 
consistent, almost idiosyncratic fashion, a style which served to make such 
ideas part of the SDLP‟s own distinctive language and ideological approach 
to the Northern Ireland problem. In turn, it shows how some of the SDLP‟s 
particular word formations were adopted by other parties to the problem, and 
thus became integral to the language of the Northern Ireland peace process. 
In doing so, the paper lays great emphasis on the role of John Hume, leader 
of the SDLP from 1979 to 2001. Such was Hume‟s importance in the 
propagation of the SDLP‟s ideas that his distinctive political parlance even 
earned it own epithet: “Humespeak”. Though this term was often used 
disparagingly – referring to the repetitiveness of his language – even critics 
recognise the extent to which Hume‟s particular phraseology has dominated 
the discourse of the peace process (Cunningham, 1997; McGovern, 1997).  
The specific concepts which the paper examines are “the three strands”, 
“the Irish dimension”, “the two traditions”, and finally the notion of “an 
agreed Ireland”. Whilst exploring each of these terms individually, the paper 
aims to show that they are interrelated, and together form a mode of political 
discourse distinctive to the SDLP. Having considered these concepts, and the 
extent to which they influenced the thinking of the British and Irish 
governments, the paper then looks at a specific debate which took place 
between the SDLP and the republican movement from the late-1980s. This 
dialogue, revolving around the issue of British interests in Northern Ireland, 
proved crucial to the evolution of republican thinking, and the subsequent 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire of August 1994. In this respect, the 
etymological origins of the peace process can again be related to the SDLP, 
and in particular to the party‟s leader in this period. 
 
The Three Strands 
 
As Gerard Murray‟s meticulous study of the SDLP has shown, a three-level 
approach towards the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict was 
conceived by the party as early as 1971 (1998, pp. 15-16), that is a over a 
quarter of a century before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) created 
a political settlement by the same means. This approach was initiated by 
John Duffy, one of the SDLP‟s earliest policy-makers, in a set of internal 
party papers which he completed in September 1971. Duffy‟s papers 
described three sets of relationships which he felt must be addressed in order 
to resolve the Northern Ireland problem: relations between the two 
communities in Northern Ireland; relations between the North and South of 
Ireland; and relations between Britain and Ireland (Murray, 1998, p. 15).  
“Humespeak”: The SDLP  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 97 - 
 
It was only in the 1980s, however, that this three relations thinking 
became evident in the SDLP‟s public discourse. Arguably, this reflected the 
political developments in this period, which created a context more 
favourable to the three relationships approach. In particular, the warming of 
relations between the British and Irish governments, culminating in the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985, appeared to broaden the framework 
within which the Northern Ireland problem was being considered. This met 
with positive response from the SDLP, with Hume telling the British House 
of Commons that the AIA provided 
[for] the first time … a real framework within which to address the 
problem. The problem is not just about relationships within Northern 
Ireland ... it is about relationships in Ireland and between Britain and 
Ireland (Hansard, sixth series, vol. 87, col. 780). 
Through the remainder of the 1980s, Hume continued to articulate this 
three relationships approach as the most appropriate way to resolve the 
Northern Ireland problem. His persistence, it seems, eventually paid off. 
Indeed, for when the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Brooke, announced 
his intention to convene political talks between the local parties in March 
1991, he told the House of Commons that “discussions must focus on the 
three main relationships: those in Northern Ireland … among the people of 
the island of Ireland; and between the governments” (Hansard, sixth series, 
vol. 188, col. 765).  
By the time the Brooke talks began, the three relationships had been 
rebranded as “the three strands” by British officials. However, the origins of 
this approach in the thinking of the SDLP were plain to see. Moreover, when 
Brooke was replaced by Patrick Mayhew in April 1992, the new Northern 
Ireland Secretary continued to organise inter-party talks in accordance with 
the three strand model. Although these discussions ended with little progress, 
when negotiations recommenced in 1996, again they were based upon the 
three strands. Eventually, the talks concluded in April 1998 with the 
announcement of the GFA. This Agreement established new political 
institutions to accommodate the two communities in Northern Ireland; new 
arrangements to facilitate co-operation between the North and South of 
Ireland; and new structures to co-ordinate relations throughout the UK and 
Ireland.
2
     
The particular design of the political institutions created under each 
strand of the GFA were, of course, the result of bargain and compromise 
between the Northern Ireland parties and the British and Irish governments 
(see Hennessy, 2000). However, that the GFA was drawn from the three 
strands schema shows how the SDLP shaped the basic terms of the 
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settlement. For, as demonstrated, the three strands approach finds its origins 
in documents written by the party in the early 1970s. The three-level thinking 
of these documents, promoted more vigorously by the SDLP from the 1980s 
onwards, shows the significant influence which the party had in creating the 
essential parameters of the peace agreement that emerged in 1998. 
 
The Irish Dimension 
 
“The Irish dimension” is a term which the SDLP used to refer to the need for 
a political settlement which extended beyond Northern Ireland, involving the 
Irish as well as the British state. In this respect, the concept ties in with the 
party‟s three relationship thinking, and particularly the emphasis on relations 
between the North and South of Ireland. For the SDLP, political linkages 
between the two jurisdictions were required to give institutional expression 
to the identity of Northern Ireland‟s nationalist community. Just as the 
British identity of the Ulster unionist community was reflected in the Union 
with Great Britain, so, the SDLP argued, the Irish identity of the northern 
nationalist community must be recognised through political structures 
connecting it with the Republic of Ireland. As Hume reasoned:   
Any solution which does not take account of the Irish dimension is 
doomed to failure. SDLP policies clearly commit the Party to a solution 
that takes account of both basic loyalties in the community and both 
must be taken into account if any solution is to be found (Irish News, 
22 May 1975). 
The party‟s emphasis on the need for an Irish dimension to any 
settlement of the Northern Ireland problem has led the term to become very 
much associated with the SDLP. However, the phrase was actually first used 
in a British government document, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper 
for Discussion (1972). Here the term was used to suggest that any regional 
settlement  
must also recognise Northern Ireland‟s position within Ireland as a 
whole … Whatever arrangements are made for the future 
administration of Northern Ireland must take account of the region‟s 
relationship with the Republic of Ireland (HMSO, 1972, paras. 76, 78). 
The SDLP read this as an acceptance by the London government of the 
arguments advanced in Towards a New Ireland – a document which the 
party had issued a month before the British discussion paper. In Towards a 
New Ireland, the SDLP had firmly set its face against any internal solution to 
the Northern Ireland problem: “Any re-examination [of constitutional 
arrangements] must therefore take place, not in a purely Six County
3
 context, 
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but in an Irish context” (SDLP, 1972, p. 1). In this, the SDLP made clear that 
it would not be party to a settlement that did not involve the Irish 
government in some way. As such, when London seemed to accept this 
position by recognising an “Irish dimension” to the problem in The Future of 
Northern Ireland, the SDLP seized upon what was actually a Whitehall term 
(Irish News, 8 November 1972), adopting the phrase as part of its own 
political nomenclature, and using it henceforth. 
The Irish dimension found its first institutional expression in the 
Council of Ireland which formed part of the failed Sunningdale Agreement 
of 1973. Like the North-South structures created by the GFA 25 years later, 
the Council of Ireland was intended to promote co-operation between the two 
parts of the island. However, whereas the all-Ireland institutions of the GFA 
were sharply defined, the powers and political remit of those agreed in 1973 
were more open to interpretation. For this reason, many unionists opposed 
the Council of Ireland, believing that it would work to erode the Irish border, 
and undermine Northern Ireland‟s position within the UK. This concern 
ultimately led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement, and the inter-
communal power-sharing government which it had created for Northern 
Ireland.  
Because unionist opposition to Sunningdale had been directed mainly 
towards the Council of Ireland, following the Agreement‟s demise, the 
London government moved away from the idea of an institutionalised Irish 
dimension. The feeling amongst British officials was that the Council of 
Ireland had been a step too far for unionists. Had the Sunningdale settlement 
involved only a power-sharing arrangement within Northern Ireland, it may 
have survived. The SDLP, on the other hand, remained firmly opposed to 
any internal settlement of the Northern Ireland problem, arguing that this 
would deny the political identity of the nationalist community. Even in the 
immediate aftermath of Sunningdale‟s collapse, the party responded 
vigorously to media speculation that this might lead to a weakening of the 
SDLP‟s commitment to North-South institutions. “The Irish dimension is 
fundamental to SDLP policy”, argued Austin Currie, a co-founder and 
leading member of the party: “Whether or not it is realised in a Council of 
Ireland or any other structure is a matter for discussion” (Irish Times, 19 June 
1974). 
Through the political inertia of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
SDLP continued to hold to this line, insisting that the Irish government‟s 
involvement in Northern Ireland was a sine qua non of any settlement to 
which it would be a party. In defending this position, the SDLP used the term 
“the Irish dimension” so frequently that, as suggested, the phrase came to be 
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considered as one of party‟s own. Even the British government – at this time 
looking to distance itself from the whole notion of an Irish dimension – 
appeared happy to forget that the phrase had first appeared in one of its own 
discussion papers. But whilst the term was invented in Whitehall, the idea of 
an Irish dimension was integral to the SDLP‟s thinking – as was evident in 
the party‟s earliest political documents (Murray, 1998, pp.12ff). Moreover, 
by continually using a phrase coined by British officials, the SDLP made it 
impossible for the Irish dimension to slip from the political agenda. By 
refusing to contemplate any settlement which did not involve the Irish 
government, the SDLP effectively vetoed any movement by London towards 
an internal solution of the Northern Ireland problem – an option obviously 
favoured by the unionist community.  
Of course, the Dublin government was also crucial in pushing the Irish 
dimension. In particular, in the early 1980s, the administrations of Garret 
FitzGerald carefully avoided any anti-partitionist rhetoric, but insisted that 
Dublin should play some role in the administration of Northern Ireland. An 
Irish presence in the structures of governance in the region, it was argued, 
would serve to address the sense of political alienation that had become 
apparent amongst the nationalist minority in this period (FitzGerald, 1991, 
pp. 473ff). As such, it was not only the SDLP‟s obstinacy over the Irish 
dimension, but also the Dublin government‟s insistence that it should be 
involved in Northern Ireland, and indeed the sympathy for this position 
among the international community, particular in the US, that together 
pushed the British government towards the logic of the 1985 AIA. Under the 
terms of this accord, Dublin was given a limited but nonetheless significant 
role in the governance of Northern Ireland. More than a decade after 
Sunningdale‟s demise, the Irish dimension was restored. 
Although the 1998 GFA ostensibly “transcended” the AIA, the 
essential architecture of the earlier accord remains in place. Despite unionist 
opposition, the inter-governmental institutions of the AIA were reformed 
rather than replaced by the GFA (O‟Leary, 2001, p. 68). The SDLP had some 
influence in this decision, with the party still opposed to any settlement 
lacking an Irish input. However, more important was opinion in London and 
Dublin. In essence, the two governments were unwilling to abandon the 
political machinery which had, since the mid-1980s, allowed for far more 
effective management of the Northern Ireland problem. As such, under the 
terms of the GFA, Dublin retains the role it has held since 1985, as guardian 
of the nationalist minority‟s essential interests. This, in addition to the new 
North-South structures created by the GFA, shows that the Irish dimension is 
still in effect. 
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The role in Northern Ireland which the Dublin government acquired 
through the AIA, and the position which it continues to hold today, is less 
than the SDLP would have liked. In 1985, the party had been hoping for 
something closer to joint British-Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland. In 
1998, the SDLP had sought North-South structures with greater political 
potential, institutions which could have evolved with more dynamism, 
leading ultimately to the reunification of Ireland. However, the Irish 
dimension to both the AIA and the GFA owes much to the SDLP‟s refusal to 
accept anything less than the British government had originally offered in its 
1972 discussion paper.  
 
The Two Traditions 
 
The idea of “the two traditions” – or the same concept articulated in different 
terms – appeared in nationalist commentaries some years before the onset of 
the Northern Ireland conflict. Indeed, John Whyte highlights the 1950s in 
particular as a period in which mainly southern writers such as Michael 
Sheehy and Donal Barrington began to consider the problem of partition in 
terms of “two distinct peoples in Ireland” (Whyte, 1990, pp. 119-20). In this 
interpretation, partition was not imposed upon Ireland by the British 
government, but a rather an inevitable response by London to the seemingly 
irreconcilable differences of these two “peoples”: Irish nationalists and 
Ulster unionists. Implicit in this thesis was the idea that it was for the 
“peoples” of Ireland – with the emphasis being on nationalists – to work to 
overcome those differences. This, it was suggested, was the only way to end 
partition and unite Ireland. 
Following the outbreak of communal violence in Northern Ireland in 
the late 1960s, and the formation of the SDLP in 1970, the new party clearly 
drew upon these ideas, articulating a gradualist approach towards Irish unity 
as the ultimate solution to the conflict.
4
 However, the party also used this 
discourse of divided peoples – or “the two traditions” as it became in the 
SDLP‟s phraseology – in explaining its immediate proposals for the 
pacification and stabilisation of Northern Ireland. For this end, the SDLP 
argued, could only be achieved by establishing political structures which 
recognised the identity of both political “traditions” in Northern Ireland, Irish 
nationalist and Ulster unionist (SDLP, 1972, p. 4; 1974a, para. 1.3). In 
essence, this meant creating an Irish dimension – that is all-Ireland political 
structures – as a counterbalance to the pre-existing British dimension – 
namely the political Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As 
the party plainly stated in its 1975 manifesto: “There is an Irish Dimension to 
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the problem. There is a British Dimension to the problem. Any solution must 
take account of both” (SDLP, 1975, p. 3).  
In effect, then, the SDLP used this two traditions thesis to support its 
arguments in favour of an Irish dimension. This tendency was most notable 
in the period after Sunningdale‟s collapse. At this time, many commentators 
proposed that the SDLP abandon its pursuit of an Irish dimension, and 
content itself with an internal settlement of the Northern Ireland problem – 
this, it was claimed, being the only basis on which unionists might be 
persuaded to share power with the nationalists. The SDLP rejected such 
suggestions, arguing that without institutional recognition of its Irish 
identity, the nationalist minority could not be accommodated within the 
Northern Ireland state (SDLP, 1974a, paragraphs 1.1-1.3). The two traditions 
thesis thus provided the ideological rationale for the party‟s continued 
commitment to the Sunningdale formula of power-sharing and an Irish 
dimension. As Hume reasoned: 
Partnership between our two traditions – both within the North through 
power-sharing, and between North and South through the Irish 
dimension – accepting and respecting our differences will in time build 
trust and confidence to replace distrust and prejudice (Sunday Press, 16 
March 1975). 
In the late 1970s, such arguments made little headway with either the 
unionist community or the British government. Buoyed by their defeat of 
Sunningdale, from 1974 onwards, unionists became increasingly inflexible. 
Not only did they remain opposed to the idea of linkages between the North 
and South of Ireland, but unionist leaders now refused to share power with 
the SDLP even within a wholly internal political arrangement.  The British 
government, meanwhile, was unwilling to enforce a settlement upon an 
intransigent majority, and so appeared to abandon all hope of establishing a 
local settlement in Northern Ireland. Instead it settled into the role of ruling 
the region directly from Westminster. This seemed to appease the unionist 
community. After all, direct rule from London secured the majority‟s 
essential political objective, maintenance of the Union with Britain. The 
nationalist community, on the other hand, grew increasingly disaffected. 
Recognising this, the SDLP continued to press for a change in British policy 
towards an arrangement that would acknowledge the identity of both 
communities. As Hume argued: 
The problem here cannot be solved on the basis of one identity alone 
and whether wittingly or unwittingly, British politicians run the risk of 
promoting violence in the North by not accommodating the two 
different identities in it (Irish News, 9 May 1978).  
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The extent of the minority community‟s alienation became apparent in 
the early 1980s, when republican prisoners began a series of hunger strikes in 
order to gain political recognition from the British government. The hunger 
strikes mobilised even moderate sections of the Catholic community, those 
who had shown no previous sympathy for the republican movement. In turn, 
this led to fears in both London and Dublin that the moderate nationalism of 
the SDLP would now be eclipsed by the radical republicanism of Sinn Féin 
(Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 2002, p. 202). 
It was partly to restore the credibility of the SDLP that the Taoiseach, 
Garret FitzGerald, established the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4. This 
initiative, originally proposed by the SDLP (Murray, p. 124),
5
 brought the 
northern nationalist party into conference with its southern counterparts, 
Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Labour Party. Although contemporary 
commentators derided the exercise as attempt by the Irish establishment to 
“save” the SDLP, the party had ambitions beyond its electoral struggle with 
Sinn Féin. It hoped to use the Forum to forge an ideological consensus 
among constitutional nationalists in both parts of Ireland, creating a unity of 
purpose that would, along with the goodwill of the international community, 
press the British government into action on Northern Ireland (Hume, 1984, p. 
24). The SDLP‟s success in achieving such consensus was evident in the 
conclusion of the New Ireland Forum report, which committed all of the 
participating parties to the two traditions thesis as the basis for a solution: 
The validity of both the nationalist and unionist identities in Ireland … 
must be accepted; both of these identities must have equally 
satisfactory, secure and durable, political, administrative and symbolic 
expression and protection (Dublin Stationery Office, 1984, article 
5.2.4). 
Although the 1985 AIA did not adopt any of the specific political 
structures that were proposed by the New Ireland Forum, it certainly drew 
upon the thinking behind the initiative. As Todd argues: 
Explicitly, the AIA recognized the need to acknowledge the rights of 
the two traditions in Ireland and to … recognize the identities of the 
two communities in Northern Ireland … 
   The implication, when the AIA is read in the light of the New Ireland 
Forum Report, is that the nationalist community in Northern Ireland as 
a part of the wider Irish nationalist tradition has a right to the 
institutionalized recognition of its identity … through the involvement 
of the Irish government in Northern Ireland (1995, p. 822).  
The same political logic and discourse informed the terms of the 
Northern Ireland peace process from its earliest days. This was clear to see in 
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the Joint Declaration for Peace – or the Downing Street Declaration (DSD) 
as it is more commonly known – which formally launched the process in 
December 1993. Here the British government promised to work with its Irish 
counterpart to 
encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of … an agreement 
over a period through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on 
full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland 
(HMSO, 1993, para. 4).  
In the 1995 Framework Documents – wherein the two governments 
provided the blueprint for a political settlement in Northern Ireland – the 
influence of the two traditions discourse was even more evident in the 
stipulation that “any new political arrangements must be based on full 
respect for, and protection and expression of, the rights and identities of both 
traditions in Ireland” (HMSO, 1995, para. 10 (iv)). Finally, the GFA was 
also suffused with a language with recognised the equal legitimacy of the 
two political traditions in Ireland (see the Agreement, Constitutional Issues, 
para. 1(v-vi)).  
All of these references show the extent to which the two traditions 
discourse became ingrained within the philosophy of the peace process. 
However, again this mode of thought can be related to ideas first expressed 
by the SDLP in the 1970s. Although the party was itself drawing on southern 
nationalist commentaries from the 1950s, the SDLP modified this thinking to 
reflect the contemporary situation in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the party 
developed practical proposals which – though based upon the rethinking of 
the 1950s – were not geared solely towards Irish unification, and in fact 
provided a conceptual framework within which Irish nationalist and Ulster 
unionist could both be accommodated in a still partitioned Ireland. In 
addition, it was the SDLP‟s frequent and repeated use of a specific term, “the 
two traditions”, that led to its subsequent adoption by the British and Irish 
governments, and thus its establishment as a central discourse of the peace 
process  
 
An Agreed Ireland 
 
Of all the concepts considered in this paper, the idea of an “agreed Ireland” is 
the one most intimately associated with Hume. However, it also relates to the 
concepts already discussed, particularly the two traditions thesis. Indeed, the 
idea built directly upon this thesis, suggesting that the two political 
communities in Ireland had to find mutually acceptable constitutional 
structures that would allow them to co-exist on the island which they shared 
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– hence an agreed Ireland. Like the two traditions thesis, the concept of an 
agreed Ireland also became more prominent within the SDLP‟s discourse in 
the aftermath of the failed Sunningdale Agreement, when the party tried to 
argue the validity of the power-sharing and Irish dimension formula which 
unionists had rejected (see SDLP, 1974b). However, it also appeared that 
Hume employed the phrase, an agreed Ireland, as a way to sate or at least to 
address the traditional nationalist desire for a united Ireland. For he used the 
term to suggest that any settlement which gave the two communities in 
Northern Ireland an equal say in the governance of the region, and any 
agreement which allowed nationalists to express a political affiliation with 
the southern Irish state, would in itself constitute “Irish unity”. For example, 
speaking shortly after the collapse of Sunningdale, Hume argued that: 
If we get an agreed Ireland that is unity. What constitutional or 
institutional forms such an agreed Ireland takes is irrelevant because it 
would represent agreement by the people of this country as to how they 
should be governed (Irish Times, 17 June 1974). 
This was an idea which Hume continued to articulate, ad infinitum, 
from the 1970s onwards. But whilst unionists vehemently opposed the all-
Ireland implications of his thinking, Hume‟s arguments did eventually find 
favour with the two governments. This was most apparent in the DSD of 
1993, where the British government stated that its primary interest was “to 
see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the 
people who inhabit the island,” and committed itself to “work with the Irish 
Government to achieve such an agreement … based on full respect for the 
rights and identities of both traditions …” (HMSO, 1993, para. 4). With this, 
Hume‟s notion of an agreed Ireland became the ideological template for a 
solution to the Northern Ireland problem (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 2002, 
pp. 221-2). Though broadly flexible as to the particular political structures 
that would be created, this model provided two guiding principles to the 
subsequent inter-party talks. Any solution arising from these discussions 
would have to include all-Ireland institutions, and must win the consent of 
both political traditions.  
The agreement that eventually emerged in 1998 is consistent with this 
model. Indeed, with the North-South structures created by the GFA, northern 
Catholics no longer reside in a polity entirely separate from that of their co-
nationals in the Republic of Ireland. The minority community‟s Irish identity 
is explicitly recognised by the Agreement (Agreement, Constitutional Issues, 
para. 1(vi)). By the same token, the Union between Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland remains intact; unionists‟ political identity has in no way 
been diminished. In this, the GFA has created a political framework capable 
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of accommodating both traditions on the island of Ireland. Hume‟s 
contribution to the conception of this framework, and in particular his idea of 
an agreed Ireland, was highly significant. 
 
“No Selfish Strategic or Economic Interest” 
 
Having explored four major concepts which contributed to the discourse and 
thinking of the Northern Ireland peace process, it is now worth considering 
the particular political exchanges which led to the cessation of hostilities in 
the mid-1990s. For here again, we can see the influence of the SDLP, 
particularly in the verbal formulations that were used.  
Of crucial importance was the dialogue between the SDLP and Sinn 
Féin which began in 1988. This debate was, in the first instance, inspired by 
the two parties‟ rival interpretations of the 1985 AIA. Sinn Féin saw the 
Agreement as an imperialist stratagem: by allowing Dublin a limited role in 
the administration of the region, republicans felt that London was trying to 
stabilise British rule in Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin, 1986). The SDLP, 
however, saw the AIA in quite a different light. In particular, Hume focused 
on Article 1(c) of the Agreement, wherein the British government had 
promised to support and indeed legislate for a united Ireland if this was 
shown to be the wish of a majority within Northern Ireland. Hume presented 
this commitment as, effectively, a declaration of British neutrality on the 
future of Northern Ireland. With this, he sought to overturn republicans‟ 
imperial interpretation of the conflict: 
This is a clear statement by the British government that it has no 
interest of its own, either strategic or otherwise, in remaining in Ireland. 
It is a declaration that Irish unity is a matter for Irish people, for those 
who want it to persuade those who don‟t (Hume, 1986, p. 382).  
Publicly, Sinn Féin rejected Hume‟s reading of the AIA. But behind 
closed doors, a debate was taking place within the republican movement. 
After the astonishing electoral gains of the early 1980s, Sinn Féin had 
reached a ceiling in its political support. This was partly attributable to the 
AIA, which has restored the confidence of constitutional nationalism, but 
more important was Sinn Féin‟s relationship with the IRA. Whilst it 
continued to defend the actions of the IRA, Sinn Féin found that it could not 
win significant support beyond the republican heartlands, where Catholic 
voters remained loyal to the SDLP. If Sinn Féin was to have any influence 
beyond its core constituency, it would have to engage with its moderate rival. 
Recognising this, the Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, began to put out 
political feelers towards the SDLP (Adams, 2003 pp. 53ff.)     
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In spite of the risks involved, Hume finally agreed to formal talks with 
Sinn Féin, beginning in early 1988. In essence, the SDLP used these 
discussions to restate and refine its reading of the AIA, and in particular its 
view that the British government was now neutral on the possibility of Irish 
unity. As Hume argued in a letter delivered to Adams at the outset of the 
talks: “Britain is now saying that she has no interest of her own in being here 
and that her only interest is to see agreement among the people who share the 
island of Ireland” (Hume, 1988, p. 4). For the SDLP, therefore, the British 
government was not the primary obstacle to Irish reunification. Rather it was 
the unionist community, and their deep-rooted resistance to that end. Thus, 
the key to achieving a united Ireland was to persuade unionists to consent to 
it.  
Despite such arguments, throughout the 1988 talks, Sinn Féin 
stubbornly rejected the idea of British neutrality on Northern Ireland, and 
restated their old colonial interpretation of the conflict: 
The claim that Britain is neutral ignores their role as a pawnbroker and 
guarantor of unionist hegemony … Britain‟s continuing involvement in 
Ireland is based on strategic, economic and political interests (Sinn 
Féin, 1988, p. 12). 
Although the SDLP-Sinn Féin talks appeared to end in stalemate, 
Hume took what republicans had said here as a challenge (Hume, 1996, p. 
115). He now turned to London, seeking confirmation – straight from the 
horse‟s mouth as it were – of his conception of the AIA and of British 
neutrality vis-à-vis Irish unity. Peter Brooke, the Northern Ireland Secretary 
from 1989, proved receptive to Hume‟s approaches, and took seriously his 
suggestion that the republican leadership was becoming more open-minded 
(Mallie and McKitterick, 1996, pp. 107-8). Brooke responded in a speech to 
his Westminster constituency on November 9th 1990, in which he famously 
declared that: “The British government has no selfish strategic or economic 
interests in Northern Ireland” (Irish Times, 10 November 1990). The striking 
similarities between this formula and the terms in which Sinn Féin had 
rejected the SDLP‟s neutrality thesis seem more than coincidental. It appears 
that someone was telling Brooke exactly what republicans needed to hear a 
British minister say.  
Following Brooke‟s speech, Hume was able to return to Adams 
claiming vindication of his interpretation of the AIA. This led to further talks 
between the two leaders which evolved into the so-called “Hume-Adams 
initiative”. The essential purpose of this initiative was to find agreement on a 
form of words – acceptable to the British and Irish governments, but also to 
the republican movement – which would be included in a joint London-
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Dublin declaration regarding the terms on which Sinn Féin could join all-
party talks towards a settlement in Northern Ireland. Though understandably 
unnerving Ulster unionists, the Hume-Adams dialogue achieved huge 
support throughout nationalist Ireland, and eventually forced the two 
governments to respond with the DSD of December 1993 (Mallie and 
McKittrick, 1996, pp. 117ff.). 
The phraseology of the DSD stands as a testament to the extent to 
which the document drew upon the Hume-Adams initiative, despite 
presentation to the contrary (Bew, Patterson and Teague, 1997, pp. 205-6). In 
order to maintain unionist support for the process, the two governments 
could not be seen to adopt a text which Adams had any part in creating, the 
Sinn Féin leader being seen as a terrorist in Protestant eyes. But though the 
terms of the Hume-Adams dialogue were diluted, the primary inspiration for 
the DSD was plain to see. Most significant in the text was an affirmation of 
the position given by Brooke three years previously, the British government 
declaring that it had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern 
Ireland”, and thus represented no barrier to a united Ireland achieved by 
peaceful means (HMSO, 1993, para. 4).  
After considerable deliberation with the republican movement, the IRA 
eventually responded to the DSD by calling a ceasefire in August 1994. The 
DSD, of course, was not the sole reason for this shift in strategy. Indeed, the 
republican movement had for some years been moving towards a more 
political approach (English, 2003, pp. 187ff). 
Moreover, if any one explanation can be given for the cessation of the armed 
campaign, it was the realisation that, though the IRA could no be defeated, 
neither did it have the military capacity to force the British state from 
Northern Ireland. By the late 1980s, many senior republicans had accepted 
this reality. However, persuading the movement as a whole to abandon the 
armed struggle and adopt a purely political strategy was no easy task. Crucial 
in the process were the various statements regarding British interests in 
Northern Ireland that were made in the early 1990s. These allowed the Sinn 
Féin leadership to suggest that there had been a radical shift in British policy 
towards Northern Ireland, and that this should be tested by republicans‟ also 
changing tack.  
On this level, the early peace process appeared as a game played 
essentially between the British state and the republican movement. However, 
as demonstrated, Hume and the SDLP helped to write the script for the 
crucial first exchanges between the two sides. Prior to the SDLP-Sinn Féin 
talks of 1988, republicans appeared unwilling to even entertain the idea of 
British neutrality regarding Northern Ireland. But as well as creating such 
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thoughts amongst the Sinn Féin leadership, Hume prompted the British 
government to make public announcements that would encourage the 
acceptance of such ideas amongst the wider republican movement. These 
statements proved vital to the development of the Northern Ireland peace 
process. In particular, without the “no selfish strategic or economic interests” 
mantra repeated by British officials throughout the early 1990s, there would 
have been no IRA ceasefire in 1994, and no peace agreement in 1998. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The great historical legacy of the SDLP, and of John Hume in 
particular, lies in redefining Irish nationalism. I deliberately do not say 
Northern nationalism, as I believe the SDLP has radically changed the 
thinking of the mainstream political parties in the South, as well as the 
broad mass of constitutional nationalist thinking in both North and 
South. Not only do I make that wider claim, but I also further claim 
that the SDLP has radically changed the thinking of physical force 
nationalism or republicanism as well. (Maginness, 2002, p. 33) 
Notwithstanding the ostentatious nature of this assertion – and indeed 
despite the fact that it is made by a member of the SDLP – it has credibility. 
With its birth in August 1970, the SDLP became the primary political 
expression of the reformist tendencies that emerged within northern Irish 
nationalism in the 1960s. Throughout the 1970s, the party consolidated this 
position by articulating a discourse and approach to the Northern Ireland 
problem that departed significantly from traditional anti-partitionist 
nationalism. Even in this early period, the SDLP enjoyed considerable 
influence within Irish government circles, but the real breakthrough came 
with the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4. With this, the party had opportunity 
to fully imbue the southern state with its political philosophy (Murray, 1998, 
pp. 123, 141), and hereafter successive Irish governments adopted a 
distinctively SDLP phraseology. In turn, the London government also took 
on something of the SDLP‟s discourse. This was evident in the AIA of 1985, 
and even more so the DSD of 1993, after which the two governments were 
united in their use of a lexicon at least partly conditioned by the terminology 
of Hume and his party. However, as Maginness points out, the SDLP also 
helped to change the thinking of physical force republicanism. Clearly, it was 
aided in this effort by the willingness of the British government to confirm 
the arguments which the party had made to Sinn Féin. But looking at the 
particular formulations which figures such as Peter Brooke chose to use, it 
seems that by the early 1990s Hume had established a direct line of 
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communication with the Northern Ireland Office, which was listening with 
great interest.    
There is, however, one party to the Northern Ireland conflict who have 
proved impervious to “Humespeak”. Ulster unionists have retained a 
particular distrust for Hume and his discourse. Cunningham suggests that 
this is a result of the perceived ambiguities in Hume‟s political language. 
Demonstrating his point, Cunningham provides a quotation from a Protestant 
clergyman which he suggests “neatly encapsulates criticisms that have been 
levelled at John Hume”: 
Protestants are really puzzled by what they feel is the ambiguous 
attitude of Catholics and their failure to define ordinary concepts in a 
clean, straightforward way … Protestants sometimes find it very 
difficult to understand the sophistry, the playing with words which we 
(sometimes) get from Catholics (Cunningham, 1997, p. 13). 
Perhaps the best example of such “sophistry” is Hume‟s “agreed 
Ireland”. For many unionists, this phrase provided the “verbal sleight of 
hand” by which Hume disguised his true ambition (Bew and Patterson, 1985, 
p. 99). Put simply, an agreed Ireland was Humespeak for a united Ireland. 
(O‟Brien, 1994, p. 177). However, the unionist reading of Hume‟s agreed 
Ireland underestimates the extent to which the concept allowed Irish 
nationalists, and particularly northern Irish nationalists, to accept a political 
settlement which fell short of a united Ireland. It did so by promising 
constitutional arrangements with an all-Ireland dimension, structures which 
allowed northern nationalists to feel some form of political association with 
the Irish Republic, the state which best represented their national identity. At 
the same time, an agreed Ireland offered the same for unionists – that the 
institutions created would respect their rights and identity, and would require 
their consent. This, at its most basic level, is what Hume‟s agreed Ireland 
was all about. It was an attempt to square the circle between Irish 
nationalism and Ulster unionism, to provide political structures which would 
satisfy both. With the GFA, this Herculean task may have been 
accomplished. The 1998 Agreement has, for the first time in Irish history, 
created institutions which have secured widespread acceptance amongst both 
political traditions on the island.
6
 The GFA has achieved an agreed Ireland, 
and Hume and the SDLP have played no small part in this.    
 
Endnotes 
 
*
 I would like to acknowledge the support of the Irish Research Council for 
the Humanities and Social Sciences in carrying out this research. I am also 
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grateful to Jennifer Todd and the editors for their constructive comments. All 
errors are my own. 
 
1
 An appreciation of the SDLP‟s place within the wider process of change in 
Irish nationalist discourse can be gained by reading this piece in conjunction 
with the article by O‟Donnell in this volume, and those by Hayward (2004), 
Ivory (1999), and Shirlow and McGovern (1998). 
2
 For an overview of the different institutions of the GFA, see O‟Leary 
(2001).   
3
 Northern Ireland comprises six of the 32 counties of Ireland. However, 
Irish nationalists have traditionally used the term “the six counties” as a 
means to delegitimise the Northern Ireland state. The implication is that the 
“six counties” are only a part of what would be a more “natural” political 
unit: a 32 county united Ireland.  
4
 For a detailed discussion of this thinking, see McLoughlin (2006). 
5
 FitzGerald had been thinking in similar terms, but modified Hume‟s idea of 
a convention of Irish nationalist parties to one which would, at least in 
principle, be open to Ulster unionist contributions (FitzGerald, 1991, pp. 
462ff.). FitzGerald and Hume were alike in much of their political thinking, 
and their convergence over the New Ireland Forum initiative shows just one 
example of the overlap and interplay between revisionist nationalist 
tendencies in both parts of Ireland. 6 
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“six counties” are only a part of what would be a more “natural” political 
unit: a 32 county united Ireland.  
4
 For a detailed discussion of this thinking, see McLoughlin (2006). 
5
 FitzGerald had been thinking in similar terms, but modified Hume‟s idea of 
a convention of Irish nationalist parties to one which would, at least in 
principle, be open to Ulster unionist contributions (FitzGerald, 1991, pp. 
462ff.). FitzGerald and Hume were alike in much of their political thinking, 
and their convergence over the New Ireland Forum initiative shows just one 
example of the overlap and interplay between revisionist nationalist 
tendencies in both parts of Ireland. 
6
 Exit polls suggested that the GFA won only a slim majority of support 
among the unionist community in the 1998 referendum. Unionists‟ 
traditional aversion to power sharing with nationalists was clearly 
exacerbated by the prospect of republicans also participating in the 
government of Northern Ireland. Following this, the failure of the IRA to 
decommission its weapons, allied to instances of continued republican 
paramilitary activity and Sinn Féin‟s refusal to accept new policing 
arrangements in Northern Ireland, saw unionist backing for the GFA fall 
further. However, more recently, the resolution of these issues appears to 
have assured unionists of republicans‟ commitment to purely democratic 
methods. Accordingly, most sections of the Protestant community have now, 
if not embraced, at least accepted the GFA as providing the most equitable 
solution for the stable governance of Northern Ireland.   
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DUP DISCOURSES ON VIOLENCE 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE 
PROCESS 
 
Amber Rankin and Gladys Ganiel 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the Democratic Unionist Party‟s (DUP) discourses 
about paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. Drawing on narrative 
analysis of DUP discourses reported in Northern Ireland‟s largest unionist 
newspaper, the News Letter (1998–2006), it explores the relationship 
between the party‟s identity, its discourses about republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries, and the impact of these words on the DUP‟s electoral success 
and on the peace process. The paper argues that these discourses may haunt 
the progress of peace-building, not least because the DUP will find it hard to 
disentangle itself from a history of scepticism and nay-saying even as it takes 
a leading role in a devolved Executive designed by an Agreement it long-
scorned. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and its founder, the Rev. Ian 
Paisley, have been controversial throughout Northern Ireland‟s Troubles and 
its current post-conflict transition.
1
 In 1971 Paisley, then a young firebrand 
evangelical preacher, founded the party with substantial support from 
members of the Free Presbyterian Church, which he also had founded. 
Paisley, his party, and his church were often regarded as prophets of war, not 
of peace. In particular, the DUP had an ambiguous relationship with 
violence. Around the time of the DUP‟s founding, Paisley and other 
members of the party were accused of shadowy dealings with loyalist 
paramilitaries. Although Paisley and the party publicly disassociated 
themselves from loyalist paramilitaries, suspicions about their true 
involvement remained. Further, Paisley‟s fiery rhetoric was regarded as 
inciting paramilitaries to violence. The story of an imprisoned loyalist 
paramilitary bemoaning the day that he ever listened to “that man Paisley” 
has become apocryphal.  
Paisley was once regarded as the politician who would always say “no” 
to compromise with Irish republicanism, particularly in the guise of Sinn 
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Féin. That has made the DUP‟s decision to share power with Sinn Féin in the 
Northern Ireland Executive all the more stunning. Images of First Minister 
Paisley laughing and joking with Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness 
of Sinn Féin (who has admitted that he belonged to the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA)) are amongst the most surprising and iconic of the recent 
transitional period. 
Throughout the Troubles the DUP was the “second” party of unionism, 
trailing the long-established Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) at the ballot box 
and in terms of respectability. It was the UUP that claimed to speak for 
“mainstream” unionism, whilst the DUP was said to appeal to the fringes. 
The DUP‟s constituencies were the unlikely bedfellows of rural-dwelling 
evangelical Protestants and urban, working class loyalists – including, it was 
assumed, those who were involved in paramilitarism. It was the UUP that 
negotiated the 1998 Belfast Agreement, while the DUP walked out of the 
talks. The then leader of the UUP, David Trimble, was honoured with a 
Nobel Prize for his work at the negotiations, but at home in Northern Ireland 
Trimble and the UUP struggled to implement the Agreement. This was due 
in large part to the DUP, which effectively tapped in to unionist disaffection 
with the terms of the Agreement and the UUP‟s inability to convince Sinn 
Féin to deliver on IRA decommissioning. During most of this time the 
Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended and the region was ruled directly 
from Westminster. DUP discourses about violence were prominent 
throughout this transitional period, when it overtook the UUP as the leading 
unionist party in terms of electoral success and respectability. Indeed, the 
DUP now confidently describes itself as the mainstream unionist party and 
its current leader, Peter Robinson, has made overtures to the UUP about 
forming some sort of united unionist party or movement.  
This means that the way the DUP has talked and continues to talk about 
violence is significant. The party‟s discourses about violence can be placed 
into two broad categories: denouncing and denying. On the one hand, the 
DUP denounce republican paramilitaries for initiating and perpetuating the 
armed struggle, which the DUP regards as illegitimate. This includes a 
consistent linking of Sinn Féin with the IRA. Prior to the restoration of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2007, it included the claim that unionists 
should not share power with Sinn Féin until the IRA had decommissioned. 
Without IRA decommissioning, Sinn Féin would remain “unreconstructed 
terrorists.” On the other hand, the DUP denounced loyalist paramilitaries for 
taking up arms, whilst at the same time denying that their party or their 
party‟s rhetoric had any impact upon loyalist paramilitaries. Loyalist 
paramilitaries often were reduced to criminals or thugs. 
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What meaning do these discourses have in what is once again being 
hailed as a “new Northern Ireland,” where Paisley shared tea and a power-
sharing executive with McGuinness? This paper argues that there are direct 
relationships between the DUP discourses about violence and the party‟s 
identity, its electoral success, and the outworking of the peace process. 
Drawing on narrative analysis of DUP discourses recorded in Northern 
Ireland‟s largest unionist newspaper, the News Letter (1998-2006), it 
explores those relationships. The first part of this paper outlines how we 
gathered, categorised and analysed DUP discourses about violence, including 
the relationship of those discourses to the party‟s identity and its electoral 
success. Here, we argue that the DUP‟s use of discourses denouncing 
republican violence has allowed it to retain its identity as the “true” loyalist 
party, and the most able defender of the union with Great Britain. This was 
important in a context in which it appeared that the UUP was impotent to 
lead unionists and protect their interests. When the DUP gradually began to 
moderate some of its policies on power-sharing, those discourses worked as 
a “smokescreen” or a cover as it took previously undreamed of positions. 
The DUP could be said to have adopted the UUP‟s positions and its policies, 
but it was able to present itself as uncompromising on its core principles.  
In the second part of the paper, we consider how these discourses may 
continue to impact on Northern Ireland‟s political transition. It is not clear 
how the DUP‟s historic condemnation of Sinn Féin and the illegitimacy of 
the IRA‟s armed struggle will affect their relationships in the power-sharing 
executive – and thus their ability to govern Northern Ireland effectively. 
Paisley and McGuinness developed what appeared to be a warm and 
effective working relationship, surprising almost everyone. It is not clear 
what sort of relationship McGuinness will have with Paisley‟s successor as 
First Minister, Robinson. It will take time for trust to develop between the 
parties. It also is not clear if the DUP has developed effective, new 
discourses to explain its participation in the Executive to its erstwhile 
followers. With the DUP sniping at its heels, the UUP failed in this regard. 
The DUP now has a hardline (if smaller) rival, Traditional Unionist Voice 
(TUV), sniping at its heels. Also, it is possible that discourses that 
disassociate the DUP from loyalist paramilitarism may absolve their party – 
and the wider unionist community – from recognising and addressing their 
own ambiguous attitudes about violence. In such a situation, the challenges 
of integrating former loyalist paramilitaries in society may not be adequately 
addressed. The DUP‟s discourses about violence may continue to haunt the 
party as it attempts to participate in a transition to peace.  
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Analysing DUP Discourses 
 
This analysis is part of a wider project on the DUP, which includes 
considering its public discourses and the presentation of the party in the 
public sphere. There are a number of sources that could be used for this 
analysis, including party statements, press releases, policy documents, the 
party‟s email and text messaging services, and so on. However, we were 
interested in not merely how the DUP wishes to present itself (which would 
presumably be reflected in its own materials), but in how the party is 
presented in the media. An analysis of all media outlets would have been 
beyond the scope of this project, so we chose to focus on the presentation of 
the party in Northern Ireland‟s largest unionist newspaper, the News Letter. 
This can be justified on the following grounds. First, newspaper reports 
generally reproduce longer and more substantial quotations from politicians 
and more in-depth analysis than would be expected on television news 
programmes. We wished to analyse substantial discourses, not sound bites. 
Second, the News Letter is widely recognized as the region‟s leading unionist 
newspaper and would be likely to contain substantial information about the 
DUP. The News Letter is used by unionist politicians as a platform for their 
electoral bids and spreading their political positions. Indeed, DUP members 
frequently write letters to the editor and op-ed pieces. It also is interesting 
that the editorial tone of the News Letter changed between 1998 and 2006, 
synchronising its sympathies with whichever unionist party was in power. 
Finally, the letters to the editor allowed us insight into what the unionist 
community was thinking and feeling towards the DUP and political events. 
Although letters to the editor may be unrepresentative or impressionistic (as 
would be the comments of callers on phone-in radio programmes, or political 
chat websites such as Slugger O‟Toole) they provide interesting contextual 
information about some of the emotions and events that surrounded the 
articulation of the DUP‟s discourses.  
The data from the News Letter was gathered using the Lexus Nexus 
search engine and the newspaper‟s website. The keyword used for the search 
engine was “DUP.” Rankin carried out this aspect of the research, June-
December 2006. These articles, with dates ranging from January 1998-
December 2006, amounted to nearly 8,000. Ganiel read each article 
chronologically, identifying “codes” for themes which were relevant to the 
research questions about the wider project on the DUP. For the purpose of 
this paper, the codes which were relevant were “paramilitarism,” and 
“security and policing.”2 Re-reading the codes that corresponded with these 
broad themes, we identified the dominant DUP discourses about violence. 
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These will come as no surprise to followers of Northern Ireland politics, as 
they are discourses that have been prominent in the public sphere. When it 
came to republican violence, the party denounced violence by focusing on 
the immorality of “terrorists” (Sinn Féin) in government and the lack of 
decommissioning. When it came to loyalist violence, the DUP cast 
paramilitaries in the role of deviants who do not represent the unionist 
community, or as criminals. It should be stated, however, that there was a 
notable lack of discourses about loyalist paramilitaries. Whilst the IRA were 
denounced nearly every day, discourses about loyalist paramilitaries were 
infrequent and usually prompted by specific events, such as feuding amongst 
rival loyalist groups.  
It is worth recording some examples of these discourses, so that their 
strength and vigour can be adequately grasped. The emotive nature of these 
words provides some insight into why, historically, Paisley and the DUP 
have been accused of inciting others to violence. As Northern Ireland 
continues its political transition, it is important to record, highlight and 
consider its occasionally harsh public discourses. This raises broader 
questions (which are beyond the scope of this article) about the role that such 
discourses play in political transitions, especially as parties and citizens 
adjust to new power relationships and political configurations. It also raises 
questions about why political parties continue to use such discourses. For 
instance, did the DUP continue to talk in such terms as a matter of principle, 
or because it was a strategy to overtake the UUP, or both? Or were there 
other reasons? Because of the nature of the data analysed in this article, we 
can only raise such questions, not answer them definitively. As such, the 
bulk of the following sections of this article are largely descriptive, and 
should be seen as part of a preliminary process of “making sense” of 
discourses about violence in post-conflict transitions.  
 
The Immorality of the Inclusion of Sinn Fein  
 
The DUP‟s criticisms of Sinn Féin and the IRA are not new. The 
party‟s discourses about “terrorists in government” are in continuation with 
what the party said for decades during the Troubles. This is an example from 
an article from 1998, shortly after the Belfast Agreement was approved in a 
referendum. The DUP, despite having opposed the agreement, decided to 
participate in the Assembly:  
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[Paisley said]: “I‟m thinking of those that were maimed by his [Gerry 
Adams] cohorts. The families that were torn apart, the people that were 
smashed and turned into vegetables by IRA violence.”  
Sinn Féin‟s Martin McGuinness stared straight at Mr. Paisley and 
accused him of running away. “You refused to come into negotiations 
but you come trundling into this room now because you are afraid you 
are going to be left behind. But I‟m afraid you‟ve already been left 
behind.” 
Peter Robinson shouted back at Mr. McGuinness, making loud 
reference to “your Semtex and Armalites” (News Letter, 2 July 1998)  
Here, Paisley‟s comments about “vegetables” and Robinson‟s about 
“Semtex and Armalites” clearly identify Sinn Féin with the IRA. The fact 
that Robinson is described as shouting adds to the emotion of the words. In 
the following narrative, from before the agreement negotiations were 
completed, Robinson focuses on the immorality of even talking with Sinn 
Féin because of their association with the IRA. He argues that it is corrupt 
and obscene to even allow them to negotiate: 
The [DUP] said the public was appalled at the “political corruption” 
and have no confidence in unionists who are attending the talks. … 
Deputy leader Peter Robinson said, “the responsibility for the 
corruption lies with the government and those parties that support the 
obscenity of trading with terrorists. … The Official Unionist3 
leadership complain that Sinn Féin/IRA are active and involved in 
terrorist incidents yet it was the Official Unionist leadership that agreed 
to let them in without handing over their weapons and it is they who sit 
around the negotiating table with Adams, McGuinness and company in 
a few weeks if the Provos
4
 decide to return.” (News Letter, 24 February 
1998) 
Discourses such as this allowed the DUP to present the inclusion of 
Sinn Féin in talks and later in the Assembly as undemocratic and morally 
wrong. Indeed, the religiously devout amongst Paisley‟s followers might 
even interpret these discourses to mean that sharing government with Sinn 
Féin would be against God‟s will. Such discourses played well in a Northern 
Ireland in which Protestants increasingly believed that Catholics had 
benefited from the agreement, whilst Protestants had not (Mitchell, 2006, p. 
32-33). This raises questions about whether people speaking for the DUP 
truly believed that it was immoral to include Sinn Féin in government, or 
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whether they saw an electoral advantage in criticising the UUP for 
compromising with Sinn Féin, or both.  
 
The Lack of Decommissioning   
 
When the IRA failed to decommission within two years of the Belfast 
Agreement (as had been suggested, though not required, in the negotiations 
and agreement), the DUP accused the UUP of being soft of terrorism. The 
DUP framed its discourses about decommissioning as a matter of trust: Sinn 
Féin and the IRA could not be trusted because the IRA had not verifiably 
decommissioned and the UUP could not be trusted because they had not 
negotiated a deal that required decommissioning. The UUP was presented as 
giving concession after concession to the IRA, with the IRA using its hidden 
caches of guns as leverage in negotiations. Even when the Independent 
Monitoring Commission (IMC) confirmed that the IRA had completed acts 
of decommissioning on several occasions, the DUP questioned the 
trustworthiness of those statements.  
For example, the IRA announced an act of decommissioning in 
October 2003 and this was verified by retired Canadian general John de 
Chastalain. However, when de Chastalain‟s press conference did not provide 
substantial or, in particular, photographic detail of what he actually 
witnessed, the DUP immediately cast doubt on what had happened and 
criticised the UUP and the IRA. The comments made by Paisley in reaction 
to this press conference epitomise this discourse:  
 “The IRA has made the UUP look ridiculous with this pathetic effort. 
… What on earth was David Trimble talking to Gerry Adams about? 
This is a demonstration of the most inept form of negotiation by the 
UUP imaginable. They are utterly unfit to represent unionism. Today 
indicated that nothing has changed in the IRA. Once again they are 
willing to milk the process for all they can get and make only weasel 
words and a hidden gesture. There is no evidence whatsoever of any 
reduction in the IRA capacity. This is yet another con.” Mr. Paisley 
said the language used by Gerry Adams and the IRA failed to state that 
the war is over or the IRA would disband. (News Letter, 22 October 
2003) 
Further on in this same report, Paisley criticises the “language used by 
Gerry Adams and the IRA” (note again the direct connection made between 
Sinn Féin and terrorism) for failing to explicitly state that “the war is over”. 
This is a neat reflection of the fact that opposing parties have been acutely 
aware of each other‟s discourse throughout the conflict and peace process. 
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As mentioned above, the question of decommissioning became a 
crucial issue of debate and competition within unionism. The DUP‟s refusal 
to accept the IMC‟s word on IRA decommissioning was not just a source of 
objection to the power-sharing Executive and Sinn Féin‟s position in it; it 
was also a strong point of contention with (and a good means of attracting 
votes away from) the UUP. Paisley questioned the trustworthiness and the 
competence of the UUP in this speech to launch the 2003 Assembly election 
campaign. Once again he claimed that concessions had been delivered to the 
IRA, and played on unionist concerns about all-Ireland structures and the 
possibility that Sinn Féin‟s Gerry Kelly (a former IRA prisoner) could be 
Minister for Policing and Justice: 
This election offers a simple choice. Four more years of Trimble-
delivered concessions to Sinn Féin/IRA or the opportunity to 
negotiate a new and fair deal that unionists as well as nationalists can 
support. This election is an opportunity to deliver a verdict on what 
Trimble and the “Official Unionists” have done over the past five 
years. They signed up to a deal, which has delivered concessions to 
the IRA, not just on one day in 1998, but for every day since. The 
pain and betrayal felt by unionists at the Belfast Agreement has not 
passed with time but has intensified as the terrorists have made a 
mockery of the democratic system. The unionist community stands at 
a crossroads. One path leads to implementing the current 
Trimble/Adams deal, which will deliver permanent terrorist 
representation in government, galvanising the embryonic all-Ireland 
structures with Sinn Féin consent required for major political 
decisions and Gerry Kelly as minister for Policing and Justice. The 
other road is a new deal, a democratic deal. (News Letter, 23 October 
2003) 
The DUP‟s discourses about the IRA‟s lack of decommissioning 
changed over time. When the IRA began with acts of decommissioning, 
witnessed first by de Chastalain and later by the IMC, the DUP questioned 
the integrity of the witnesses and the lack of detail in their reports. During 
negotiations to restore the Assembly in December 2004, the DUP demanded 
photographic evidence of decommissioning, which was rejected by Sinn Féin 
as an attempt to humiliate the IRA. Any hopes that a deal could be salvaged 
were put on hold days later after the Northern Bank robbery in Belfast, 
which is believed to have been carried out by the IRA. The DUP also talked 
about Sinn Féin needing a “decontamination period” after decommissioning, 
to allow them to become “fit” for democratic government. When Methodist 
minister Harold Good and Catholic priest Fr Alec Reid were invited to 
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witness decommissioning, the DUP even doubted their testimonies, 
considering them naïve. However, by the time of the negotiations in October 
2006 in St Andrews, the DUP seemed to equate Sinn Féin‟s willingness to 
sign up to the Policing Board as “proof” of the IRA‟s decommissioning. This 
is how Paisley explained his decision to go into government with Sinn Féin 
in May 2007: 
“In politics as in life, it is a truism that no one can ever have 100% of 
what they desire. They must make a verdict when they believe they 
have achieved enough to move things forward.” The DUP leader said 
Sinn Féin‟s acceptance of the rule of law at its ard fheis [annual 
convention] three months ago had met that test. “Support for all the 
institutions of policing has been a critical test that today has been met 
and pledged, word and deed. … Recognising the significance of that 
change from a community that for decades demonstrated hostility for 
policing has been critical in turning the corner.” (News Letter, 9 May 
2007)  
After years of denouncing claims of IRA decommissioning as 
inadequate, this is, undoubtedly, a significant change. But questions remain 
about whether unionists accept the DUP‟s explanations for its decisions. In 
the quotation above, Paisley equated Sinn Féin‟s recognition of the police 
with IRA decommissioning, allowing the party to claim that it had succeeded 
where the UUP failed. It is not clear whether this is enough to satisfy all of 
Paisley‟s followers. The DUP has made little attempt to articulate sustained 
practical, moral or theological discourses to justify sharing power with Sinn 
Féin.   
 
Denying: Loyalist Paramilitaries as Deviants and Criminals 
 
Far fewer of the DUP‟s discourses engaged directly with loyalist 
paramilitarism. Those that did were usually in response to direct accusations 
about DUP links to violence; or particular events such as loyalist feuds. The 
lack of discourses about loyalist violence as compared to the almost constant 
discourses denouncing the IRA is worth considering. The DUP developed 
discourses about the rising crime rate, blaming it on the implementation of 
the Belfast Agreement – particularly the scaling down of the police and 
army. However, noticeably absent from those discourses was any recognition 
that an increasing proportion of crime and violence was now carried out by 
loyalist – not republican – paramilitary groups. 
The following response by Minister of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLA) Jeffrey Donaldson, a former UUP MP who defected to the DUP in 
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opposition to the 1998 Agreement, appeared on the Letters page. He was 
responding to comments made by the UUP‟s Dermot Nesbitt, who tried to 
equate the DUP with the IRA and accused Donaldson of socialising with 
Martin McGuinness:  
Dermot‟s case is based on his assertion that, at one point, he observed I 
was standing near a table where Martin McGuinness was seated with 
others, a kind of “proximity socialising”.  
I did not speak with Martin McGuinness in the reception and, when I 
challenged Dermot on this point in a BBC Talkback interview, he 
withdrew his allegation that I was socialising with Mr McGuinness. 
… In the Donegal debate, whilst I concentrated on exposing republican 
failure to end their terrorist activities, Mr Nesbitt continuously attacked 
the DUP and at one point, rather pathetically, sought to equate the DUP 
with the IRA. To borrow a phrase, it was rather like being savaged by a 
“dead sheep”. It is becoming absolutely clear that, having lost the 
support and trust of the unionist community, people like Dermot seem 
determined to prevent the DUP from delivering a fair deal for unionism 
as it would only expose his past failings. After all, it was Dermot who 
promised South Down unionists that he would not sit in government 
with any party with “guns under the table, on the table or outside the 
door”. He broke his word and became a government minister alongside 
Martin McGuinness and Bairbre de Brun without a single IRA bullet 
being decommissioned. (News Letter, 6 August. 2004) 
Donaldson denies and dismisses Nesbitt‟s accusations about DUP links 
with violence by equating them (quoting from the famous put-down by a 
British Labour Party MP of his Conservative counterpart in Westminster) to 
“being savaged by a dead sheep.” He then goes on to draw his argument back 
to an accusation against the UUP, once again blaming the UUP for the IRA‟s 
lack of decommissioning.  
On occasion, the DUP has condemned loyalist paramilitaries. In this 
example from August 2005, during a feud between the Loyalist Volunteer 
Force and the Ulster Volunteer Force, the DUP MLA, Edwin Poots, 
describes loyalist paramilitaries as criminals who were oppressing their own 
people:  
Loyalist paramilitaries claim to exist because of the republican threat 
against their community, but the reality is that people in the loyalist 
community are living in fear not from their traditional enemy but from 
people within their own community. The ongoing feud within elements 
of loyalism is causing huge damage and demoralising the unionist 
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community. For decades republicans have attacked and killed 
thousands of Protestants, but today there is a clear reality that 
Protestants could be attacked by so-called loyalists as well as 
republicans. The murder of four Protestants, by these so-called 
loyalists, has caused dismay and has totally demoralised the Protestant 
community. 
Poots goes on to say that loyalist paramilitaries were now doing the 
work of the IRA by unleashing misery on their communities:  
Why does the IRA need to continue their campaign of terrorism when 
so-called loyalists will do the job for them? ... The current campaign is 
not about defending Ulster. It has more to do with protection money, 
extortion and drug dealing. While the IRA are using their guns to 
squeeze concession after concession out of the British government, 
loyalists have turned their guns on themselves and have turned to 
criminality, extortion and drug dealing. As a public representative I 
appeal to these so-called loyalists who are oppressing the Protestant 
community to get off the backs of your own people. Instead, get 
involved in restoring normality to deprived Protestant areas and divert 
your energy to setting up programmes that will provide a better future 
for your children. (News Letter, 24 August 2005) 
Paisley responded in a similar way to loyalist attacks on Catholic 
property in his constituency: 
“My view on the attacks is a simple one. ... There are people in 
Ballymena who know who are doing this and they should be supporting 
the police and getting the PSNI on the job of bringing these people to 
order. These attacks have been universally condemned by all law 
abiding people in Ballymena.” Mr Paisley claimed there had also been 
a series of attacks on Evangelical and Protestant churches in the 
Province and said a window was smashed at his own church in recent 
days. He added: “On both sides there is this cancer and the only way it 
can be fought is by the people who know who is responsible. There are 
people in Ballymena who know who those people are. They don‟t come 
in the middle of the night and go away in the middle of the night. They 
are people living in the area. … They should desist at once. They have 
no place in the community whatsoever. If they think they can speak for 
the people of Ballymena then they should stand for election and see 
what kind of response they get.” (News Letter, 31 August 2005) 
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Paisley uses characteristically strong words: “they have no place in the 
community whatsoever.” The earlier comments from Poots dismiss loyalist 
paramilitaries as criminals who are terrorising their own people, rather than 
“defending Ulster.” Over the years, the DUP have consistently denied the 
legitimacy of loyalist paramilitary violence – as well as the possible 
involvement of party members in it. This has allowed the DUP to present 
itself as a party with “clean hands”, democratic and morally fit to exercise 
power. However, there are those who contend that the DUP has not 
satisfactory explained its former links with paramilitaries (Brewer and 
Higgins, 1998; Mitchel, 2003; Moloney, 2008). Further, reducing loyalist 
paramilitaries to criminals and thugs may absolve the party and the unionist 
community from facing up to the role loyalist paramilitaries have played 
over the years.  
 
Identity and Discourses about Violence 
 
Since its inception in 1971, there have been two major strands in the 
DUP‟s identity: loyalism and evangelicalism. The loyalist strand emphasises 
the DUP‟s identity as a tough, straight-talking party tenaciously clinging to 
the link with Great Britain. It will not “sell out” at any cost, unlike the 
“softer” UUP. Until it overtook the UUP in the 2003 Assembly elections, 
this strand made the DUP appear as if it was on the edge – a party of protest 
that was the brash, vocal, “thought police” of unionism, as Jackson (1999) 
has put it. The evangelical strand emphasises the DUP‟s identity as righteous 
and morally trustworthy (Mitchel, 2003, p. 171-212; Bruce, 1986, 2007; 
Smyth, 1986). Free Presbyterians and other evangelicals remain over-
represented in the ranks of party representatives (Mitchell, 2008a; Bruce, 
2007; Ganiel, 2006; Southern 2005).  
The appeal to the party‟s evangelical identity can be seen below in the 
way Paisley draws on Biblical themes to denounce the immorality of Sinn 
Féin and unionists who did business with them. The colourful language 
about weapons and genocide, and the venue at which it was spoken, an 
Independent Orange Order
5 
demonstration in Portglenone in 2001, appeals to 
the party‟s loyalist identity: 
To vote for taking into the Executive of Northern Ireland the Roman 
Catholic IRA/Sinn Féin with all their weaponry carefully preserved for 
the genocide of the next Protestant generation, is an act of darkest 
treason. Yet, Orangemen in the Assembly cheered after they had 
defeated their brother-Orangemen and fellow Protestants by joining 
ranks with the political representatives of the IRA murderers, thus 
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succeeding in that Iscariot treachery. Today, those same Orangemen, 
besashed, will sport themselves as defenders of the Faith and 
maintainers of the Union. A return to the basic principles of Orangeism 
is imperative. (News Letter, 13 July 2001) 
As in Paisley‟s address above, discourses about the immorality of 
terrorists in government often included religious overtones, including the 
idea that the IRA should not only decommission their weapons, but that they 
should “repent” before Sinn Féin should be allowed to participate in 
government. Perhaps the most famous of these was Paisley‟s 2004 
“sackcloth and ashes” speech to party supporters in Ballymena. Here is an 
example from an article describing criticism of the speech: 
Ian Paisley yesterday brushed aside the “delicate” nature of the peace 
talks, when he reminded republicans that they were not the only ones 
who had suffered throughout the Troubles. 
The DUP leader decided to ditch the diplomatic approach and 
expressed his inner feelings, when he told reporters in Downing Street 
that he stuck by comments he had made last weekend to party members 
– that the IRA should be humiliated and made “to wear sackcloth and 
ashes” for their crimes. 
… “There is no excuse for what they (the IRA) did,‟ the DUP leader 
said. „Every day the security forces have to wear sackcloth and ashes 
… They have to do that – that is all right for the security forces 
(according to republicans). But as for us, we are immune to it – that is 
their (republicans) attitude.” (News Letter, 1 December 2004)  
Discourses such as these have allowed the DUP to present itself as 
remaining true to both the evangelical and loyalist strands of its identity.  
 
Relationship between Discourses and Electoral Success 
 
It is important that the DUP seems to remain true to its identity. This 
allows the party to present itself as vigilant and trustworthy, at the same time 
providing security as it makes changes that – on the surface – do not reflect 
its traditional loyalist and evangelical identities (Ganiel and Dixon, 2008; 
Ganiel, 2007). For instance, even before it agreed to share the Assembly 
Executive with Sinn Féin in 2007, the DUP had committed itself to power 
sharing and had worked with Sinn Féin at other levels of government. 
Beyond its tough discourses about violence, the party utilised other 
narratives to accomplish this. For example, the party has consistently 
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claimed it opposes the Belfast Agreement. So first, it justified its 
participation in institutions set up by the agreement on the grounds that they 
would destroy the agreement. Then, they justified their participation by 
saying that if they were the largest party, they would “re-negotiate” the 
agreement and get a new, “fair deal” for unionism. Now, by referring to the 
points agreed during negotiations at St Andrews in 2006 as “the St Andrews 
Agreement”, the DUP can claim that it has done just what it said (Ganiel, 
2007).  
Such discursive tricks have allowed the DUP to retain its appeal to 
traditional loyalists and evangelicals and to tap into widespread Protestant 
dissatisfaction with the Belfast Agreement. At the same time, the gradual 
shift of their policies in a more UUP-like direction has attracted moderate 
unionist voters. Tough discourses about violence and the agreement have 
provided a smokescreen for significant policy changes. These have been 
accompanied by discourses that contrast the DUP‟s tough stance with that of 
the supposedly weak UUP. This can be seen in the following narrative from 
MLA Norah Beare, who criticised the UUP‟s willingness to sit in 
government with former paramilitaries. This statement is from June 2006, 
just a few months before the St Andrews deal: 
I fail to see how any unionist worth his salt could issue a statement on 
restoring devolved government but make no mention of the obstacle 
created by paramilitary and criminal activity … I speak to many people 
and I know that they share my party‟s desire to get down to sorting out 
the bread and butter issues for ourselves […] but they also want us to 
make sure we get the basics right so we have a government which is 
truly democratic. 
They do not want to go back to the old Ulster Unionist tactics of 
bowing the knee to republicans, entering a government prematurely, 
discovering republicans have still not delivered and then being forced 
to go back to square one and being no better off. (Beare, 20 June 2006) 
Of course, words alone do not explain the DUP‟s electoral success. The 
DUP has a much stronger grassroots presence than the UUP, and individual 
ministers are often regarded as hard-working on bread and butter issues. The 
UUP has had its own internal problems, including bitter divisions that often 
left the party paralysed. And the IRA itself might even be considered a key 
player in the DUP‟s electoral success, as its ambiguity about 
decommissioning played into the party‟s hands (Moloney, 2008; Bruce, 
2007; Farrington, 2006).  
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That said, the question remains whether the words that have helped 
propel the DUP to electoral success will come back to haunt them now that 
they must exercise power. At a basic level, traditional loyalists and 
evangelicals may feel betrayed by images of Paisley and McGuinness in cosy 
collaboration. It is possible that the DUP could lose those voters. In 
December 2007 a group calling itself Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) was 
launched. This grouping, which claims branches in 12 of the 18 
constituencies in Northern Ireland, initially described itself as a movement, 
not a party, and is led by former DUP member and current MEP Jim Allister. 
Allister resigned from the DUP in protest after its decision to sit in 
government with Sinn Féin. In his statement announcing the launch of TUV, 
Allister (2007) said: “TUV will occupy the traditional unionist ground so 
wantonly abandoned by others for the sake of office.” TUV contested a by-
election in Dromore in 2008, splitting the unionist vote and paving the way 
for a UUP victory. Allister remains the most visible and vocal public critic of 
changes in DUP policy. Similarly, a group calling itself Concerned Free 
Presbyterians was established after Paisley entered government with Sinn 
Féin. They claimed that Paisley‟s decision had compromised his Christian 
witness, and eventually Paisley agreed not to put himself forward for re-
election as Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church – a position he had 
held since its inception.
6
 Further, the Grand Chaplain of the Orange Order 
and a prominent evangelical within the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Rev. 
Stephen Dickinson, issued a statement in support of TUV (Dickinson 2007). 
The next part of the paper considers in more detail how the DUP‟s discourses 
about violence may impact on the political transition.  
 
Discourses about Violence and Political Transition 
 
With the DUP and Sinn Féin now sharing power in the Assembly, it 
may be tempting to look at the DUP‟s discourses about violence and ask, “so 
what?” The past is the past, words are only words, and now it is time to 
move on. But to do so would be to fail to raise wider questions about issues 
that it may be necessary to address in post-conflict, transitional societies, 
such as relationship-building, truth recovery and reconciliation, and re-
integrating ex-combatants into society. It also is not certain if the DUP 
needs, or has, alternative discourses to replace their previous discourses 
about violence.  
First, it is not clear how the DUP‟s harsh words about Sinn Féin and 
the illegitimacy of the IRA will affect their relationships in the Executive. 
Many of the DUP‟s discourses about IRA violence conveyed a lack of trust. 
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Could the IRA be trusted to stop killing people? Could people associated 
with the IRA be trusted to govern democratically? Does Sinn Féin need a 
“decontamination period”? These discourses not only reflect a lack of trust 
by members of the DUP, but also reflect attitudes that are present at the 
unionist grassroots. The DUP and Sinn Féin are now sharing government, 
but it is unlikely that trust has developed overnight. Further research on 
political parties in Northern Ireland might concentrate on how trust was built 
between these parties to the extent that they agreed to enter into government. 
It also is worth considering further steps that might be taken to build trust. 
The DUP‟s emotive discourses about IRA violence should also serve to 
remind us that people at the grassroots – especially unionists who have lost 
loved ones to IRA violence – may still not trust Sinn Féin or the IRA. 
Accordingly, grassroots confidence building measures should be considered.    
Second, it is not clear that the DUP has convincing discourses to 
explain to its constituencies its change in direction. Thus far, the party has 
justified its decision to share power in the Executive by appealing to 
“democratic” principles and claiming that Sinn Féin‟s recognition of the 
police can be equated to making the IRA “go away.” This can be seen in the 
following narrative from MLA Mervyn Storey, from June 2006. In advance 
of the St Andrews negotiations, Storey was explaining what it would take for 
the DUP to share power with Sinn Féin: 
as desirable as devolution is, it must be rebuilt upon solid foundations. 
Previous attempts to establish devolution in the Province have failed. 
Why? Because basic fundamentals like a solid, unshakable democratic 
footing and accountability were missing … [no other democratic 
country in the world] would tolerate the presence of the associates of 
unreconstructed terrorists and gangsters within their government. 
The simple and straightforward standard that all those wishing to wield 
power within a devolved administration in Northern Ireland should be 
demonstrably committed to solely peaceful and democratic methods is 
not one made up by the Democratic Unionist Party. It is universal … 
We know where we want to get to – democratic devolution. There is 
now nothing left to negotiate. Parties either sign up to the basic 
standards of democracy and abide by them or there can be no place in 
any Executive for them. (News Letter, 8 June 2006) 
 A second way that Paisley and his wife have used to justify the 
DUP‟s decision is to appeal to Paisley‟s authority as a man of God. This 
discourse has not been dominant in the secular public sphere of newspapers 
and other media, but has surfaced in the Free Presbyterian magazine the 
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Revivalist. Moloney (2008, p. 502-503) cites an editorial in the May 2007 
issue of the magazine which claims that Paisley “was God‟s „specially 
anointed‟ leader,” and drew on that authority in his political decisions. In her 
column in the same issue, Paisley‟s wife Eileen wrote: “Like the Israelites of 
old treated Moses so they treat today‟s God-anointed leader. They refuse to 
believe that God is already working in the most unexpected places and in the 
hearts of the most unexpected people. Again, like the Israelites, they prefer to 
remain in the wilderness of the past than move into the promised land of a 
better and happier future” (quoted in Moloney, 2008, p. 503).  
That said, it is not certain that either of these discourses have won the 
hearts and minds of dissatisfied unionists. Indeed, there have been rumblings 
from the unionist grassroots that people were disappointed that Paisley and 
McGuinness seemed to be enjoying each other‟s company so much as they 
acted out their duties as First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The 
existence of TUV and Concerned Free Presbyterians indicate that the DUP‟s 
discourses have not been entirely effective. Further research on TUV and 
Concerned Free Presbyterians could attempt to gauge the depth and breadth 
of unionist opposition to DUP-Sinn Féin power-sharing. 
Third, the DUP‟s denial about its relationship with loyalist 
paramilitaries could have implications for truth recovery and reconciliation. 
Most of the biographies of Paisley or analyses of the DUP from the 1980s 
and 1990s consider the question of the party‟s relationship with loyalist 
violence (Bruce, 1986, 2007; Moloney and Pollak, 1986; Smyth, 1987; 
Cooke, 1996; Moloney, 2008). All acknowledge at least some links, although 
Bruce (1986, 2001) downplays them. Bruce‟s (2007) later work on Paisley is 
even more strident in its defence of Paisley‟s non-violent credentials. But 
Moloney (2008), Brewer and Higgins (1998) and Mitchel (2003) claim that, 
at the very least, Paisley‟s anti-Catholic rhetoric stirred some paramilitaries 
to violence. More recently, O‟Callaghan and O‟Donnell‟s (2006) analysis of 
materials from the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, demonstrates 
that in the mid-60s, the Royal Ulster Constabulary‟s Inspector General 
believed that what was called in the documents the “Paisleyite Movement” 
consisted of the following groups: the Ulster Constitution Defence 
Committee, the Ulster Protestant Volunteer Division, the Ulster Volunteer 
Force, the Ulster Defence Corps, the Ulster Protestant Action Defence 
Committee and the Ulster Volunteer Force. O‟Callaghan and O‟Donnell 
argue that the information in these documents contributed to the decision to 
ban the UVF at the end of 1966. Although this predates the formation of the 
DUP, Paisley‟s very personal involvement with these groups bears 
consideration. It is likely that many nationalists do not believe the denials of 
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Paisley and the DUP about their involvement with or responsibility for 
loyalist violence. Therefore, it is worth asking to what extent should public 
knowledge about Paisley and the DUP‟s relationship with violent groups be 
part of a “truth recovery” process in Northern Ireland? Of course, this should 
be set in the context of the violence of republican and loyalist paramilitary 
groups and the security forces. At this stage, it is not clear what shape 
Northern Ireland‟s truth recovery process will take, so it is also worth 
considering how a lack of truth recovery may impact on the potential 
reconciliation of people from groups with violent histories – including Sinn 
Féin and the DUP.  
Fourth, the DUP‟s denial of involvement with paramilitaries, coupled 
with their harsh condemnation of their current activities, raises questions 
about the integration of ex-combatants into society (See also Mitchell, 
2008b). DUP discourses about loyalist paramilitaries have tended to cast 
them as people who are outside of the pale, not worthy of inclusion in the 
community. (Occasionally, loyalist paramilitaries are deemed worthy to re-
enter the unionist fold if they become Christians by being “born again” or 
“saved.”) These discourses may reflect a wider unionist attitude about 
violence, which focuses blame on a select few. This absolves the rest of the 
community from responsibility for violence, brushing over ambiguities about 
turning a blind eye to tacit support for violence, including not only terrorist 
atrocities and punishment beatings, but the violence associated with some 
Orange parades. In such a situation, the challenges of integrating former 
loyalist paramilitaries in society may not be adequately addressed. For 
instance, it is not clear if or to what extent this item is even on the DUP‟s 
agenda.  
The material presented in this paper should be seen as part of a 
preliminary process of documenting hardline discourses about violence 
during Northern Ireland‟s peace process. It aims to raise questions about the 
appropriateness of such discourses as Northern Ireland transitions from 
physical violence to peace. It has demonstrated that the DUP has used 
discourses about violence to secure its own identity as a party and to 
overtake the UUP in electoral terms. But using discourses about violence in 
these ways means that the party now faces challenges in working political 
institutions with people it has spent years denouncing – and in justifying this 
change to its supporters. The party also faces challenges in coming to terms 
with violence in its own past and that of the unionist community. This serves 
as reminder that even as power-sharing is implemented, issues and attitudes 
around violence remain unresolved and unaddressed. Such ambivalence 
about violence is common in transitional societies. This ambivalence may 
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hinder the progress of peace building. With that in mind, political parties and 
other policy makers would do well to consider the public impact of 
continued violent discourses.   
 
Endnotes 
 
* We are grateful to Katy Hayward and Catherine O‟Donnell for their 
organisation of the Peace Lines conference in Dublin in June 2007, and for 
the helpful comments of those who participated.  
 
1
 It is worth initially clarifying the terms “unionism” and “loyalism.” 
Unionism is an umbrella term for the population of people in Northern 
Ireland who favour retaining the union with Great Britain. The 
overwhelming majority identify with the Protestant religious tradition. 
“Loyalism” generally refers to a population of unionists who are considered 
more “extreme” or “hardline” about their loyalty to Great Britain. See Todd 
(1987) for a fuller explanation. 
2
 Other codes included: peace process, the surrender process, the 
delegitimatisation of Trimble and the UUP, morality, the security threat, 
victimisation, renegotiation, the Assembly, cross community relations, 
cultural issues, Jeffrey Donaldson (related to his transfer from the UUP), 
education, Europe, funding, gender, local politics, moral issues, “no” 
campaign, non-involvement in talks, North/ South dimension, parading, 
party growth, party member activity, power-sharing, protest, religion and 
politics, social/economic issues, unionist disunity, and US involvement. The 
coded data is stored at the Belfast campus of the Irish School of Ecumenics, 
Trinity College Dublin. 
3 “Official Unionist” is another name for the Ulster Unionist Party. 
4
 “Provos” is short for the “Provisional IRA.”  
5
 The Independent Orange Order is a fraternal organisation for Protestants. It 
is smaller than the main Orange Order, from which it separated near the 
beginning of the last century. Both groups are exclusively Protestant and 
their main activity is organising parades throughout the summer months. The 
largest parades are on the 12
th
 of July and commemorate the victory of the 
Protestant King William of Orange over a Catholic force at the Battle of the 
Boyne in 1690. These parades are often contentious, especially if they pass 
through predominantly Catholic areas.  
6 
The Concerned Free Presbyterians group had an interactive website which 
disseminated their criticisms of Paisley and the DUP. But after Paisley‟s 
decision to step down in September 2007, the content of the site was taken 
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down. Now the visitors are greeted with the message: “This website has now 
been „put beyond use‟.” <http://www.concernedfreepresbyterians.com> 
(December 2007). We downloaded and saved electronically a substantial 
portion of the postings on the website before they were removed.  
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“FAITH, CROWN AND STATE”: CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSES 
WITHIN THE ORANGE ORDER IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
James W. McAuley and Jon Tonge 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite a decline in membership in recent decades the Orange Order 
remains one of the largest and most significant organisations within civil 
society in Northern Ireland, representing a significant proportion of the 
Protestant population. The Orange Order claims a moral and political 
rationale to opposition to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and many of the 
political consequences that have followed. Drawing upon a large 
membership survey of the Orange institution (the first such survey ever 
undertaken), and abetted by in-depth semi-structured interviews, this paper 
examines core political and social attitudes of Orange Order members in a 
post-conflict environment. It identifies core discourses on offer within 
Orangeism, and how these structure responses to contemporary events. It 
concludes that the maintenance of “traditional” discourses within the 
Orange Order (seen by its critics as a barrier to the modernisation of 
unionism) may be key to its endurance against the odds in a changing 
political context and increasingly secularized world. 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Orangemen interpret the Boyne as the conclusive victory of the 
Protestant Reformation in the British Isles. Their incessant marching is 
to demonstrate that all Protestants, but particularly those who live in 
Northern Ireland, must maintain a constant vigil against Rome. (Boyd, 
1995, p. 60) 
If being British and wanting to live under the Union Jack still means as 
much to the people of Northern Ireland as it did for their forefathers, 
then they will have to make the same determined stand. (Orange 
Standard, May 2007) 
 This paper highlights contemporary political ideologies and discourses 
within Orangeism and in particular, considers how it has positioned itself 
through political and cultural reactions to the peace process in Ireland. The 
Orange Order (correctly entitled the Loyal Orange Institution) is a large and 
complex voluntary, communal organisation. While it once claimed a 
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membership of up to 120,000 (one in three of all Protestant males in 
Northern Ireland) the current strength of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland 
is estimated at around forty thousand members (Stevenson et al., 2007, p. 
110). For many Protestants it continues to offer a central focus for social life 
and, although its political importance has declined drastically in recent 
decades, it retains an important cultural and religious influence in many parts 
of Northern Ireland. This paper identifies crucial political alignments and 
realignments within Orangeism that have taken place in recent years.  
 In so doing, this paper draws directly upon public declarations and 
texts produced by the Orange Order (mainly taken from the monthly 
publication, Orange Standard) and on material drawn from interviews with 
members. Within this, two important bands of discourse need to be 
recognised. First, those that contain “internal” messages; in many ways 
Orangeism represents a classic discourse community, representing a group of 
people, “who share common ideologies, and common ways of speaking 
about things” (Little et al., 2003, p. 73). Second, the Orange Order also 
projects “external” messages that seek to frame and position the Order within 
distinct moral, social, and political arenas of life.  
 Beyond this, we then seek identity several, sometimes overlapping, 
discourses within contemporary Orangeism that give it political expression. 
We identify those discourses that unite Orangeism and give its membership a 
sense of identity and continuity. We then highlight political and cultural 
discourses that give the Orange Order much of its contemporary dynamic. 
Finally, we suggest how these discourses are drawn upon to construct visions 
of the future within Orangeism. To begin, however, we outline the collective 
and organisational bases of the Orange Order within which such discourses 
are formed. 
 
Collective Identity and the Orange Order 
 
The Origins of the Orange Order 
 
 The origins of Orangeism rest in the agrarian conflict of late eighteenth 
century Ulster and in sectarian conflict that emerged in and around County 
Armagh (Smyth, 1998). By far the most detailed (and best) account of the 
period remains Gibbon (1972), who clearly outlines how both Protestant and 
Catholic peasants organised in opposition, through agrarian secret societies, 
which became manifest in a series of violent confrontations. As a result, 
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Protestants formed the Orange Order in 1795 after a period of prolonged 
confrontation (Roberts, 1971) the grouping taking its name from William of 
Orange who defeated the Catholic King James II (Senior, 1966).  
 It developed structures and organisation that mirrored the Freemasons 
(Dewar et al., 1967) and as a symbol of its collective solidarity the Order 
began to organise public meetings (the first Boyne commemoration parade 
taking place in July 1796). It remained largely rural-based, often organized in 
direct opposition to the rise of the nationalist United Irishmen; indeed 
Orangemen were armed and used by the government to militarily confront 
them. The Order also found growing support from the Protestant gentry, 
which noted the progress of Orangeism, “then gave support, finally took over 
and reorganized the movement, and used it as an instrument to preserve 
Protestant ascendancy” (McCaffrey, 1967, p. 144). 
 Throughout the 1860s and 1870s Orangeism “expanded rapidly in the 
face of resurgent nationalism” (Mitchel, 2003, p. 135) and by the late 1880s 
the Orange Institution had become well established in Ulster‟s growing 
urban centres, with Belfast‟s expanding bourgeoisie displaying an ever-
increasingly involvement in its organization. This was given further 
momentum through political resistance to the Home Rule movement. 
Intensified political agitation meant that Britain was forced to consider the 
granting of some limited self-government to Ireland – “Home Rule”. 
Protestants became increasingly fearful of political dominance by a Catholic 
majority. As Jackson (2001, p. 119) suggests, the “significance of the Orange 
Order in terms of the ideological and institutional groundwork for Unionism 
can hardly be overstated”. 
 
Structures and Activities of the Orange Order 
 
 As a result, Orange Order membership expanded rapidly, playing a 
central role as Protestant Ulster sought to formulate coherent political 
opposition to reflect their perceived social, cultural and religious distance 
from the rest of the island, as “resistance to Home Rule injected the Order 
with new life and enabled it to recruit all classes to its ranks” (Crawford, 
1987, p. 29). The organisation structures of Orangeism that developed at that 
time largely remain in place today. Membership of the Grand Orange Lodge 
of Ireland is organised into a hierarchal pyramid structure. At the base are 
about 1,400 Private Lodges to which every member must belong (Grand 
Orange Lodge of Ireland, 2008). The style of these varies considerably, 
“some being fervently evangelical, others little more than social drinking 
clubs” (Mitchel, 2003, p. 137). Within the broad structure of the Order, 
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private lodges elect representatives to District Lodges, which in turn send 
representatives to the County Lodge level. There are 12 County Grand 
Lodges representing Antrim, Armagh, Belfast, Cavan, Donegal, Down, 
Fermanagh, Leitrim, City of Londonderry, Londonderry County, Monaghan 
and Tyrone, which then elect representatives to the governing body of the 
organisation, with 300 representatives (Bryan, 2000, p. 97 –102; Grand 
Orange Lodge of Ireland, 2008). 
 Today the Orange Order is perhaps best known for its parading 
tradition, and the public demonstration of membership on the streets (Bryan, 
2000). By far the most prominent, are the set of parades held annually on or 
around the Twelfth of July, to commemorate the victories of King William 
III (William of Orange) in the religious wars of the late seventeenth century 
(Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p. 381). In July 2007, for example, tens of 
thousands of members marched to 20 venues across Northern Ireland. In 
Belfast, the parade consisted of 134 lodges (including two from Scotland and 
one from Canada), supported by 69 marching bands and two floats (Belfast 
Telegraph, 13 July 2007). 
 Elsewhere, there were also smaller demonstrations in the Republic of 
Ireland and even reports that some members of the Irish Regiment serving in 
Basra had held their own demonstration (Rusk, 2007). More formally, the 
Order has an organised membership in Scotland (by far the largest outside of 
Ireland), England, Australia, New Zealand and Canada and the USA, as well 
as smaller groupings in countries such as Togo and Ghana (Harland-Jacobs, 
2008; Patterson, 2008; Sweetman, 2000). These are all places where 
Orangeism found root on the back of emigration and Empire military service 
and active church representatives (Jess, 2007, p. 160). 
 
Discourse and Ideology 
 
 This section of the paper considers how we can begin to understand the 
discourses that unite Orangeism and give its membership a sense of identity 
that is relevant to contemporary society. In particular, the interventions of 
Foucault, particularly through his argument that the subject is constructed 
through discourses of power and knowledge (Foucault, 1977 and 1978) and 
that discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak” (Foucault, 1989, p. 49) have positioned contemporary debates 
around discourse within the social sciences. 
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 The concept of discourse has developed across a multitude of 
disciplines (see Abu-Lughod and Lutz, 1990; Howarth, 2000; Parker, 2002; 
Vighi and Feldner, 2007) and has become increasingly contested and 
challenged (Hall 1996, 2006; Sutherland, 2005; Žižek, 2005). The approach 
advocated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) which conceives “all objects 
of inquiry or knowledge as discursive” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, p. 492) have 
further structured debates concerning the nature of political discourses. 
Within the parameters of this paper, we place ourselves in the camp that 
seeks to continue to link discourse with ideology. Here we recognise that 
discourses “enable, they constrain, and they constitute” (Storey, 2006, p. 
101). And with regard to shared identification, such as is found within the 
Organge Order, we subscribe to Doane‟s (2006, p. 256) view that:  
On the one hand, discourses shape the mental models, or “common sense” beliefs, through which 
individuals interpret social reality; on the other hand they collectively reinforce or transform ideologies. 
 
Official Discourses of Orangeism: Faith, 
Loyalty and State 
 
 There are several, sometimes overlapping, discourses currently on offer 
within Orangeism. Here we classify these as: official discourses; discourses 
of continuity; political discourses; discourses of unity; and, discourses of 
cultural resistance. The official discourses framed by the Orange Order are 
most readily identified by the “resolutions” adopted annually at the Twelfth 
of July parades. These resolutions are categorised under three headings: 
faith, loyalty, and state. As Stevenson et al. (2007) explain, resolutions are: 
“addressed or “spoken to” at all demonstrations across Northern Ireland by 
invited Orangemen who hold positions relevant to the resolution (i.e. 
politicians for speeches on “state” and “loyalty”, clerics on “faith”) or 
members of the County level of the organization” (Stevenson et al., 2007, p. 
110).  
 The resolutions around “faith” emphasise the claim to be a religious 
organization, and that its members should have “a sincere love for their 
heavenly Father” and that they should “make the Holy scriptures the rule of 
their faith and practice” (Smyth, 1995, p. 3). Orange membership also 
involves “an unambiguous rejection of the themes of the Roman Catholic 
Church” (Smyth, 2001, p. 128). The Order is “directly opposed to the 
ecumenical movement” (Orange Standard, July 1988), and those Protest 
churches involved in that movement, as “the naivety of ecumenical-minded 
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Protestants never ceases to amaze” (Orange Standard, June 2003). It 
continues to oppose the secularisation of Sunday, to promote the “traditional 
Ulster Sabbath” and to call for “Sunday observance” (Orange Standard, June 
1999).  
 This emphasis on the religious role of the Order needs to be set in 
context. Religion remains a “key ethnic marker” in Northern Ireland 
(McGarry et al., 1995, p. 212). For the Order the maintenance of the Union is 
central to the defence of Protestantism, and the defence of Protestantism is 
core to the defence of the Union. Hence, Orange Order membership is also 
an expression of political identity and support for unionism (McAuley and 
Tonge, 2007). The particular framing of this by the Orange Order can be 
seen directly in the other resolutions presented. The loyalty resolution in 
2007, for example, highlighted the 25
th
 anniversary of the liberation of the 
Falkland Islands. This was linked directly to the “sacrifice” of those 311 
members of the Order who were killed during the Northern Ireland conflict. 
The final resolution around the state provided the most overtly political 
output stating that, “like many others within the unionist community, 
[Orangemen] share grave reservations about the presence of those in 
government whom we would not see as democrats in the accepted sense of 
the term” (cited in News Letter, 12 July 2007). 
  
Discourses of Continuity in the Orange Order 
  
 Much of the strength of the Orange Order rests on an emphasis on 
cultural reproduction. This involves emphasis on continuity, both physically 
in terms of membership and in the reproduction of cultural memory. Joining 
is often a product of generational support for the Order and a communal 
sense of solidarity expressed through membership. Of those surveyed a large 
majority of members joining in the past twenty years did so for “family 
reasons” or because of “family traditions”. The following quotations from 
members discussing their reasons for joining, illustrate the point well: 
It was traditional, it was like sort of … very much family orientated … 
you know, sort of  family blood. It was kind of the done thing, that 
when you came that age, you followed your fathers and your uncles 
and so forth (Interview AM01, Belfast). 
Family tradition, father, grandfather, grandmother, great grandfather, 
brothers, so [membership was] very much something that was within 
the family. It was very much a matter that my father had asked, “what 
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do you feel about joining the Institution?” I said, “well, I‟ll give it 
some thought”. I knew that my grandfather was an Orangeman, and my 
grandmother was an Orangewoman. My great grandfather was an 
Orangeman. So, it was, it was part of my family heritage and also part 
of my culture of course (Interview AM02, Belfast). 
 It is important to recognise how, through these senses of tradition and 
longevity, Orange discourses relate to broader senses of unionist identity and 
are bound into a “grand cultural unionist narrative” (Porter, 1996, p. 87). 
Crucial within this process of self-identification are the ways in which 
collective memories are used to construct political identities and 
understandings. The reproduction of Orange discourses explains how 
members of the Order can best relate to the wider social and political world. 
Those memories, once brought to the fore, work to strengthen senses of 
identity (Norvick, 1999, p. 5). Several writers have, for example, firmly 
established the centrality of the Battle of the Somme in the formation of 
senses of loyalist identity (see Brown, 2007; Graham, 2004; Graham and 
Shirlow, 2002; Officer and Walker, 2000). Such constructed memories help 
determine the ways in which individuals formulate and secure their 
understandings of everyday life and how they connect to broader political 
collectives. Take the following extract from the Orange Standard (October 
2006), which links the sacrifice in two World Wars directly to contemporary 
senses of loyalism and identity: 
The people of Northern Ireland displayed their loyalty in Britain in two 
World wars, with great loss of life, through the sacrifice of its soldiers, 
sailors and airmen, and the 1,000- plus citizens of Belfast who died in 
the German air raids of 1941. … Northern Ireland Protestants have 
nothing to feel embarrassed about as far as their membership of the 
United Kingdom is concerned. They are as British as the people of 
England, Scotland and Wales, and that is the way it will remain for the 
foreseeable future. 
  Likewise, one of the resolutions at the 12
th
 July demonstrations in 2008 
highlighted the 90
th
 anniversary of the Battle of Passchendaele at the Somme 
campaign during the First World War, when the 36
th
 Ulster Division 
sustained significant loss. As the Order expressed it, their “memory remains 
with us today and we pledge ourselves to remember those who gave their 
lives and hold their memory for future generations so that their loyalty, 
courage and sacrifice will never be forgotten” (cited in News Letter, 12 July 
2007). Thus, Orange identities are framed and maintained by the strength of 
discourses that emphasise links to much broader communal political-cultural 
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memories, which in turn legitimise an identifiable set social and power 
relations within Northern Irish society. 
 
Political Discourses of Orangeism 
 
 So while the Orange Order continues to project itself as “unashamedly 
Protestant and Unionist” (Orange Standard, October 1999) it is clear that 
from its inception the Order has been part of a broader formulation of 
political values, and a political dimension has “been part of its essence” 
(Storey, 2002, p. 64). As Roberts (1971, p. 269) put it: 
 The Order has never claimed that its political purposes and activities 
are unimportant, and the function of Orangeism as a creator and 
preserver of a complex political and social identity need not be 
regarded as a purely latent one. The motivation for many a member 
and leader has been political, not religious, and the political endeavours 
and successes of Orangeism may well be more apparent to non-
members and enemies than any religious aspect. 
 Broadly, the political discourses of Orangeism are framed by the 
following worldview: 
The Orangeman is at one a religious man and one concerned for the quality of life for people in the place 
where he lives. This is why there has always been in Orangeism the emphasis on religion and politics. In 
life there is no separation of the one from the other. It is inclusive of both, the spiritual and the practical, 
for the practical is the outworking of the spiritual in everyday living. As a man believeth so is he. We use 
“politics” in that wider sense for everything that matters in their lives from birth to death. It includes all 
that concerns people and politicians about how their country is governed, what they want to do with it and 
get from it. (Orange Standard, September 2003) 
One member expressed this directly when he said: “the political background 
here is entirely different than anywhere else, because the politics here are not 
just about who‟s best within the country; the politics here is, „do you want to 
be part of this country, „do you want to be part of that country?‟” (Interview 
AM01). For many members, the question is one of balance between religious 
and political expression. Indeed, as Kennaway suggests, “the present 
generation of Ulster Protestants look at their religion through political eyes”, 
although he is critical of the fact that it is the former which has the greatest 
influence on the latter (Kennaway, 2006).  
 
Orangeism and the Ulster Unionist Party 
 The traditional outlet for party political expression by Order members 
has been through the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Such links are 
longstanding. Indeed, the UUP developed directly from a meeting of the 
Orange Order, attempting to give the expression of Orange-Protestant-
Unionist identity a more political direction, through the coherence attempt to 
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politicise the perceived difference of Ulster (Jackson, 1989; Walker, 1996). 
Following the formation of the Northern Ireland state, the Orange Order was 
instrumental in the UUP forging and maintaining its position of hegemony 
(Boulton, 1973; Kennaway, 2006) and Orange membership became 
obligatory for anyone aspiring to a position of leadership within the UUP.  
 A reciprocal relationship developed; the Order benefiting from 
members holding high political rank. Between 1921 and 1972 (when 
Northern Ireland came under direct rule from Westminster), all six Prime 
Ministers were members of the Order (Kaufmann, 2007; Millar, 2004, p. 19). 
Unionist politicians, especially at election time, presented themselves as key 
defenders of Protestantism and the Union, and drew directly on Orange 
mobilised support. Throughout much of the history of the Northern Ireland 
state, the UUP has looked to support from Orange Order to shore up its vote 
(with much success). Protestant-Unionism became the dominant discourse of 
the political ideology of the new Northern Ireland state as other social and 
political perspectives became marginalized. This ideology was reproduced 
through the Order itself, thus in the mid-1960s, for example, one leading 
Orangeman, the Reverend Ross was able to claim that: 
We believe as Orangemen that our Order is the fabric of Northern 
Ireland. Without our great Order the social and political structure of the 
Six Counties would become flabby and anaemic. Orangeism is 
entwined with the very history of our Province. (Ross, 1964, p. 5) 
  While Orange Order membership has steadily declined over the past 
three decades, the organisation undoubtedly continues to hold a central 
position in the social world of many Protestants, orientating members and 
broader unionist reactions to political events. Thus, the Order continues to 
projects itself, “as a nerve that runs right through the heart of the Protestant 
community” (Orange Standard, August 2004). The formal relationship has 
changed noticeably in recent years, culminating in March 2005, when the 
Order announced it was breaking the alliance with the UUP, cutting directly 
political, religious and cultural bonds with Northern Ireland‟s 
“establishment” party that had lasted for a century. While there were mixed 
views within the membership, the following is typical of those who 
supported the split: 
Clearly you know, for decades it was aligned directly with the Ulster 
Unionist Party, until quite recently, I mean that‟s something I think has 
benefited the Institution … Personally, I think it was long overdue, to 
break the link. I suppose the Orange Order was originally set up to 
protect the Protestant people, I mean that was one of its basic functions 
away back in the 18
th
 century. So, I suppose, it had a certain 
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background in … you know where it probably aligned itself to one 
particular strong political party at the time.  When the State was 
formed in the last century. But now the UUP doesn‟t really speak for 
many in the Institution … I‟d be more of a DUP man myself. 
(Interview JM02, Belfast) 
 
Orangeism and the Peace Process 
 The politics of Orangeism were brought into sharp relief by the peace 
process. Throughout the contemporary period, the leadership of the Orange 
Order, and much of its membership, have opposed the terms of the 
settlement brought about through the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 
(hereafter the Agreement), which they regard as part of an ongoing series of 
concessions designed to weaken unionist resistance to an all-Ireland and who 
remained convinced that the Agreement could not, “bring about a just and 
lasting peace” (Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1998). Indeed, Martin 
Smyth, the former Unionist MP and ex-Grand Master recently claimed that 
the power-sharing Assembly, marked the: “erosion of democracy and … a 
sad decline in our national and international standards” (cited in McAdam, 
12 July 2007). 
 By the time of the 2001 Westminster election, support for the pro-
Agreement UUP was in noticeable decline, with a small majority of Orange 
members choosing the DUP over the UUP (Tonge and Evans, 2004). By 
2004 this trend had become pronounced, with almost two-thirds (65 per cent) 
of Orange Order members surveyed declaring a voting intention for the 
DUP, compared to less than a third (29 per cent) for the UUP. The overall 
decline in unionist support for the UUP‟s promotion of the Agreement was 
accompanied by political realignment within the membership of the Order 
(McAuley and Tonge, 2007). 
 We have offered explanations for the move of political support within 
Orangeism and the undermining of the UUP as the traditional party of 
Orangeism (McAuley and Tonge, 2007). Broadly, however, primary in any 
explanation of the shift in Orange support towards the DUP has been the 
dovetailing of Orange Order and the DUP‟s perceptions that unionism has 
been in political, religious and cultural retreat because of the consequences 
of the Agreement. Orange Order members voted almost two to one (61 to 33 
per cent) against supporting the 1998 Agreement (McAuley and Tonge, 
2007; Tonge and Evans, 2005), making opposition within Orangeism more 
extensive than that in the broader unionist population, where some 57 per 
cent offered support for the Agreement (Hayes and McAllister, 2001). 
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The DUP and the Reordering of Orangeism  
 Part of the strength of the DUP response rested in its success to frame 
unionism in a particular way, drawing directly on common sense and 
collective understandings of defeat, victory, values and identity that are 
found across unionism. The DUP promotes itself as the only legitimate 
guardian against incursions by Irish nationalism and republicanism, while all 
other unionists are seen as ineffectual and/or complicit in the downfall of 
Northern Ireland. A key self-defined task for the DUP has been to undo the 
perceived concessions made by the UUP and to continue to put political 
pressure on republicans. Collective memories directly inform the 
contemporary political debate. In particular, the public discourse of the DUP 
projected the peace process as another in a long line of events attempting to 
dilute unionism – the end of the Stormont parliament, the arrangements made 
for a power sharing executive under Sunningdale, and the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement – to name but a few.  
 The DUP claim that they seek to return unionism to what they see as 
its doctrinal fundamentals is heard and understood by many Orange 
members. The overt opposition of the DUP to the 1998 Agreement and the 
positioning of the Party as the key defenders of the Protestant Unionism 
proved to be a centrifugal force causing the reordering of unionism 
(McAuley, 2002). The broad stance of the DUP in expressing both moral and 
political opposition to the Agreement was deeply meaningful to many within 
the Orange Order. Such changes have, in part at least, been brought about by 
a dramatically changed social economic profile in the membership of the 
Order. In particular what (Kaufman, 2007) refers to as the increased 
proletarianisation of the membership has meant changes in political 
affiliation towards the DUP.  
 Those self-identifying as working-class now form the bulk of Orange 
Order members, with fewer than twenty per cent defining themselves as 
middle-class (McAuley and Tonge, 2007) with most middle-class Protestants 
now clearly expressing social and political distance from the Orange Order 
(O‟Leary, 1998; Pollak, 1996). The perspective offered by the DUP has 
continued to resonate with the membership; our sample indicates that since 
the Agreement was signed in 1998, more DUP than UUP supporters have 
joined the Order, and that support for the DUP continues to be dominant 
within the Order, although this has in turn been challenged following the 
entry of the DUP into a power sharing government with Sinn Féin. 
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Discourses of Unity in Post-Agreement 
Orangeism 
 
  The Orange Order continues to centre on the construction of unionist 
and Protestant unity in what are still perceived as uncertain political times. 
The Order argues that Protestants will increasingly turn to them to safeguard 
their interests (Orange Standard, June 2000). Thus, the leadership has 
increasingly projected the organisation as capable of unifying unionism. 
They appeal for the reconstruction of the “unionist family”, as it “is not too 
late for Unionists to get their act together and to defeat this evil conspiracy 
which seeks to destroy their position and this Province and put it under the 
heel of Dublin” (Orange Standard, April 2003). 
 Such calls for unity have become central to much of the public discourse 
of Orangeism, and can be seen in claims that for Orangemen: “the great 
desire is still for a single Unionist party” (Orange Standard, June 2005) and 
that the Order “will lobby for Unionist unity on all key issues” (Orange 
Standard, April 2005) or through demands that “Unionist parties must 
agree”, (Orange Standard, July 2005), that “Unionist unity must be 
achieved” (Orange Standard, September 2001) or that  “Unionist unity is a 
priority” (Orange Standard, September 2002). Recently, the leadership has 
claimed that, “all Protestants who care for the welfare of this Province, and 
who cherish its place within the United Kingdom must go to the polls” 
(Orange Standard, May 2003) and that it is the duty of all members to vote, 
“if they treasure their British citizenship and identity” (Orange Standard, 
November 2003).  
  Sometimes the demands are made even more directly, such as, 
“Unionist must vote – or else!” (Orange Standard, May 2007); or that, “all 
Orange brethren must unite and vote” (Orange Standard, May 2005). In 
realpolitik this means promoting a political pact, between the UUP and the 
DUP. Such a view finds support from within the membership, which 
increasingly fears a split in the unionist vote in any forthcoming elections, 
and the likelihood of a strengthening of Sinn Féin representation. Hence the 
claim, that: 
Whatever the future may hold for Unionism its aspirations can only be 
realised through all shades of Unionist opinion uniting and working 
under one banner. Uniting Unionism is as relevant to-day as it was 100 
years ago (Alexander, 2005, p. 43). 
 This also draws on longer-standing discourses within Orangeism 
concerning the lack of political awareness and mobilisation of its members. 
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In 1995, for example, the Order produced a booklet to celebrate the 
organisation‟s Bi-Centenary. In the editorial, Martin Smyth sought to 
position Orange Order as follows: 
many of its members are deeply complacent, not only regarding their 
own spiritual standing, but about the future of Ulster. This Province 
has suffered defeat and humiliation at the hands of dedicated, articulate 
and cunning pan-nationalists, aided and abetted by some of the most 
powerful forces within the British establishment and the White House 
(Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1995, p. 3). 
These comments highlight another consisitent discourse within Orangeism, 
that they must be eternally vigilant against those who would seek to 
undermine the core tenets of Protestant Unionism. 
 
Discourses of Cultural Resistance: The Importance of Parades 
 
 For many Orange Order members the very existence of Northern 
Ireland remains under threat, as “enemies within and without threaten 
Unionism” (Orange Standard, September 1998). According to this 
discourse, these enemies are focused on one key objective, “the ultimate 
incorporation of the Province in an all-Ireland in which British, Protestant, 
Orange and Unionist culture and identity would be swamped and eventually 
eradicated”. The category consisting of those who seek to bring about the 
downfall of Ulster Protestantism is widely constructed. Take the following: 
It is the traditional enemies of Protestantism and Unionism - Irish 
nationalism and republicanism - which is spearheading this attack on 
Northern Ireland‟s loyal ethos. But it is being aided and abetted by 
Government policies which can only have one outcome - a weakening 
of Northern Ireland‟s position within the United Kingdom. (Orange 
Standard, April 1999) 
 All of these discourses are woven together to place the Order at the 
heart of Protestant-Unionist responses to contemporary events. Wright 
(1996) suggests that a continual sense of siege is a “central reality of 
Northern Protestant society”. In the contemporary period they have pointed 
to what they believe as plans for the “de-Protestantisation” of Northern 
Ireland, as part of an “onslaught being waged against the British identity of 
the province” (Orange Standard, February 2004). At its utmost, some 
sections of Orangeism talked of “ethnic cleansing pursued by Irish 
republicanism for over 30 years” (Orange Standard, December 2002). 
 More recent discourses suggest that while the physical war has been 
replaced by “a cultural war being waged against unionism and Orangeism” 
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(Hume, News Letter, 13 July 2007, p. 35). “Orange culture” remains “under 
attack” (Orange Standard, August 2000) and that Orange members are 
involved in a “Culture war We Must Win” (Orange Standard, March 2008). 
As the Orange Standard expressed it: 
The shooting and bombing “war” in Northern Ireland is hopefully over, 
but the battle for the hearts and minds of the people will be fought with 
greater intensity than ever. Let no-one be under any illusions. The 
campaign by republicans and nationalists to erode the British identity 
of Northern Ireland will be stepped up in many ways, and the Orange 
Order will need to be in the vanguard of resistance to this latest phase 
in the strategy of the republican-nationalist alliance to try and achieve 
their objective. (Orange Standard, July 2007) 
 Fears surrounding attacks on Protestant Unionism, both real and 
symbolic, continue. This takes several forms. Some are concrete, such as a 
series of arson on Orange Halls that have taken place over the past decade. 
Others rest on the wider belief that Orange culture is constantly and 
coherently being undermined. This has found its clearest expression around 
the issue of parading, which is now deemed to be “top of the republican „hit‟ 
list” (Orange Standard, August 2000). There are over 3,000 Orange parades 
in Northern Ireland every year, of which a small number (around sixteen) 
remain disputed (Mullin, 1998). In recent years, restrictions have been placed 
on several parades, particularly those that are routed through interface 
districts (between Catholic and Protestant areas) or areas where Catholics are 
in a majority.  
 The most prominent of the contentious parades during the mid- and late-
1990s – from the Protestant church at Drumcree near Portadown – remains 
unresolved. The reason why a reasonably obscure march to and from a 
Protestant church should have become international news and towards the 
top of the agenda of the Orange Order can only be fully understood if we 
consider the following words of Gordon Lucy, Chair of the Ulster Society in 
the early days of the saga. As he put it, there is, a perception “that if 
Orangeism lost this particular battle in the heartland of Orangeism, routes all 
over Northern Ireland would come under attack” (Irish Times, July 13 1996). 
Although the intensity of the conflict around Drumcree has ebbed since the 
1990s it has remained central to the Orange psyche, and to symbolise much 
wider concerns about the perceived retreat of Protestant Unionism. 
 Importantly, such “anti-Orange” activity is seen as another challenge to 
Protestant cultural identity, and as part of a wider schema, which is “a 
product of a carefully prepared and thought out plan of action by Sinn Féin/ 
IRA” (Orange Standard, August 2000). For the Order: 
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Marching has become an even greater focus of attention in recent years 
because republicans have decided that, having spent 35 years 
slaughtering members of the Protestant community with the gun and 
the bomb, they have now moved into the next phase of the plan to 
break Protestant resistance so as they can achieve their end goal – the 
destruction of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom (Orange 
Standard, August 2004). 
  This is sometimes presented as part of a wider campaign against 
Britishness and the Orange Order, of which the following views are 
indicative: 
The hate campaign launched in the media against the Protestant people 
has been unrestrained and sustained. Newspapers have shamefully vied 
with each other to come up with some new angle to blacken the Ulster 
Protestants. (Orange Standard, September 1998) 
No Orangeman is in any doubt that the media treats him, and the 
Orange Institution, with little understanding and less sympathy. 
(Orange Standard, October 1998) 
 
Discourses of the Future 
 
 Despite the widespread changes in the political landscape of Northern 
Ireland, not least of which is the introduction of a working power-sharing 
devolved government, many within the Orange Order fear for their future. 
Many Orange members continue to be suspicious of the “other” community, 
even in the new political era. Take, for example, this statement from a 
leading member of the Orange Order made in early 2008: 
I see Sinn Féin as the other side of the IRA coin, and in spite of what 
may have been said with regards to the IRA, their err, renunciation of 
violence and all the rest, I still see the organisation as having the 
potential if it ever needed to, to pick up its arms again, and err, there‟s 
always been the big question mark, as to what extent all the arms were 
decommissioned and destroyed.  There‟s always going to be a big 
question mark over that.  I know that, err, [unclear] and his group said 
that they were satisfied and that decommissioning had been 
comprehensive and complete, but there will always be a big question 
mark over that because there was, there wasn‟t ever the opportunity of 
people who would have been very sceptical and most stringent in their 
demands with regards to verification, and the IRA refused the whole 
way down the line to allow these, err, very critical, very sceptical 
people to see what was going on. (Interview AM02, Belfast) 
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 The fears of this section of the leadership have not been eased by the 
emergence of a devolved government and the agreement of the DUP to enter 
into a power sharing administration with Sinn Féin. As this member 
expressed it, his reactions were “surprise, shock and stunned”.  He expanded 
as follows: 
For the leadership of the DUP to have preached what they did preach 
for the years they preached, and … there was people probably done 
time for what that man preached, and then to backtrack, you know, 
either he was, he was right for 40 years and wrong for one year, or he‟s 
been wrong for 40 years and right for one year, you know. So, history 
will tell us. (Interview JM02, Belfast) 
At best some thought power-sharing “a price worth paying to get local 
government” or “a price that had to be paid” (Interview JM01, Belfast). At 
the same time, however, this member claimed he had “become more 
suspicious of them [Sinn Féin], more mistrusting” (Interview JM01, Belfast). 
As the Orange Standard (June 2000) argued: 
The decision of the Democratic Unionist Party to share power with 
Sinn Féin will not affect the long-term goal of the latter. To do their 
utmost to bring about a united Ireland … No-one in Protestant Ulster 
should be under any illusions. 
 Beyond this, there are concerns about how the Order can make itself 
relevant in an increasingly secularised society and engage with public 
discourses within civil society. In response, the Order has deliberately set 
about attempted to improve its often extremely negative public image, 
especially at times of disputed parades. Under the guidance of a new young, 
and often highly educated leadership grouping, for example, the Order has 
attempted to re-brand its Twelfth of July parades as community festivals. 
The most prominent of these is “Orangefest”, which the Northern Ireland 
Tourist Board (2008) now describes as “one of Europe‟s largest cultural 
festivals with music, marching and street pageantry” undertaken in a 
“carnival atmosphere”. Such images are no doubt central to winning the 
culture war for the Orange Order, but the public relations campaign is far 
from won. Sinn Féin Assembly member John O‟Dowd, for example, claimed 
that the “proposed „Orangefest‟ will be seen as little more than „bigotfest‟ in 
the eyes of the vast majority of people not connected to the Orange Order” 
(Sinn Féin, 2008). 
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Conclusions 
 
 In Northern Ireland, the boundaries between society and the state, 
between civil activity and the political realm remain blurred. This is readily 
identified in the roles undertaken by Orangeism and the structures and 
discourses of the Orange Order. Overtly, Orange discourse remains centred 
upon several core elements: the Protestant faith and Christian principles, 
loyalty to the Crown and to a state that guarantees civil and religious liberty. 
These discourses run alongside each other; sometimes they are overlapping, 
and often, members place different emphases on different strands. 
 Whilst in one sense contemporary discourses simply reproduce some of 
the traditional roles of the Order, the contemporary dynamic is different. 
Traditional alliances have become marginal to the political direction the 
Order seeks to take and the majority of its members. While there are 
different elements and discourses emphasised by members, for many politics 
and religion remain about the existence of the state. Some who have recently 
joined the Order have been attracted by the discourse of consistent 
opposition to what are seen as the negative consequences of the Agreement 
for unionists. Once they have become members, they have worked to 
strengthen this discourse. Others seek to modernise the organization and 
make it relevant in an increasingly secular and globalised society. What is 
clear, however, is that the overarching discourse is that all of these elements 
can only be guaranteed by the continuance of the Union between Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain, and the core belief that the Order must act as a 
bulwark to ensure the maintenance of the constitutional link that remains 
primary. 
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Abstract 
 
The debate concerning ideology and ideological shifts during peace-building 
in Northern Ireland has generally failed to account for the attitudes and 
opinions of former combatants concerning the nature and meaning of 
discursively constructed identities and political strategies. This invisibility is 
peculiar in that debates concerning ideological shifts have been driven by 
academic analysis or by those former combatants who maintain that the 
Irish peace process is paralleled by core ideological abandonment. The 
material presented within this article indicates that former Provisional Irish 
Republican prisoners do not view the peace process as involving ideological 
ditching but instead that their commitment to republican discourse remains 
complete.   
 
Introduction 
 
This article examines the attitudes of former Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) prisoners regarding the transition from violence and 
the role they have played and continue to play in republican activism.
1
 The 
findings within this article indicate that these former prisoners do not view 
the peace process as involving ideological disbandment. Instead republican 
ideology remains centred upon the reproduction of established discursive 
conflicts, as promoted via non-militaristic means.  It would appear that what 
IRA former prisoners mean by the peace process is articulated around the 
promotion of republican values and a discourse guided by the eventual 
achievement of republican goals. It is also understood that this and other 
republican beliefs have both presented and secured republican unity and 
allowed the leadership and the grassroots to refute accusations of “sell-out”, 
a feature that has historically dogged Irish republican movements.   
Unsurprisingly, among those interviewed
2
 there is no sense that 
critiques of violent republicanism are correct in arguing that the IRA were 
terrorist-inspired and lacked ideological coherence (Alonso, 2001) or that 
republican coherence and discursive value has been abandoned in favour of 
the acquisition of political power (McInytre, 1995). There is some 
acknowledgement of a “management” of change and the shaping of 
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contemporary republicanism by the policies of the British state and the 
“complexities of this relationship between movement and community” 
(Bean, 2007, p. 13). The acceptance that there have been tactical shifts is 
couched in the presentation of a wider understanding of republican 
mobilisation. This acknowledges a tactical awareness, whether that has 
involved the use of violence, promoting the Irish language or serving in 
government within a partitioned Ireland, that was understood as an on-going 
reality throughout the conflict (Smith, 1995).  Moreover, there is no denial 
among IRA former prisoners of the complexities of emerging out of armed 
conflict, but this is paralleled by an apparent sense of having maintained 
ideological congruity and transitions that are primarily strategic. Indeed, 
former IRA prisoners argue that it is not the structure of republican discourse 
that has changed but the presentation of ideology and the pinpointing of 
successful strategies that will achieve key goals (Adams, 1989, 1995; 
Maillot, 2005).  
There has been a critique by other republican prisoners that contends 
that the peace process has been framed via a ditching of core republican 
principles. This contrary position suggests that the peace process is based 
upon elitist managerialism of former combatants has removed internal 
dissenters and censored any debates concerning the disjuncture of republican 
discourse (O‟Bradaigh, 1996; Maloney, 2003; Patterson, 1989). We do not 
accept or deny the merits of these criticisms but instead argue that there is an 
equally valid requirement to understand those who generally reject such a 
perspective. Evidently, there is an insufficient knowledge, beyond leadership 
level, concerning the attitudes and opinions of the bulk of former republican 
prisoners.
 3
  
This paper further indicates how former IRA prisoners claim that they 
have not “abandoned” the ideological compass which “legitimised” violence 
and that the present nature of community and political activism is structured 
around a sense of republican authenticity. We address the construction, 
interpretation and meaning of discourse among republican activists by 
highlighting four key dimensions: (i) the interpretation and construction of 
legitimacy, (ii) the reasons for deciding to join a paramilitary organisation, 
(iii) imprisonment and the development of ideological beliefs, and (iv) the 
delivery of republican ideology in the post-conflict environment. It emerges 
that, for republicans, the manner through which resistance is articulated and, 
more importantly, practiced has shifted out of violence due to an internal re-
consideration of normative rules needed to promote republican discourse 
(Graham and Shirlow, 2003; Tonge, 2005). 
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Despite shifts in their approach to politics and community activism, 
former IRA prisoners understand activism and ultimately the peace process 
as a route to Irish unification. Moreover, their attitude towards the “other”, 
mainly unionist and loyalist, remains based upon negative stereotyping and a 
mode of engagement centred on utilising inter-community contact as a 
means to persuade those who are pro-union of their ideological “folly” and 
the “incoherence” of unionism. 
 
Discourse and Republican Legitimacy 
 
Analyzing Republican Discourse 
 
Discourse constructs social relations, through language, written and 
spoken texts, thus constituting the objects and subjects of the social world. 
Republican ideals are understood as the outcome of discursively fabricated 
classifications of belonging (Burton and Carlen, 1979) and republican 
involvement in the peace process remains guided by the inspiration and idea 
of a united Ireland. Such a process of discursive representation reminds us 
that all forms of loyalty-driven discourse are based upon different imaginings 
of community, practice and ideological delivery. Furthermore, the allegories 
and mythic representation of discourse in a divided society are 
unproblematic to those who hold particular and exclusive renditions of 
identity and power.  That is to say that the contemporary peace process is not 
to be understood as the outcome of ideological rejection but of manoeuvre, 
resource competition and conflict via non-violent means. Republicans and 
their opponents remain tied to alternative notions of power relations and the 
maintenance of resistance towards an objectified other (English, 2003, 2006; 
Munck, 1992).  
Republican discourse, as understood by our respondents, has evolved 
through identity-securing strategies and the raising of republican 
consciousness. The use of violence is understood by way of the stages of 
revolt, political development and commemoration. The promotion of the 
Irish language and culture and the development of links with a sympathetic 
diaspora are viewed as additional stages in the development of identity 
politics. Thus the shift in tactics has been linked to the move from 
“powerlessness” due to asymmetrical relations, to the governance and 
delivery of power through political “achievement” within an equality driven 
political landscape.  Linked to this overall shift from “powerlessness” is an 
interpretation advanced by Stedman-Jones (1983) that identity and political 
expression is tied to discursive aspects of linguistic expression that do not 
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easily map themselves onto homogenous interpretations of political 
movements, but instead there is a need to appreciate how: 
Language disrupts any simple notion of the determination of 
consciousness by social being because it is itself part of social 
being. We cannot therefore decode political language to reach a 
primal and material expression of interest since it is the 
discursive structure of political language which conceives and 
defines interest itself. (1983, pp. 21-22, cited in Shirlow and 
McGovern, 1997) 
Discourse within this analysis is studied via the medium of interests 
that are produced and reproduced via realities such as violent conflict, 
perceptions of conflict, perceived “successes” of that conflict and the 
capacity to express ideas and deliver actions that are influenced by fluid 
social, cultural and economic relationships that emerge during or parallel to 
conflict. The perception that a discourse will remain static and unwavering 
undermines the impact of such fluidity and also reduces conflict to an 
interpretation of violence and harm as opposed to understanding how other 
forces condition and explain  transformation out of armed conflict. 
Acknowledging that armed action and the discourses attached to it are 
temporal and conditioned by the reproduction of society at various scales, 
especially in conflictual arenas such as Northern Ireland, is of importance. 
This results in a displacement of interest with the roots and dimensions of 
conflict and in so doing permits a concern with how conflict itself fashions 
the cognition and understanding of interests centred upon knowledge, 
experience and experimentation with tactics and discursive strategies 
(Foucault, 1972, 1973, 1979).  
The use of violence by former IRA prisoners is understood as having 
required a language during and after the cessation of armed conflict that is 
defined via a chain of equivalence which encloses a particular perception of 
established and re-produced justification. This generally remains as a self-
referential and self-sustained notion of legitimacy.  Thus the discourse 
attached to studying the past may lead to an adoption of a language of peace 
but the discourse of that language remains viewed as avowedly republican 
and thus “legitimate”.  
Crucially, discourse is concerned with the variable “discursive 
formations” which permit specific assertions and remarks to be made while 
others are excluded. A discursive formation is “a set of rules”; that is to say 
the code by which objects, subject positions and strategies are moulded, 
forged and created. As Foucault (1973) argued discourse is not simply 
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concerned with written or spoken words but with the articulatory social 
practice of language, meaning and interpretation. As noted by Foucault: 
These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the 
canonical use of vocabulary, but the ordering of objects. 
“Words and things is the entirely serious title of a problem; it is 
the ironic title of a work that modifies its own form, displaces 
its own data, and reveals, at the end of the day, a quite different 
task. A task that consists of not- no longer-treating discourse as 
groups of signs...but as practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak.” (1972, p. 49, cited in Shirlow and 
McGovern, 1998) 
 
Discourses of Legitimacy in Republicanism 
 
The material obtained from extensive interviewing of former IRA 
prisoners provides an understanding of involvement in conflict and the 
delivery of a peace process and their influence over that process as 
understood by them. It grounds experience, legitimacy and the mobilisation 
of long-serving interpretations of history and conflict and the merging of 
these around ideas of developing and sustaining conflict transformation 
(Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008). With regard to overall senses of legitimacy, it 
was found that former republican prisoners view the conflict as a reaction to 
state “oppression”. Attitudes towards the peace process do not relate directly 
to academic determinations of conflict and peace building as they remain 
grounded in much closer experiences of conflict. The interpretation of 
moving out of violence is not understood as a process of ideological 
“ditching” or the emergence of a “mutual stalemate” (Zartman, 2003) but of 
the development of tactics and the impact of conflict upon opening up means 
to promote republican discourse (Hazelkorn and Patterson, 1995).  
Like previous and contemporary forms of Irish republicanism the most 
significant condition for mobilisation is to be found in the agency of activists 
(Bean, 2007). Within republicanism the base has been attached to creative 
cultural mediums and organisational structures that sought to define 
collective identity (Shirlow and McGovern, 1998).  The IRA deployed the 
language of community to not only instil nationalist “unity” but to also 
establish hegemony within the nationalist community. The building of such 
hegemony has been partly achieved through recent electoral politics, with 
Sinn Féin emerging as the dominant voice of Northern nationalism 
(McAlister, 2004; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). The use of violence 
The Maintenance of Republican Ideology   
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 161 - 
 
evidently undermined Sinn Féin‟s capacity to become politically 
transcendent. Tonge (2006, p. 141) shows that: 
By 1988, however, the political arm of the republican 
movement in Belfast was beginning to publicly question the 
utility of an armed struggle which undermined their political 
appeal to a local electorate anxious to see improvements in job 
opportunities and local services. 
Ultimately, the re-mobilisation of Irish republicanism in the late 1960s, 
and its restructuring in the 1970s, saw a series of actions and long-term 
strategy developments that fermented the nature of constitutionalism as now 
articulated and practiced. The discursive shifts that have taken place within 
this particular version of republicanism have been set against the background 
of building the republican movement. Controlling, and then shifting, 
ideological capacity and meaning within the republican movement is 
understood as being centred upon a constant fusion of styles and strategic 
and tactical experimentation (Bean, 2007). Smyth (2005) has also argued that 
the capacity to move from a military to political position was generally 
unproblematic as the “empty signifiers” of “justice” and “democracy” were 
essentially: 
multiple interpretations and capable of being integrated into 
disparate discourses. The absence of justice or democracy can 
be used to justify a reformist strategy, but equally both can be 
integrated into a justification for armed struggle. (Smyth, 2005, 
p. 144) 
Smyth‟s (2005) argument is crucial in that it highlights the fluidity 
within republicanism as a political discourse within itself. Thus the gaze and 
interpretation of republicanism has been overwhelmingly linked to the 
interpretation of violence and the mobilisation of armed conflict as opposed 
to understanding the various strands and opinions that produced republican 
discourse. The positioning of republicanism as merely violent generally 
obscured the extent and nature of internal ideological awareness and tactical 
shift. It also reminds us that the conflict was also shaped by state policy, the 
opening up of dialogue with Sinn Féin (primarily by John Hume of the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party), the desire to build wider cognition of 
republican ideas, and the failure to build republicanism as a movement due to 
collective armed activism. 
 
Reaction and Republicanism: Reasons for Joining Up 
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Joining the IRA was in many instances centred upon “events more than 
anything else” and the violence that emanated from an identifiable “other”. 
As noted by a female respondent, “a million things happened” and the sense 
of societal and political deterioration in the early stage of the conflict was a 
paramount cause of mobilisation. Many of those imprisoned in the early 
1970s saw themselves as reacting to loyalist and state violence, unionist 
hegemony and state indifference towards aggrieved Catholic communities.  
The sense of “hitting back” as a mode of becoming involved and then 
adopting a more defined republican discourse was commonplace. For some 
respondents the sense of being part of a violated community was important:  
Well, like most people at the time it wasn‟t an ideological thing 
it was more a gut reaction to something that was happening at 
the time. (Male respondent 1, West Belfast) 
This sense of community violation was also advanced through an 
appreciation of personal experience and the need for collective engagement. 
As noted: 
It was because of what was happening all around us at the time. 
We were kids. Bombay Street was getting burnt down. Before 
that it was student riots, student protests. There was always 
trouble down around the Falls anyway. There were parades 
even then. I remember the Divis Street riots, not really 
understanding them but I knew it was sort of us and them. 1969 
was the central year when everything changed.  I watched the 
streets being burnt down around us … Back to school after the 
holidays, I heard all the personal stories of kids who had been 
run out of their homes with the house on fire. Everybody was 
joining the Fianna [the youth wing of the IRA] that seemed to 
be some sort of way of reacting against it, or doing something 
against something that you felt you were powerless against. It 
gave you some sort of strength. (Male respondent 2, West 
Belfast) 
Whereas some respondents were drawn to, or cultivated into 
organisations, others came from families steeped in republican traditions. 
Even among those who did not come from such backgrounds, or in which 
such backgrounds were hidden, the sense of their being a notional 
republicanism was evident: 
My older brother was in the Fianna and he had been from when 
he was fairly young. But I didn‟t really notice until around 1969 
that he seemed to be doing sort of secrecy stuff. New 
republicans in the area, old republicans in the area - I knew that 
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there was a, had an idea that there was an IRA.  Every now and 
again their name would come up. But I had no real republican 
family ties. But I had republican records in the house, I heard 
songs at parties. (Male respondent 3, County Derry) 
This capacity to locate republican family histories was important in that 
it established a sense of ideological lineage that was brought to the fore by 
the collapse of social relationships in the 1960s and 1970s. The primacy of 
1966 (virtually invisible in academic analysis until recently) as the 50
th
 
anniversary of the 1916 Rising was also attached to senses of consciousness-
raising and a need for republican re-mobilisation. In essence several factors 
influenced the discursive journey of republicanism; ideological mobilisation 
through the use of commemoration, socialisation and the goal of Irish unity; 
situational violence and the response to state and loyalist activity; structural 
factors conditioned by “second-class” citizenship and the demands for 
equality of recognition and anti-discrimination legislation. The fusion of 
these was constantly understood by the respondents as being the basis on 
which to utilise violence.  
Although accepting that the motivation of early republican activists 
was reactive to the conditions and experiences of societal breakdown, in 
the early 1970s, it was constantly stated that those who engaged in violence 
at that time had a developed sense of economic, cultural and social 
injustice and an appreciation of a need to adopt a more wide-ranging 
republican ideology. Furthermore, it was postulated that any lack of 
ideological cohesion and discursive knowledge amongst IRA activists, 
during this time, was slowly and deliberately replaced by developed 
explanations and strategies that did more than merely react to violent 
events. However, it should be stressed that early violent reaction was 
neither merely inflexible nor obdurate but fashioned by senses of injustice 
and both vague and established notions of a republican heritage and 
discourse.  
 
Imprisonment and Discursive Fine Tuning 
 
Education and Debate; The Long Kesh experience 
 
Virtually all respondents spoke of being inspired by prison debates 
within and between paramilitary groups. These debates provided an 
ideological vocabulary of what “people already felt and knew was wrong”. 
Furthermore such debates did not challenge the efficacy of violence, or 
promote a sense that armed conflict was to be dispensed with due to a 
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stalemate with loyalists or the British State. Within the prison arena 
republicans challenged dominant representations of them and also nurtured 
identities of resistance against prison authority (Corcoran, 2006; McKeown, 
2001). Ironically, the republican challenge to British state authority and the 
associated process of their criminalisation opened up spaces of dialogue with 
the prison authorities that encouraged negotiating skills that would 
eventually be used in peace-building strategies.  
For republicans ideological manoeuvring and future political 
approaches were influenced by the prisoners as well as by significant debates 
that were led by a wider republican community and influenced and supported 
from a much broader Irish nationalist alliance (Clarke, 1987). However, 
irrespective of the impact of former prisoners upon future discursively 
designed tactics and re-orientation, the organic nature of debate and dialogue 
within and even at times between republicans and loyalists was significant in 
bolstering alternative and future practices. It is noteworthy that former 
prisoners viewed themselves as the “IRA beyond bars, and not as a group 
that were removed from wider activities”.  
Imprisonment also influenced a process that one respondent identified 
as a time to “learn a lot of things”.  This sense of learning and a 
commitment to acquiring and developing a republican discourse was 
understood as a process of learning in developing a republican logic: 
Long Kesh imprisonment in those days: we did read Irish 
history and we did get to political lectures, we did learn more 
about everything. It was your first chance to read books on 
communism, books on revolution, Che Guevara, Connolly. All 
the things that you wouldn‟t have read when you were a 
teenager and probably wouldn‟t have read. But in Long Kesh, 
all these books were being passed around. Everybody‟s talking 
about them, everybody‟s debating them. So you naturally want 
to be informed about it. You want to understand it.  We did a lot 
of things in Long Kesh. It wasn‟t just political education, it was 
military education. But there was also lots of sports and lots of 
ordinary reading and just messing about. So they were all 
forming some form of political understanding of what was 
happening (Male respondent 4, West Belfast). 
 Debates among republicans within prison aided the shifting of IRA 
tactics as they morphed more fully into politics, community activism and 
cultural expressionism. Central to these debates was how the IRA could 
create the ideas and actions that would lead to the abandonment of violence, 
but only when such a tactical disjuncture could uphold an activist driven and 
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congruous republican discourse. Challenging an established modus operandi 
attached to violence was accompanied by maintaining a narrative of 
oppression and resistance along with a new repertoire of inclusion, and a 
future preference for the memorialisation of armed conflict as opposed to 
violent engagement (Shirlow and McGovern, 1998; McGovern, 2000).  The 
nature of such debates was attached not only to moving out of armed 
conflict, but also discussing how to produce an alternative nationalist 
political culture within which the IRA would no longer be required to act as 
a armed bulwark against the British Army or armed loyalists, but would 
instead become agents of change through influencing alternative platforms 
and arenas.  
With regard to imprisonment there are several process and attitudinal 
shifts that are of significance. The impact of imprisonment provided 
ideological coherence and a recognition that purist ideological explanations 
needed to be internally reviewed. As noted by a respondent imprisoned in 
the 1970s and 1980s: 
I don‟t know how well I would have articulated my views 
before I went to jail. I think jail was brilliant in terms of giving 
me the time to sit down and read and clarify my thoughts. I 
think all my thoughts were there, I had all the reasons and all 
that type of stuff. But I may not have had the clearer articulation 
of why and the times, dates, figures and trends and all that type 
of stuff - I might not have been clear on that. Jail gave me the 
time and the opportunity to clarify my own head. To have it in 
me. There have been times when - like the hunger strikes and 
things - you‟ll be living in the moment, you‟ll be just living - I 
mean events would have been right and wrong for you, or 
things happening would have been right and wrong. You would 
have been just almost dealing with them in the here and now, 
where going to jail and going through that type of thing - you 
can read history properly … It definitely gave me - I mean, one 
thing the jail did for me, it gave me this idea of being analytical 
and being critical. Not just to take something at face value on 
the moment, where I may have when I was a teenager or when I 
was in the middle of it. (Male respondent 2, County Derry) 
 
Ideological Capacity-Building 
 
The promotion of a non-violent republicanism was influenced by 
evident identity tapping and/or formation that defined a counter-hegemonic 
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project that was located in the capacity to weld together disparate forms of 
Irish nationalism. What emerged was predominantly class-based in terms of 
the republican electorate, but the glue that held together an emergent 
consciousness was linked to republican versions of land, folklore, oppression 
and ultimate delivery from British authority. It is arguable that the push 
towards ideological coherence within the prisons was required given that 
detainees needed a cultural and political vocabulary that was unifying and 
shared.  
What is important to note is that the operationalisation of republican 
history and ideological coherence was achieved and mechanisms were found, 
such as awareness-raising, that created a culture of debate and dialogue that 
transformed the capacity for the emergence of collective action. The terrain 
of consciousness was crucial with regard to defining what was required in 
order to facilitate armed action and then ironically the displacement of that. 
Inadvertently, this layering of consciousness eventually established and 
upheld the rationale for non-violent political developments. Within the 
prison context republicans built a micro-society of ideological identification 
and dialogue.  
A resistance discourse was dedicated to a series of platforms, which 
began with violence, was increasingly paralleled by political protest and 
consciousness-raising and eventually upheld the practice of constitutional 
politics. Republicanism shifted from a desire to seize control to a strategy of 
advancing and mobilising along an eclectic populist front. As stated by a 
republican former prisoner: 
There was no master plan. We didn‟t start out with a plan. 
We did things in tandem as we went along. We (prisoners) 
raised our ideas and then that of the community. We 
discussed the need for peace and then took it to our people. 
We moved from an old arrogant position that we were the 
leaders and the people would be led. We started to provide 
ideas and ways forwards and realised that if we removed 
that elitist crap about ourselves being right and others duped 
that people would listen to us. Eventually we realised that 
people wanted the violence stopped and we were now so 
close to them in so many ways, like through Sinn Féin and 
pressure groups, that we had to listen and then respond.
 4
  
 
Building the Political Dimension  
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The building of politics by Sinn Féin and the shifts that political 
activism encouraged, also points to a need to understand the issue of scale. 
The building of community and the raising of consciousness within that 
process could never establish a nationalist community within which there 
was a majoritarian fervour for armed struggle.  The rhetoric of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, which presented the republican people as willing to become 
armed ambassadors of republican philosophy and a more significant guerrilla 
movement was unachievable and misplaced. In developing the idea of the 
republican “people” the republican movement came, by the mid 1980s, 
closer to developing a form of hegemony within highly segregated Catholic 
low income communities (Shirlow, 2006; Tonge, 2006). Republicans had 
completed the foundations of loyalty to them but had no apparent 
conventional political structure to erect. Therefore, the capacity to reform 
social welfare conditions, influence regeneration and housing strategies, and 
ultimately represent the electorate remained missing due to republicanism 
having insignificant influence over state agencies and institutions. The 
Hearts and Minds
5
 strategy undertaken by the British State and the use of 
public funding to support non-republican groups in Catholic communities 
furthered the nature of republican dislocation.  
The capacity and recognition that republicans had established political 
corroboration and that a popular electoral mandate was to be enlarged, 
furthered the identification of prisoners, not merely in the historical sense of 
having suffered but as those who had part-framed and supported the creation 
of a form of republicanism that was increasingly relevant.  The emergence of 
community cohesion between the IRA and the nationalist community came 
during the Hunger Strikes 1980-81 when the death of prisoners was to verify 
the extent of prisoners‟ devotion to the cause. This devotion was translated 
into political support for IRA prisoners, who stood in elections North and 
South of the border, from those strongly opposed to the physical force 
tradition.  
This forging of such a (previously unachievable) alliance indicated that 
the mobilisation of shared nationalist suffering created political dividends 
that violence could not fashion. In the longer term republican prisoners 
enjoyed a status linked not only to their incarceration but also as part of a 
broader movement that gained major concessions from the British state. The 
emotional power and resonance of these sub-groups (prisoners, advice 
workers, elected representatives, community workers) within republicanism 
was based upon their contribution both in the past and in the present 
regarding wider political mobilisation.  
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The military-political containment of paramilitaries from the late 1970s 
also increased the pressure on the movement to “thicken and re-direct the 
battlefield”. Near continual successes in elections toughened these demands 
and pointed towards new possibilities in community activism and wider 
understandings of politics.  Such a proposition was more compelling to 
prisoners, given that the Sinn Féin was composed of former prisoners. A 
sense of mutual reinforcement was created between the imprisoned and the 
“politicos”. A key component in the role of devotion to the republican 
leadership was the nature and level of trust invested in them. Trust was not 
an imagined concept for the prisoner community but based upon a personal 
and shared experience. Moreover, the unfolding political developments of 
the 1990s and the Belfast Agreement, in particular, created international 
kudos for the republican movement. The release of prisoners also provided 
state recognition that the imprisoned were effectively political in their 
orientation. The issue of trust was thus fulfilled and republican former 
prisoners could locate political positives in the contribution that they had 
made.  
 
Republicanism‟s „Coming of Age‟ 
 
For republican respondents developing ideas became a conscientious 
by-product of years of study and analysis within which the key emphasis was 
placed upon how “struggle” encompassed various forms of inequality 
beyond that which had emerged from British colonialism and the enactment 
of unionist hegemony. Resistance in a post-conflict situation was understood 
as being undertaken through multi-faceted and non-violent mediums. In 
particular, inequality and oppression in whatever form were to be challenged 
through the agenda of equality building, which ultimately was somewhat of a 
distance from the use of armed conflict to end the “colonial” domination that 
“caused” social inequity (McGovern, 2000). Republicans appeared heavily 
devoted to the idea that they were emerging unbroken and that the 
experience of prison is one of ensuring that “attempts by our captors to 
criminalise us and our struggle” had failed (Mac Giolla Ghunna, 1997, p. 2). 
Republican prisoners espoused a mixture of pride in their resistance 
whilst recognising that their struggle had raised consciousness within the 
republican movement and facilitated a more sophisticated capacity to critique 
societal shifts. Articles and summaries of imprisonment, undertaken by 
former prisoners, consciously presents struggle as having being forged 
within a comparative international frame that included the historical tenets of 
Gramsci and the art of meaningful intellectual analysis and action as 
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articulated, for example, by the Palestinian academic Edward Said and the 
executed Nigerian environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa. The role of these 
international thinkers was linked to the identification of an internal 
republican intellectualism that had included “among their ranks a high 
proportion of writers, poets, musicians and artists, many of whom endured 
imprisonment and used those years to further their cultural activities” (Mac 
Giolla Ghunna, 1997, p. 3-4). The self-presentation of an articulate 
movement was one of political repositioning and the coming of age of 
contemporary republicanism. 
Republican ideological faith was to remain centred upon the 
achievement of a united Ireland. But the use of new vocabularies of 
inclusion, a less hostile and atavistic attitude towards the British state (who 
were, identified as persuaders for a united Ireland)
6
 and the notion that there 
were a range of mediums through which to achieve political power meant 
that the goal of unification was being articulated via new tactics.  So much so 
that ten years after the Belfast Agreement Gerry Adams, President of Sinn 
Féin, was able to claim at the special Ard Fheis on Policing (28
th
 January, 
2007), that the role played by those who purchased An Phoblacht (a 
republican weekly newspaper) had been as important as those who had 
“picked up the gun”. Adams (2007, p. 1) during the same speech stated that: 
Republicanism should never be about elitism or dogma or 
militarism. Republicanism always has to be about citizenship 
and people's rights and equality. We are about making 
republicanism relevant to people in their daily lives.  
 
Working with the “Other” 
 
The shared journey upon which so many republican prisoners and Sinn 
Féin representatives could map their lives also meant that there was no 
compunction to analyse the reality that they conducting their various affairs 
as partly dictated by the British state and global forces beyond their control. 
In essence the republican movement and the IRA in particular maintained a 
disciplined leadership that could rationalise a re-positioning of activism. 
Discipline and the capacity of former prisoners to locate a community that 
recognised their “sacrifices” helped to pave the way for a smooth transition 
of republican practice. This transition was furthered by many republican 
former prisoners undertaking community-based employment within which 
the struggle, through civic as distinct from militaristic strategies, could be 
undertaken and in so doing maintain community status and republican 
congruity.  
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There is an important difference in that republican involvement in 
community work post-1998 not only strengthened republican activism, but 
also created a more seamless transition into civic society and thus removed a 
political vacuum that may have caused indifference to peace building 
initiatives. The more general trend amongst loyalists to return to more 
normal sites of employment did much to undermine the capacity of loyalism 
to cope with the tensions caused by the emergence of a post-ceasefire 
environment. In essence republicans emerged into a Northern Ireland within 
which their electoral fortunes and the influence over republican territory was 
ever-present and within which a narrative of sacrifice placed them within 
their communities with both status and influence. Republican former 
prisoners were now tied into a wider international arena within which their 
political influence was welcomed and partly-accommodated.  
 
Comparing Republican and Loyalist Former Prisoners 
 
There are a series of difference and also some similarities with regard 
to understanding how the micro-history of incarceration affected republicans 
and loyalists. Both sets of prisoners were influenced by internal debates 
although the numbers involved were greater amongst republicans. Each set 
of prisoners largely conformed to their respective leaderships inside and 
outside of jail. Many more republicans understood prison as a site of 
resistance against British and Irish state hegemony, whereas for pro-state 
volunteers such activism was undermined by the dimension of being 
essentially pro-British. One of the more significant differences was that 
many republican prisoners understood that “struggle” would continue in a 
post-imprisonment environment and that the vocabulary and skills needed to 
perpetuate republicanism required knowledge of how to pursue a non-violent 
conflict. In contrast, most loyalists thought of the conflict as having ended 
once they had been released or after the IRA had called a ceasefire, and as a 
result of this their struggle was to be represented by unionist political parties. 
For those who were to uptake a role in conflict transformation the emergence 
from prison had been framed by the experience of debate and dialogue 
within prison and the capacity to locate that knowledge within a landscape of 
post-conflict change.  
In general, republicans retain an overtly hostile attitude towards 
loyalists which was juxtaposed by cordial personal relationships on a host of 
inter-community engagements. IRA respondents, as they did in the 1970s, 
still dismissed loyalism as sectarian, non-progressive, non-socialist, non-
autonomous and criminal. As noted by a respondent “loyalism is misguided, 
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poorly led, self-seeking”.7 Loyalists as the following quote observes remain 
understood as dupes of British state practice: 
The development in loyalism now has more to do with British 
strategy rather than internal development. (Male respondent 4, 
West Belfast) 
Furthermore, loyalism is seen as community centric and ultimately 
reactionary: 
Because they are interested in their community, they are 
interested in basic rights for their people. Their problem is that 
they don‟t really want it for other people and they resent the 
others in society having it. So they‟ll be reactionary whether it 
be to immigrants, blacks … nationalists, republicans. (Male 
respondent 5, West Belfast) 
 
The Reasoning behind Community Activity 
 
Despite this, most former IRA prisoners have determined a shared role 
to play in undermining the return of violence which is tied to their sense of 
status and legitimacy, and a collective belief that the peace process is 
insufficient regarding the capacity to quell sectarian violence, delivers social 
justice and challenging their shared experience of criminalisation. For IRA 
respondents, intra-community activity is understood as a tactic structured 
around persuading those contacted of the rationale of a united Ireland 
whereas Loyalists and Irish National Liberation Army respondents view such 
engagement as developing shared working class experiences and values.  
 Former prisoners have also been involved in creating alternative 
community narratives which link themselves into a post-ceasefire process. 
This has also involved challenging the mythic status of violence and in so 
doing diverting youth attention away from paramilitaries and sectarian 
violence.  From this perspective, former IRA prisoners involved in 
community work and restorative justice programmes seek to reduce tensions 
and/or promote reconciliation. There is a sense of the need to create an 
intersection between agency and structure via the shift from a military to 
negotiator role. 
Quasi-states also exist with regard to the political influence over 
territory. The broad swathes of Northern Ireland that return Sinn Féin 
representatives in places such as West Belfast and East Tyrone are 
effectively micro-states that are centred upon renditions of group loyalty and 
distinctive cultural interpretations of republicanism (Rolston, 1989; Ryan, 
1995). Within such places the plethora of festivals and drama events held, 
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numerous wall murals, a growing community capital, various Irish language 
sites, republican advice centres and former prisoner group offices testifies to 
an overall strategy that has engendered a highly politicised form of spatial 
expansion and cultural cohesion during the conflict. The capacity to create 
and maintain republican solidarity both in terms of influencing place and 
gaining significant political and cultural power lies in this particular 
movement‟s highly centralised leadership structures.  
Such leadership structures, that have fashioned and framed republican 
transition, were heavily influenced by resistance strategies developed within 
the prison environment. The imprisonment of republicans between the early 
1970s and 1998 and the impact of that imprisonment was historically unique 
in that militant republicanism could not be defeated. This contrasts to the 
internment of IRA prisoners during the Second World War and post-civil 
war periods when the forerunner of the present republican movement 
emerged into near political vacuums. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the evidence presented above there has been no abandoning of a 
historical past and in many ways the beliefs regarding the “other” are 
sustained despite the development of inter-group activity. Legitimacy and 
interpretations of the past have not shifted in order to sustain the peace 
process, but instead conflict transformation has been assembled around 
locating shared concerns and promoting the efficacy of ideologies of 
community activism as opposed to violence. Political resistance is now 
articulated around non-violent means and the capacity to shift out of violence 
is based upon discourses of republican loyalty.  
Activism, whether it is militaristic or political/community-based, is not 
interpreted within a temporal frame of past and present, but is understood as 
being influenced by a seamless political philosophy that mobilises strategies 
best suited to the advancement of republican discourse. Disengagement from 
armed struggle has, it is argued, neither altered values nor rejected or 
abandoned key principles, but instead the contemporary variant of 
republicanism is part of a discursive journey that has partly developed out of 
republican historicisation of armed conflict and imprisonment. Moreover, 
armed conflict, it is postulated, delivered the peace process, in that, as far as 
IRA former prisoners are concerned, it undermined British authority, 
provided negotiating strength and the capacity to deliver republican 
discourse via mediums such as community activism and political 
mobilisation.  
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Having been imprisoned provides legitimacy in itself, and this is now 
invoked to provide community-led strategies of transformation. 
Transformation is not about ideological decline or a separation from past 
motivations but instead the promotion of republican ideas within an 
environment they believe was altered by successful military interventions. 
Respondents view violence as the logical response to the denial of their 
respective rights, a situation that places them at odds within unionism in 
particular. Ironically, the use of violence has removed the need for violence 
and the Belfast Agreement, which they view in selective ways according to 
what “their side” had achieved, has created recourse to a modus operandi 
that seeks the same ideological commitments and goals through non-violent 
activity.  Former IRA prisoners continually expressed the idea that violence 
was an option among other developing tactics and techniques and they 
invariably understand violence as being conditioned by the fluidity of 
circumstances.  
The central logic through which republicanism is now practiced is 
centred upon a redefinition of the Easter Rising inspired notion that 
republicans were the embodiment of the Irish state. This long-established 
rendition was evidently insular, as indicated in the past by political 
abstentionism from Dáil Éireann and Stormont (the respective political 
chambers in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland) and via the 
simplistic notion that the removal of the “British” through armed resistance 
was achievable. Republicanism is now far removed from the irredentism of 
an ideology framed in an Irish society that was yet to be influenced by the 
welfare state, partition, the rise of conspicuous consumption, the emergence 
of the Celtic Tiger and the realities of thirty odd years of conflict in Ireland. 
By holding ministerial posts in the Northern Ireland Assembly and through 
political advances in the Republic of Ireland and the capacity to be part of a 
future Irish government Sinn Féin can now present themselves as state 
partners.  
However, this does not mean that working with loyalists and unionists 
is infused with eagerness but instead republicans co-operate as part of the 
process of what they identify as building a united Ireland. Recognition of 
harm caused to undeserving victims is located but such an interpretation is 
either paralleled/secondary to the harm endured to ones own community. 
There is some sense of a need to stretch beyond exclusivist constructions of 
harm and to locate voices beyond political legitimacy. However, such a 
perspective is linked to a sense that violence was justifiable.  In sum, the use 
of violence was not rejected via moral concerns but instead conditioned by a 
sense that it had bolstered negotiating positions, as evidenced by the huge 
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Canary Wharf and Manchester bombings, during the temporary fracture of 
the IRA ceasefire in 1996). The discursive frame which has emerged among 
former IRA prisoners suggests that their legitimacy had been proven as 
opposed to defeated. 
 
Endnotes 
* This paper is based upon funding received from the Leverhulme Trust 
(F/01 582/C). The project was entitled „Abandoning Historical Conflict? 
Former paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland‟. 
 
1
 We here discuss the version of republicanism attached to the Provisional 
IRA and Sinn Féin. 
2
 87 former IRA prisoners were interviewed or took part in focus groups.  
3
 There are obviously dissenting voices located around the Continuity and 
Real IRAs and there political associates. Also there may be dissenting voices 
that have not been public or accounted for, but in general it would appear 
that the majority of former prisoners have kept connections with former 
prisoner groups.  
4
 This quote is not from the project funded by Leverhulme but comes from 
work undertaken by the lead author. 
5
 This mid-1980s strategy was based upon British State funding within 
deprived communities in Northern Ireland. The aim being to fund non-
republican/non-loyalist community groups so as to make them more relevant 
than those operating along the axis of politics and military action.  
6
 Adams made this point in Sinn Féin‟s 1992 policy document, Towards a 
Lasting Peace. It was rejected by Tony Blair who dropped Labour‟s unity by 
consent policy upon becoming party leader and dismissed the prospect of a 
united Ireland „in our lifetimes‟ upon becoming Prime Minister (see Tonge, 
2002).  
7
 Adams in Towards a Lasting Peace (1995 p. 95) argued that “you cannot 
be a socialist and a loyalist”. 
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